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Abstract 
Following the attacks of September 11 2001 in the United States, China proclaimed its own 
‘war on terror’ with the Uyghur of Xinjiang as a frontline. At the same time as ongoing US 
anti-terrorism efforts around the world, the Chinese government deployed repressive 
campaigns in one of its own troubled regions, campaigns which intensified with the riots in 
Urumqi in 2009. A series of high-casualty attacks since 2014 demonstrates further 
exacerbation of the conflict and entailed a strengthening of the counter-terrorism apparatus 
in the following years. Yet several scholars have questioned the nature of the purported 
terrorist threat to China, suggesting that the new narrative around the Uyghur issue was an 
attempt by the regime to preserve its authority and escape international condemnation for 
the severity of its actions. However, although these scholars highlight the party-state’s use 
of the terrorism label for the Xinjiang conflict, there is still a comprehensive analysis missing 
on how the party-state portrays the terrorist threat to its people. 
 
Responding to this research problem, this dissertation presents the first systematic analysis 
Chinese media coverage of domestic ‘terrorist’ attacks. Drawing upon eight cases from 2009 
to 2015, and twelve Chinese newspapers, this analysis focuses on the determinants of 
terrorism coverage and framing patterns through a combination of qualitative content 
analysis and quantitative text analysis. I argue that the Chinese party-state engages through 
various methods of news censorship and coordination to construct a terrorist threat that is 
surprisingly abstract- invoking extremism as the threat, but without referring much to 
particular agents, organisation or religions. Also, I argue that the party-state uses the abstract 
terrorism portrayal to campaign against all ‘three evil forces’ (terrorism, extremism, 
separatism), while also promoting social values that align with the regime’s resilience. The 
dissertation reveals the various frames that make up the party-state’s terrorist threat 
construction. It demonstrates that the party-state uses the Xinjiang conflict to rally the 
Chinese people under the flag of the Chinese Communist Party while also creating the image 
of an archetypical enemy that can be applied to a large range of party-state perceived threats. 
These features of the Chinese news coverage of ‘terrorist’ attacks shed light on the mediated 
reality of the conflict and provide an alternative perspective to US-centred media scholarship 
on terrorism. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Over a long period of time-especially since the 1990s-the ’East Turkistan’ forces inside and 
outside Chinese territory have planned and organised a series of violent incidents in the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region of China and some other countries, including explosions, 
assassinations, arson, poisonings, and assaults, with the objective of founding the so-called state 
of ’East Turkistan’. These terrorist incidents have seriously jeopardized the lives and properties 
of people of all ethnic groups, as well as social stability as a norm in China, and even threatened 
the security and stability of related countries and regions. (Information Office of the State 
Council 2002: 435). 
 
The issue of terrorism in China is often understood as the ‘Xinjiang problem’. For three 
decades, social unrest involving the indigenous Turkic Muslim population, the Uyghur 
people, has rocked the far western Xinjiang region of China. The Chinese party-state1 has 
consistently referred to these uprisings as separatism (࠶㻲), one of the ‘three evil forces’2 – 
understood to be the party-state’s archetypical enemy. The party-state formulated its ‘three 
evil forces’ terminology prior to the September 11 2001 attacks, but the consequent global 
focus on fighting a ‘war on terror’ provided Beijing with a way of justifying increased attacks 
against Uyghur separatism. Four months after George W. Bush began to speak of a global 
‘war on terror’, China claimed to face its own domestic terrorist threat in Xinjiang and by 
doing so reframed its ethnic separatist issue as a terrorism one with links to al-Qaeda 
Tschantret 2018). One of the first official party-state documents that claimed the issue of 
terrorism in China was called ‘East Turkistan terrorist forces cannot get away with impunity’, 
published in January 2002, of which the above direct quotation gives an impression of the 
party-state approach to terrorism. Since then, a cycle of escalated violence and harsh 
repression has made the ‘Xinjiang conflict’, or ‘terrorism’, one of the top national security 
concerns of the party-state (Clarke 2018).  
 
The scholarship concerning the use of the terrorist threat designation in China has 
continuously criticised the party-state for jumping on the bandwagon of the US ‘war on 
terror’, arguing that this was a tactic to make ‘crack downs’3 on separatists internationally 
 
1 Throughout the dissertation, I use the term ‘party-state’ to refer to both the Chinese Communist Party and the 
Chinese state since it is impossible to distinguish between either in contemporary China. For more details, see 
Wright (2016). 
2 The ‘three evil forces’ comprise of terrorism, religious extremism and separatism. Aris (2009) points out that 
the party-state gave terrorism, extremism and separatism broad definitions to enable its signatories wide 
latitude to repress dissidents and unrests alike. 
3 ‘Crack down’: The party-state’s use of suppressive force to respond to large-scale and serious ethno-religious 
unrests. See Li (2019). 
11 
 
permissible and nationally more urgent for the protection of stability. Recent publications 
on China’s terrorist violence highlight further that the party-state authorities use the 
escalation of violence since the last decade as an opportunity to justify the securitisation of 
the Chinese society beyond Xinjiang (Finley 2019; Tredaniel and Lee 2018; Tschantret 2016; 
Xie and Liu 2019). Yet, examination of how the party-state portrayed this terrorist threat has 
remained scarce and analysis has focused on policy documents. Even after ten years of 
escalated violence, no systematic analysis of how the party-state communicated the terrorist 
threat portrayal to the Chinese public has been done.  
 
Aiming to address the gap, I took a political communication perspective by analysing the 
Chinese terrorism news coverage as a party-state construction. Scholarly evidence has 
abundantly shown that news content needs to pass through layers of censoring and editing 
mechanisms (i.e. Barbour and Jones 2013; Brady 2017b), thus the news output that is 
accessible to the Chinese public is a media portrayal of the terrorist threat that was approved 
by the authorities.  My analysis focused on Chinese newspaper data to uncover what factors 
determined the scale of news coverage and what frames defined the terrorism media 
portrayal. I focused on print media for two reasons: First, the newspaper readership in China 
is high and continues to grow (Bandurski 2018; Wang 2017). Second, there is much research 
available that confirms the existence of a sophisticated apparatus of censoring mechanisms 
for newspaper coverage. Therefore, the analysis of newspaper coverage can give insight into 
the Chinese party-state’s construction of terrorism. While social media analysis received 
increasing scholarly attention, the sheer quantity of posts and the lack of understanding on 
how well the state authorities censor the content make it difficult to infer from social media 
content the party-state construction of the terrorist threat. Therefore, in this dissertation, I 
present the first comprehensive examination of how the Chinese print media have portrayed 
the party-state’s terrorist threat. It demonstrates that the Chinese party-state uses terrorism 
news coverage to promote its ideology of stability maintenance while creating an abstract 
terrorist threat to campaign against terrorism, religious extremism and separatism 
simultaneously.  
 
The analysis of Chinese news coverage consisted of three parts: First, I aimed to identify 
what factors determine the extent of terrorism coverage. Since there have been no studies on 
this subject for China yet, I tested how well the ‘traditionally’ strong determinants of 
terrorism coverage in the US-centred literature on the subject apply to China’s censored 
media environment. Second, I analysed how the news media portrayed the terrorist threat by 
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using both qualitative content analysis and quantitative text analysis methods. The former 
involved an inductive open coding process and indicator questions for analysing a sub-
sample of 458 news reports; the latter validated the qualitative findings through analysis of 
the full sample of 2291 news reports and studied frequently occurring terms and their 
relationships. Third, I examined differences in news content across eight ‘terrorist’ attacks 
to conclude on changes in the news portrayal of terrorism over time. Beginning with the 
escalation of violence in July 2009, quantitative topic modelling of the sample and indicator 
question for the sub-sample helped identify prevalent changes in news reporting. Overall, 
the dissertation contributes to the understanding of authoritarian political communication, 
showing what narratives emerge in the terrorist threat construction of the Chinese party-state 
and how this adds to the party-state’s handling of the ethnic conflict in Xinjiang. 
 
This introductory chapter sets out the aims of this thesis and contextualised them within the 
country of study and history-political changes. It begins by discussing research on the 
Xinjiang conflict as an intersection between terrorism framing studies, authoritarian 
resilience, and studies of the Xinjiang conflict to highlight the contributions of this project 
to each. The following sections cover the importance of Xinjiang to China, the course of the 
party-state’s terrorist threat perception, the potential merits of introducing the terrorism 
discourse to the Xinjiang conflict and the role of the media in this context. It finally 
concludes on the main arguments and structure of this dissertation. 
 
Research contributions on terrorism news framing, authoritarian resilience and the 
Xinjiang conflict 
Examining the portrayal of terrorism in Chinese news media is of great significance for 
understanding how the party-state domestically legitimises the fight against the Xinjiang 
separatists through the terrorism designation. As Nacos (2002/2006) and Norris et al. (2003) 
argue in their seminal works on terrorism framing in media, the news media shape public 
opinion of the political leadership as well as the interpretation of terrorist events. Various 
experimental studies in the US and UK confirmed that the news reporting of terrorism can 
increase public fear of it, increase support for restricting civil liberties to combat terrorism 
and foster negative attitudes by the public towards Muslims (Brinson and Stohl 2012; 
Sikorski et al. 2017; Wood 2011). In line with these points, researchers of the party-state’s 
terrorist threat construction argue that ‘threat inflation’ achieves the party-states goal of 
signalling regional instability, which in turn legitimises its hard-line approach in Xinjiang 
and rallies the Chinese people around the flag of the Communist Party regime (Cliff 2012; 
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Kanat 2012). Given that the party-state has been using the terrorism label for Xinjiang for 
two decades, and the impact of media content on public opinion of the Xinjiang conflict, 
there is urgent need for examination into how the Chinese media portray terrorism in the 
censored environment. There is strong evidence of the party-state using media control to 
create narratives (i.e. Luqiu 2018; Roberts 2018b). Research on news coverage is therefore 
a useful source for insight into the party-state’s terrorism threat construction and into what 
news output reaches the public on the Xinjiang conflict. 
 
Examination of the media’s portrayal of terrorism in Xinjiang can also make an important 
contribution to the authoritarian resilience scholarship. Scholars in this area continuously 
show that authoritarian leaders fear the loss of political authority due to widespread political 
resistance (i.e. Geddes 1999; Dukalskis and Gerschweski 2017; Levitsky and Way 2010). 
These scholars commonly picture authoritarian leaders employing various strategies to 
maintain stability, among which the most common ones are repression, coercion, co-optation 
and legitimisation of authority. They tend to agree that an authoritarian regime cannot 
survive by repression or coercion alone. In this line, Bondes and Heep (2012) argue that part 
of the authoritarian leadership’s job is to persuade the public that the status quo is legitimate 
and demands public support. Given that the Xinjiang conflict signals weak party-state 
leadership which risks fanning resistance, the party-state’s response to this threat gives 
insight into how China’s authoritarian leadership confronts the separatism issue and 
persuades the public of its terrorist threat portrayal. Therefore, examining the news portrayal 
of the Xinjiang conflict after it has passed various layers of censorship contributes to the 
authoritarian resilience scholarship by providing insight into how the party-state uses media 
control to persuade the Chinese people that the terrorism construction is legitimate and 
reinforces support for the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. 
 
Yet another contribution of this research lies in its focus on the media’s role in the Xinjiang 
conflict scholarship. Despite a recent surge in publications on the Xinjiang conflict, studies 
remain focused on the party-state led repressive campaigns against the Uyghur people or the 
securitisation of Xinjiang under the guise of counter-terrorism efforts (i.e. Clarke 2008/2018; 
Roberts 2012/2018). With the continuous escalation of violence since the 2009 Urumqi riot, 
these sources highlight extreme repressive and coercive measures used by the party-state to 
achieve regional stability. Leibold (2019) describes the emergence of a surveillance state in 
Xinjiang that engages in monitoring, ethnic sorting and disciplining of its regional 
population in the name of safeguarding all people against terrorism. Smith-Finley (2019) 
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sees these measures as a form of ‘state terror’, drawing particularly on the example of the 
millions of detained Uyghurs and alleged party-state enemies in Xinjiang’s ‘re-education 
camps’ (㙼ъᢰ㜭ᮉ㛢ษ䇝ѝᗳ). Yet, these scholars have not considered the use of media 
control as a party-state strategy to achieve stability in Xinjiang. This research compliments 
the above studies by exploring the news portrayal of terrorism as a party-state construction 
aimed at strengthening legitimacy for its Xinjiang ‘counter-terrorism efforts’. 
 
Xinjiang’s strategic importance to China  
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, literally ‘new frontier’ in Chinese and ‘East 
Turkistan’ to separatists, is located at the Western Chinese border (see Figure 1-1). The 
conquest of the region was completed under the Qing Dynasty in the eighteenth century, yet 
it remained largely beyond the purview of the central authorities until the 1940s (Bovingdon 
2010; Millward 2007). In 1949, when the territory was included in the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC), over 90 per cent of the population were members of the Turkic Muslim group 
called the Uyghurs. Despite gaining autonomy in 1955, China has pursued a policy of forced 
assimilation of the Uyghurs through party-state supported immigration of Han Chinese to 
Xinjiang on the justification of economic development and increased loyalty to Beijing.   The 
latest census data from 2010 illustrates a percentage growth of Han population in Xinjiang 
from 6 per cent in 1953 to 41 per cent of 22 million people in 2010, only slightly lower than 
the 46 per cent of Uyghur population (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2013).  The 
rapid process of industrialisation, assimilation and securitisation in Xinjiang has aggravated 
xenophobia and ethnic inequalities while escalating resentment between the authorities in 
Beijing and the local indigenous populations. 
 
Resolving the social conflict in Xinjiang is strategically significant for the party-state 
because bad governance and social instability would reflect badly on the political leadership 
of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) both nationally and internationally. For instance, the 
continuation of social instability driven by ethnic grievances between Han and Uyghur 
Chinese is in conflict with the CCP’s long-standing promotion of economic growth and 
ethnic solidarity (Klimes 2018). Public unrests in Xinjiang could also fan resistance against 
the CCP rule nation-wide (i.e. Dodge and Keraenen 2018; Hillman and Tuttle 2016). Yet, 
this unrest also provides opportunities for the party-state to bolster authority on the national 
level by clamping down on resistance in Xinjiang. Altogether, for the above reasons, the 
party-state leadership under Hu Jintao (2003-2013) and Xi Jinping (2013 – ongoing) has 
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been keen to forge a ‘partnership of stability’ with indigenous ethnic groups to produce a 
perception of legitimacy among the local communities in Xinjiang. 
 
 Figure 1-1: Xinjiang in contemporary China 
 
Source: Wars in the world 2014.  
 
Xinjiang also holds significant strategic importance for the party-state economically. It is the 
most important energy base in China, ranking second in accessible coal supply and first in 
the production of natural gas. It is a major industrial base for cotton, livestock and nonferrous 
metals (Hao and Liu 2012; Tanner and Bellacqua 2016). The region also serves as a major 
transit hub for Russia and Central Asian oil and gas. As one of the largest global importers 
of oil, China relies on two major sources of oil production: Central Asia, with its 
geographical links to Xinjiang; and the Middle East, with cultural links to the Muslim 
community in Xinjiang. Xinjiang has become a bridge head for China’s open-up policy in 
Central Asia because it shares borders with Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Pakistan, Russia and Afghanistan. Two-thirds of the trade between China and Central Asia 
takes place in Xinjiang. As Hayes (2019) covers in detail, Xinjiang plays a major role in 
President Xi Jinping’s ‘big power diplomacy’ and ‘neighbourhood diplomacy.’ The region 
is home to many projects under the Belt and Road Initiative that will eventually link Beijing 
to over 70 countries around the world. Considering Xinjiang’s strategic geological position 
at the border to various Central Asian states, social instability in the region is a serious threat 
to the Xi and CCP authority in China. 
 
China’s evolving terrorism problem 
Studies on the Xinjiang conflict identify two turning points since 2000: First, after 
September 11, there was a shift in the party-state assessment of the threat from Uyghur 
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separatism to Uyghur terrorism (i.e. Barbour and Jones 2013; Cunningham 2012; Wayne 
2007). Second, after the Urumqi riot in 2009, a vicious cycle of escalating violence in the 
form of local uprisings and party-state-led counter operations intensified (i.e. Tredaniel and 
Lee 2018; Tschantret 2016; Xie and Liu 2019). A potential third turning point may be 
identified with the further escalation of violence since 2013. In addition to attacks in 
Xinjiang’s cities Bachu (April 2013), Lukqun (June 2013), and Urumqi (May 2014), 
separatist attacks on Tiananmen Square (October 2013) and on the Kunming train station 
(March 2014) carried the conflict out of Xinjiang and had a national-scale impact (Klimes 
2018). In the aftermath of these attacks, Xinjiang’s party secretary Zhang Chunxian (ᕐ᱕䍔), 
previously viewed as a moderate, published an article in the People’s Daily declaring a 
‘people’s war on terror and for social stability’, in which terrorists should be ‘chased down 
the streets like rats’ (Zhang 2014).  
 
Before September 11, the Chinese party-state assessed the violent unrests in Xinjiang not as 
terrorism but as separatist activities (or ‘splittism’ ࠶㻲; Clarke 2008/2018; Mackerras 2001; 
Millward 2007; Hierman 2007). With the collapse of communist regimes in Europe and the 
Soviet Union, public unrest in Xinjiang against the CCP rule intensified in the 1990s. The 
most well-known examples are the Baren incident in 1990 and the Yining incident in 1997, 
in which protesters called for independence and attacked Han Chinese. Meanwhile, as 
Pokalova (2013) and Roberts (2018) described in detail, the party-state launched systematic 
crackdowns on protest activities, strengthened the security presence of military and police 
forces, and increased scrutiny of religious and educational activities. National Minority 
Policies forced the assimilation of ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and stressed the importance 
of ‘unity and cooperation among the various ethnic groups’ (Tredaniel and Lee 2018: 179). 
Xinjiang Party Secretary Wang Lequan (⦻Ҁ⋹) declared that terrorism was not a problem 
in Xinjiang, interpreting the events as perpetrated by Muslim separatists and stating that the 
‘society [was] stable and people [were] living and working in peace and contentment’ 
(Pokalova 2013: 288). 
 
Shortly after September 11, the party-state re-defined the public unrests in Xinjiang as 
evidence that China was facing its own terrorist threat. In November 2001, the party-state 
prepared the document “‘Eastern Turkistan’ Organizations and their ties with Osama bin 
Laden and the Taliban’” for United Nations Security Council meetings in which Beijing 
claimed the previously unknown East Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM) was a 
major actor in Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network (Roberts 2018). In this paper, and 
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various shortly following ‘white papers’ and PRC public announcements, the party-state 
elaborated on the threat of ETIM and generally East Turkistan forces as imminent threats to 
the security of China and the world. Given the timing of the release of these official 
documents, many experts of the Xinjiang conflict viewed them as attempts by the party-state 
to link its struggle with Uyghur unrests to the US global ‘war on terror’ (Clarke 2018; 
Pokalova 2013; Tanner and Belacqua 2016; Tredaniel and Lee 2018; Tschantret 2018). 
Despite the party-state’s reassessment of the Xinjiang conflict, the beginning of the 
millennium was relatively tranquil in the region. 
 
July 2009 marked the second turning point in the Xinjiang conflict and the start of the still 
ongoing episode of major violence in Xinjiang. In July 2009, fighting broke out in Xinjiang’s 
capital city, Urumqi, following reports of an alleged sexual assault on a female Han worker 
by Uyghur co-workers at the Xuri toy factory (Klimes 2018). The unrest that followed for 
several days claimed the lives of at least 197 people according to party-state sources and left 
over 1500 people injured (Roberts 2018, Klimes 2018). Beijing blamed the exiled pro-
independence Uyghur leader Rebiya Kadeer for inciting the riots, describing the events as 
premeditated by the three ‘evil forces’ of terrorism, separatism and extremism at home and 
abroad (Barbour and Jones 2013). The authorities responded to the unrest with a curfew, 
blocking internet access and disabling mobile phone messaging. Massive crackdowns 
followed, including checkpoints around Urumqi, interrogations and detentions of over 700 
people (Cliff 2012). Since then, party-state authorities have constructed a multi-layered 
network of mass surveillance in Xinjiang involving monitoring, categorisation, exhortation 
and disciplining of its population in the name of what Xi Jinping dubbed his strategy for 
achieving ‘social stability and enduring peace’ (䠽ḙ䤲⪙⎋摾㮺ᵄ⪈) in this region 
(Leibold 2019). In 2014, the Second Central Xinjiang Work Forum explained these changes 
towards mass surveillance as Xinjiang being under ‘new circumstances’ (ᯠᖒ࣯) with the Xi 
Jinping administration; the terrorist threat portrayal remained a centrepiece in this operation 
as an imminent threat that required a resolute party-state response. 
 
The merit of appropriating the ‘war on terror’ lexicon 
Many scholars of the Xinjiang conflict have followed the party-state in using the terrorism 
designation particularly after 2009 (i.e. Clarke 2012/ 2019; Roberts 2018; Tschantret 2016) 
while a few others refer to separatist activities as insurgencies (Homolar 2019; Odgaard and 
Nielsen 2014; Wayne 2007). This is not surprising given that the Xinjiang conflict involves 
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a wide range of violent and non-violent activities, such as protests, riots, assassinations, 
explosions and knife attacks. A brief discussion of prominent designations shall cover this 
debate before moving into the advantages for the Chinese party-state of using the terrorism 
label.   
 
Insurgency refers to the struggle between a non-ruling group and a ruling authority, where 
the former uses a combination of violent and non-violent means to challenge governmental 
power and legitimacy, while striving to obtain or maintain control over a particular area and 
seek high levels of public support (Boot 2013; O’Neill 2005). Terrorism is usually referred 
to as one of the tactics of insurgency, together with political mobilisation and warfare 
(O’Neill 2005; Metz 2012). Prominent terrorism studies expert Bruce Hoffman has 
summarised terrorism’s four core elements: terrorism is (i) perpetrated by sub-national 
groups or non-state entities, (ii) political in aims and motivation, (iii) violent (or threatens 
violence), (iv) designed to have psychological impact beyond immediate victims/ targets. 
Numerous observers align themselves with Hoffmann (2006) and specify terrorism as 
premeditated, politically motivated form of violence by small groups aimed at instilling fear 
in the target population and aimed at winning publicity by targeting unarmed civilians and 
political actors alike (Byman 2007; Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens 2006; Khalil 2013; 
Norris et al. 2003; Tuman 2010). The majority of definitions emphasise a link between 
violence, political motives, and ‘innocent’ victims. China established an official definition 
of terrorism in October 2011 that was revised for China’s first counter-terrorism law in 2015, 
where it was defined in Article Three as:  
 
Any advocacy or activity that, by means of violence, sabotage, or threat aims to create social panic, 
undermine public safety, infringe on personal and property rights, or coerce a state organ or an 
international organization, in order to achieve political, ideological, or other objectives (Zhou 2019: 83).  
 
Western scholars agree that the Chinese party-state’s designation of the Xinjiang conflict 
remains highly abstract and does not meet the legal definition of terrorism used in Western 
democracies (Bovingdon 2010; Millward 2007; Roberts 2012). Non-academic institutions 
such as the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) and Radio Free Asia 
(RFA) regularly raise questions about the party-state’s interpretation of the Xinjiang conflict 
as terrorism. The ambiguity of the terrorism definition makes it difficult for observers to 
determine the nature and magnitude of China’s terrorism problem.  In this regard, Clarke 
(2008) makes an important addition to China’s terrorism definition by emphasizing the part-
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state’s ability to establish an almost one-way trajectory of culpability for political violence. 
Clarke (2008: 281) argues that terrorism is perpetrated both in China and globally ‘against 
the legitimate political community of the state by a small group of malcontents’, therefore 
legitimising the elimination of this biological threat to China’s orderly society. Pokalova 
(2013) notes that tight media control further limited the available information on these forces 
to the few official Beijing sources which made ETIM the face of the party-state’s terrorist 
threat construction and enabled the party-state to define the domestic discourse on the 
Xinjiang conflict. 
 
Studies of Xinjiang terrorism portray three main strategic benefits for the party-state in 
applying the terrorism designation to the Xinjiang conflict: legitimised securitisation to 
counter the threat, deployment of an expansive definition of ‘terrorism’, and strengthening 
international security cooperation (Clarke 2018). The most common argument is that 
domestically the terrorism designation permitted China a wide range of measures to counter 
Xinjiang unrest successfully by creating a discourse that antagonises both ethnicities to the 
point where the Han Chinese not only are induced to accept the threat construction but also 
proactively demand punitive actions against the Uyghurs (Tredaniel and Lee 2018). 
Commonly cited examples for these measures are the emerging surveillance state, repressive 
campaigns against Islamic teachings, security crackdowns and the expansion of counter-
terrorism legislation and forces. Designating something as a security threat warrants taking 
action against it, and therefore is a way for the state to legitimise the use of ‘emergency’ or 
‘extraordinary’ measures in order to preserve the social order (Tredaniel and Lee 2018). Cliff 
(2012) argues that the Chinese party-state needs instability in order to justify its hard-line 
policies in the region, this also fits with Kanat’s (2012) argument that the war on terror can 
be used as a diversionary strategy in order to ‘deflect public attention from recurring 
domestic troubles, to solve the problem of legitimacy and to rally their citizens around the 
flag of their regime’ (Tredaniel and Lee 2018: 186). Researchers of other authoritarian 
regimes made similar observations of political leadership using the terrorism label for ethnic 
separatist movements, including Russia’s Chechnya conflict and Turkey’s conflict with the 
Kurds (Bilgin and Sarihan 2013; Dershowitz 2002; Goodin 2006; Pokalova 2013). 
 
Meanwhile, the Chinese party-state has a powerful tool in the form of media control at their 
disposal to reinforce the terrorist threat construction among the Chinese public. The media 
draws public attention to certain aspects of an issue and constructs a ‘pseudo-reality’ by 
selecting and omitting information for reporting (Baudrillard 1994; Boydstun 2013; 
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Luhmann 2000). The CCP takes advantage of this feature by exerting control over news 
reporting. Scholars have long pointed to media control as one tool used by authoritarian 
leaders to maintain resilience of the regime structure by shaping public attention on the 
legitimacy of those in power as well as any threats to named authority. Such strategies, as 
King et al. (2013) summarises, involve both censorship (the limiting or omitting of 
information) and news coordination (the promotion of information). For example, Barbour 
and Jones (2013) found the Chinese news after the Urumqi riot in 2009 to frame the events 
as terrorist acts, justifying the violent crackdowns and ethnic repression in the name of 
protecting the Chinese citizens from the perceived threat of the other. Chen (2012) agrees 
with Barbour and Jones’ observation, showing how party-state officials in the Chinese news 
define the riot as ‘an evil killing, fire setting and looting’, ideas that were repeated in all 
party-state communication materials. In short, due to media control, China’s political 
leadership has a powerful tool at their disposal with the potential to shape public discourse 
in favour of the party-state’s threat interpretation.  
 
Reinforcing the terrorist threat construction provides a platform to confront future challenges 
to power while also promoting more nationalist attitudes among the public. This is evident 
in Beijing’s increasing tendency to label not only dissenting Uyghurs but also Tibetans, 
Falun Gong members or the current Hong Kong protesters as ‘terrorists’. Hastings (2011) 
reaches the same conclusion in his analysis of the course of Uyghur unrests in Xinjiang; he 
argues that the abstraction of the term terrorism and media control enable the party-state to 
apply the ‘enemy of the state’ label to a wide range of party-state threats. Moreover, recent 
research by Hou and Quek (2015) into the effects of terror attacks on public attitudes in 
China shows that citizens become significantly more nationalistic and supportive of policies 
that compromise civil liberty for the fight against terrorism. Portraying the Uyghur unrest as 
externally instigated, with links to al-Qaeda, further allowed the party-state to align itself 
with the US as a country that also suffered from ‘terrorism’ and to silence international 
voices on repression (Hastings 2011). It further permeated China’s relations with Central 
Asian countries through transnational cooperation in the fight against the three evils, such 
as in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) processes (Clarke 2018; Fredholm 
2013). 
 
In sum, the above discussion shows the party-state introduction of the terrorism discourse as 
a result of coinciding circumstances, namely the escalation of Uyghur dissent at the end of 
the 90s, the growing awareness of the strategic importance of Xinjiang with the opening up 
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policies, and the opportunity post-9/11 to align itself with the US in a war on terror. In this 
line, researchers showed the growing use of the global war on terrorism frame as a new 
political tool to legitimise tighter public controls and excessive repression. The terrorism 
label with its unclear definition and great legitimising power has become an important frame 
in contemporary Chinese politics and thus requires analysis. The scholarship on China’s 
threat construction presents various strategic benefits to the terrorism designation, yet 
examination of the content of the party-state discourse on China’s ‘terrorism’ is scarce. 
  
Research questions and methodology 
While scholars confirmed the party-state’s use of the terrorism label and the securitisation 
of Xinjiang, there is little analysis of how the Chinese news media report the ‘terrorism’ 
issue. The previous pages already show the importance of studying the latter by referring to 
media control as a tool in the party-state’s repertoire. Using media control can influence the 
regional, national and international perception of the Xinjiang conflict and how the Chinese 
authorities respond to it. I studied the news coverage from two perspective: the number of 
press reports that cover the terrorist event (discussed in Chapter 4) and the news content 
itself (discussed in Chapter 5 and 6). As the literature review demonstrates, the available 
terrorism media research only published on the former or the latter. Separately from each 
other, both strands of research suggest that it is not just frames that can reinforce and 
influence perceptions of an event but also the extent of news coverage has such power. 
However, so far, there is a lack of considering combining both perspectives for a more 
holistic understanding of news coverage. Also, there is a strong focus on ‘Western’ 
democracies, this subject lacks attention for China. Aiming to provide a systematic 
understanding of the terrorism news portrayal in China, I examined both aspects of the media 
coverage.  
 
Using both qualitative and quantitative methods, I present findings what determines the scale 
of news coverage and what frames define the news portrayal of Chinese domestic ‘terrorism. 
The findings mainly derive from twelve Chinese newspapers and eight cases of ‘terrorist’ 
attacks that took place between 2009 and 2015. By answering the research questions below, 
this research study aims to present a first understanding of the Chinese news media’s 
portrayal of terrorism and thus contributes new knowledge on terrorism coverage in a 
censored media environment that contrasts with the US-centred terrorism-media scholarship. 
The research was guided by three questions:  
 
22 
 
v To what extent can traditional predictors of (US-centred) terrorism coverage explain the 
amount of Chinese news attention for Chinese terrorist attacks?  
v What are the prevalent frames in Chinese newspaper reports on the domestic terrorism?  
v How did the prevalent frames change from 2009 to 2015?  
 
The first research question derived from a strand in the terrorism news coverage research 
that examines the question of what determines the amount of news coverage terrorist attacks 
receive (i.e. Chermak and Gruenewald 2006, Kearns 2019). This literature is focused on 
pluralist media environments such as the US, and my research demonstrates the moderate 
explanatory power of these ‘Western’ determinants for China’s censored media environment. 
The first analysis chapter, Chapter 4, turns the reader’s attention towards a discussion of how 
well the traditional ‘Western’ determinants can explain the scale of Chinese terrorism 
coverage. The importance of this contribution lies in the absence of any such study for 
Chinese terrorism coverage, rooted in the for decades ongoing scholarly call to test the 
‘Western’-focused media theories for other countries and political systems (see Chapter 2). 
While such studies on terrorism mainly exist for the US media environment (i.e. Kearns et 
al. 2019, for an extensive literature discussion see Chapter 4), this will be the first time to 
compare the case of China with its censored media system to the pluralist media environment 
of the US. The argument that has driven this pursuit was as simple one, as China researchers 
on other news items evidence, what explains the amount of media attention in pluralist 
environments might not hold true for censored media environments. I tested determinants 
that are ‘traditionally’ strong in Western terrorism coverage – these are the proximity of the 
news organisation to the attacks, the number of deaths, target types and tactic types. I further 
added variables that reflect China’s censored media environment, which involved testing 
differences in the amount of news coverage between party-controlled and commercial media. 
The analysis involves negative binomial regression analysis under consideration of leaked 
censorship instructions from China Digital Times (2019). 
 
The second research question targets an understanding of China’s terrorism news 
construction, aiming to identify prevalent news frames in the news coverage and discuss 
these in Chapter 5. This analysis began by open coding a representative sample of the 
collected news data in order to inductively explore prevalent news frames. This also led to 
the formulation of indicator questions to gain empirical evidence for the framing 
observations. The inductive approach was necessary to minimise research bias that would 
come from testing what is known in the US-centred terrorism media scholarship. The 
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inductive research findings provide an independent analysis for China that can be put in 
contrast to the US frames as well as identify any frames that are unique to China that would 
otherwise not be found. While this qualitative approach is supported by a second coder to 
ensure intercoder reliability, quantitative text analysis provides validation for the coding 
observations and additional insight into news frames based on frequency and correlation 
analysis of the news content. 
 
For the analysis of the third research question, the dataset is distinguished by each of the 
eight cases under study, covering a time period from 2009 to 2015. Based on the above-
mentioned indicator questions as well as quantitative topic modelling, the analysis provides 
first insight into prevalent changes in news frames over time. 
 
Overall, similarities between the Chinese and US terrorism framing suggest the Chinese 
news media has appropriated the US ‘war on terror’ lexicon in constructing an evil, abstract 
enemy other. However, the Chinese media define the terrorist threat differently through the 
‘three evil forces’ terminology instead of the perpetrator’s Muslim identity. The Chinese 
media do not mention a ‘war on terror’ as was the case in US terrorism coverage. Chinese 
news media further add their unique ‘twist’ to terrorism coverage with a strong news focus 
on the social values of economic growth, national unity, ethnic solidarity and the rule of law. 
This signals that the party-state uses terrorism coverage as an opportunity for the party-state 
to promote its CCP ideology of stability maintenance while delegitimising any opposition 
as threatening said stability. These findings evidence differences in the terrorism coverage 
between the US and China, and, in particular, highlight the party-state ideology around the 
above-mentioned social values as distinctive features characteristic for China in addition to 
frames related to terrorism specifically. 
 
Thesis structure 
The rest of the thesis is divided into six parts. Chapter two is a literature review of the key 
bodies of scholarship that form the theoretical foundation of this thesis and its research 
questions. Specifically, it engages with literature on authoritarian resilience and the role of 
the media, the threat perception on Xinjiang, and terrorism news framing. Chapter three 
explains the methodological approach and methods used to investigate the research questions 
of this thesis. In particular, it explains the multiple case study research design and mixed 
method approach. It also explains the data collection process. Due to the combination of 
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various quantitative and qualitative methods, brief methodology sections in chapters four 
and five provide analysis specific details. 
 
Chapter four answers the first research question by presenting test findings on the 
determinants of the extent of Chinese terrorism coverage. An additional section on the 
methodology in this chapter will cover both the quantitative research process as well as the 
origin of the variables under study. Chapter five addresses the second research question by 
explaining prevalent frames in China’s terrorism news construction. The additional 
methodology section will provide details on the text mining approach in R as well as explain 
the qualitative content analysis approach. Chapter six continues the news content analysis 
with an exploration of changes in prevalent frames from 2009 to 2015. Chapter seven will 
draw on all previous discussions to present the main arguments of the thesis and situate the 
analytical and empirical contributions in the academic literature. It will further identify 
limitations of this study and suggests next areas for study. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
This chapter highlights three gaps in the academic literature on Chinese politics and media 
studies that have inspired this project’s aim and approach. First, an empirical gap exists that 
connects the authoritarian resilience debate to the theory of framing. Second, the absence of 
systematic, empirically grounded analysis of terrorism framing in the Chinese print media 
presents an analytical gap in the scholarship on terrorism in the media. Third, the scant 
consideration of the media’s role in the party-state’s terrorist threat construction and 
Xinjiang operations constitute a ‘media gap’ in the literature on the Xinjiang conflict. The 
literature review is organised so as to demonstrate these three gaps. Three sections each start 
by setting out on the existing scholarly knowledge on the subject before moving to show the 
gap this thesis is filling. At the end of the chapter, a short section ties the previous discussions 
together by situating the research questions of this dissertation in the academic debates as 
well as briefly reviewing anticipated findings. I discuss the literature on the determinants of 
scale of news coverage separately in Chapter 4 since this approach allows to closely tie the 
research design section back to the hypotheses that I analysed. 
 
 
The first section covers research that is thematically closest to this project’s topic. It begins 
with a review of two studies that discussed the media’s portrayal of terrorism in China, 
before turning for more insight on the subject to the well-researched terrorism media 
scholarship that focuses on pluralist media environments such as the US and UK. The 
subsequent debate on ‘de-Westernising’ media theory draws attention to the danger of 
applying theories derived from the analysis of ‘Western’ countries to China with its censored 
media environment, therefore opening up the argument that the absence of a systematic 
analysis of Chinese news framing of terrorism constitutes an analytical gap in the terrorism 
media scholarship.  
 
The second section reviews more broadly the Xinjiang conflict literature to review what is 
known on the party-state’s construction of the terrorist threat and its counter-terrorist 
operations in Xinjiang. This section provides insight into the terrorist threat as a party-state 
construction as well as demonstrating the various strategies the party-state employs to 
achieve stability in Xinjiang. The section uncovers these party-state strategies and highlights 
the little consideration given to the media’s role among these strategies. A media gap exists 
in the scholarship of the Xinjiang conflict.  
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The third section presents the conceptual framework in which this project was grounded in, 
that is establishing the connection between framing theory and the scholarly debate on 
authoritarian resilience strategies. Both areas received ample academic recognition 
separately from each other, yet it was just recently that scholars were able to establish the 
link between the two conceptually by showing how framing can be a persuasion tool for 
authoritarian leaders to legitimate their rule. There is scant empirical research that illustrates 
this connection so far, however, the section will show that this project’s topic is well suited 
to evidence this connection.  
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Connecting framing theory to the authoritarian resilience scholarship 
This research project is grounded in the debate on authoritarian resilience, a subject that is 
concerned with the durability of authoritarian regimes. While scholars discuss various 
resilience strategies, legitimacy re-surfaced over the last decade as important tool to 
authoritarian leaders after it became clear that the use of violence, or threat of it, would fan 
resistance but not regime durability. Accordingly, legitimation, so the claim to political 
power, is a tool to reproduce the people’s belief in the elites’ leadership qualities and their 
determination to serve the common interest. In this sense, as Bondes and Heep (2013) 
explain, claims to legitimacy are attempts of persuading the public of the righteousness of 
the status quo.  
 
While the importance of persuasion to a regime’s legitimacy has been widely acknowledged, 
it was Bondes and Heep (2012) who explained the relationship between legitimacy and 
persuasion by introducing the framing perspective from the political communication 
scholarship to the debate. Accordingly, frames are simplifying, prioritising and structuring 
the narrative flow of events, they act as attempts of persuasion since they guide the 
interpretation of events. For example, they applied this conceptual framework to the study 
of official frames on the CCP leadership in party-state documents. They found that trust in 
the leadership’s qualifications, prioritisation of the people’s wellbeing, and the emphasis on 
stability are frames that persuade the Chinese people of the legitimate leadership of the CCP 
in China. The following sections demonstrate that each component -legitimacy, persuasion 
and framing- are well studied by scholars on their own, yet Bondes and Heep (2012) 
provided the conceptual framework for this research project on terrorism coverage by 
connecting the three concepts.  
 
Resilient authoritarian regimes strive for legitimacy 
The durability of the CCP’s regime has become a central study focus in the debate on 
authoritarian resilience, 4  driven by consensus that authoritarian rule appears inherently 
fragile due to weak legitimacy, over-reliance on coercion, over-centralisation of decision 
making, and the predominance of personal power over institutional norms. This is why 
Geddes (1999) claimed that authoritarian rule usually has a short life expectancy. Since the 
 
4 Scholars have dedicated their attention to the subject under various names, such as authoritarian persistence 
(Bader 2015; He 2014), responsive authoritarianism (Weller 2008; Reilly 2012; Stockmann 2013), and 
competitive authoritarianism (Howard 2006; Levitsky and Way 2002) yet continue the notion of a regime that 
appears table in maintaining authoritarian rule.  
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millennium, after two decades of scholarship concentrated on explaining the trajectories of 
democratisation, the field of authoritarianism studies underwent a renaissance motivated by 
the democratic backsliding and the persistence of authoritarian regimes in different parts of 
the world (Art 2012; Burnell 2006; Levitsky and Way 2002). In a recent review, Pepinsky 
(2014) argued that this resurgence in research on authoritarianism was characterised by an 
‘institutionalist turn’. 
 
This new wave of research concentrated on explaining durability, persistence, and stability 
through a focus on the delicate balance between intra-elite cohesion on the one hand and the 
usage of coercion on the other hand. Institutions like parties, parliaments, courts, and 
elections were discussed mainly insofar as they provide the autocratic regime with 
opportunities for co-optation and repression (Brownlee 2007; Dukalskis and Gerschweski 
2017; Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2012). State repression has become renowned as standard 
instrument in authoritarian rule to uphold and extend political and social control, civil rights 
are routinely circumscribed, potential opposition intimidated, the population disciplined at 
large, and coercive measures applied (Levitsky and Way 2010; Bellin 2005; Rorbaek et al. 
2014). Coercion is a subset of repressive practises that involves violence or the threat of 
violence, while state repression refers to government behaviour that brings political 
quiescence and facilitates regime durability through some form of restriction or violation of 
political and civil liberties (Davenport 2000). Considering that repression may spark 
collective action, various scholars explain its strength in ‘demonstrated capacity’ by making 
threats highly credible and predictable (Belin 2008; Byman 2016; Moller and Skaaning 2013; 
Pei 2012), while also studying elite co-optation as an additional authoritarian resilience tool. 
Co-optation, so the strategy of preserving loyalty of the regime elite by giving them enough 
stake at the status quo, has become further object of studies with the capacity to widening 
the regime’s power base through controlled inclusiveness (Blaydes 2011; Gandhi 2008; 
Shkel and Gareev 2015). 
 
In line with the above, in 2003, US scholar Andrew Nathan (2003) argued that China’s 
durability is rooted not in autocratic force but a system that is responsive to societal demands. 
Shambaugh (2008) argues that the collapse of the USSR taught the CCP valuable lessons, 
leading it to adopt new policies to illustrate its responsiveness to public issues. Economic 
policies suffer less frequently from ideology, resulting in many large party-state enterprises 
to be removed from party-state ownership or placed under joint ownership with private 
businesses. The mix of authoritarianism with market economy co-opted the people in favour 
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of the CCP leadership with more entertainment and improved living standards (Barma and 
Rather 2006; Hong 2011) and greater freedom in criticising party-state activities (Edney 
2012; King et al. 2013). Meanwhile, scholars of the Xinjiang conflict show the party-state 
to employ a ‘carrot and stick’ method of heavy economic investments and heavy 
securitisation of the region. While scholars, such as Tredaniel and Lee (2018), argue that the 
securitisation and repression created fertile conditions for the escalation of violence since 
2009, many did not consider the legitimation strategies as another party-state tool to win 
over public support for stability in Xinjiang and the rest of China. 
 
Only recently did legitimation enter the authoritarian resilience debate as a third ‘pillar’ for 
sustaining authoritarian rule, driven by the common notion that no regime can survive 
without public support and repression can prove destabilising (Geddes 1999; Kailitz 2013; 
Schatz and Maltseva 2012). Case-based research has pioneered this new strand, most 
prominently for the cases of China and Russia (Dukalskis and Gerschweski 2017). These 
studies construct legitimacy from public opinion, defining the term as ‘capacity of a political 
system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most 
appropriate or proper ones for the society’ (Lipset: 1959: p. 86). Soest and Grauvogel (2017), 
based on review of prior studies, identified six main legitimisation strategies in authoritarian 
regimes, which are: foundational myth, ideology, personalism, procedure, performance, 
international engagement. Respectively, the first mechanism stress historical roots of the 
regime (i.e. liberation struggle), ideology-based legitimacy claims involve frames on the 
righteousness of the given political order, while some authoritarian regimes focus on the 
person of the ruler to boost their appeal to the population. Procedural legitimacy is 
commonly grounded in carrying out elections, performance emphasises the success in 
satisfying the citizen’s needs, and international engagement to bolster domestic legitimation. 
 
In China studies, the legitimacy debate evolves commonly around the ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ party-
state resilience strategies. For over two decades, economic growth has been studied as key 
‘soft’ strategy of the CCP to assert its authority through performance (Dukalski; Laliberté 
and Lanteigne 2008; Perry 2008; Sandby-Thomas 2015; Zhao 2009). Barma and Rather 
(2006) speak of the emergence of ‘illiberal capitalism’, referring to the mix of 
authoritarianism with market economy in the context of an increasing integration of China 
into the world economy. However, critical voices, such as Zeng (2014) and Tsai and Dean 
(2013) warn that legitimacy based on economic growth is insecure because of the market 
economy’s cyclical nature. Propaganda is yet another legitimation strategy to increase 
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collective consciousness and increase loyalty to the authoritarian leadership (Brady). Edel 
and Josua (2018) further show that even repression requires legitimation. Dukalskis 
investigates popular protests in China in 1989, Myanmar in 2007, and Iran in 2009– 2010, 
and finds that protesters were blamed as criminals for inciting disorder and for being 
manipulated by foreigners and ‘not committed to the regime’s vision of legitimacy’ (Edel 
and Josua 2018: 884). In sum, legitimacy and legitimisation are now well recognised among 
scholars as an important subject of study in understanding the resilience of authoritarian 
regimes. Dukalski and Gerschweski (2017) go one step further in stressing that the question 
is no longer whether authoritarian rulers legitimate their rule but rather how and to what 
extent they do so.  
 
Framing theory explains persuasion as legitimisation strategy of authoritarian leaders 
In the words of political communication scholar Edelman (1993: 232), ‘the social world is 
[…] a kaleidoscope of potential realities, any of which can be readily evoked by altering the 
ways in which observations are framed and categorized’. In line with this observation, 
originally developed in social movement theory, Goffman (1986) defines frames as 
interpretative schemata that are simplifying and accentuating reality, and in doing so 
influences individuals in how the perceive, label and understand events.5 For communication 
scholars, the most useful definition of framing comes from Entman (1993: 52), who specified 
that: 
 
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating 
text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, 
and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. 
 
In other words, framing theory emphasises the ability of an entity – media, individual, or 
groups – to delineate people’s reality, highlighting one interpretation while de-emphasising 
a less favoured one (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). For instance, Woods (2011) 
demonstrates how variations in messages can influence how people come to think about and 
 
5 A by-product of the scholarly focus on topics in the news media have become two of the most fertile research 
areas in media studies: the agenda setting theory and framing theory. As Woods (2007) criticised, there are 
persistent disagreements in communication research on the differences and even meanings of agenda setting 
and framing. While explaining my understanding of framing, I dismiss terminological quarrels to other studies. 
In this sense, while McCombs and Shaw (1972) coined agenda setting theory as an examination of what 
information the media provide, Nevalsky (2015) sees in framing theory an evolution of the former as it 
examines how an author writes about and presents a topic. My choice of using the framing theory is a 
continuation of the already existing studies on Chinese terrorism framing that employed this perspective 
(Barbour and Jones 2013). 
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feel about a range of events, such as when violence that is labelled ‘terrorism’ is often 
associated with ‘radical Islam’.  For this research project, I drew on framing theory to explain 
the importance of understanding the news coverage of terrorism as a media ‘construction’, 
a product of party-state censoring mechanisms and market commercialisation. The media 
are used to legitimate the rule of the CCP leadership, potentially appealing to Uyghur citizens 
in Xinjiang to cease the unrests and appealing to the China’s citizens beyond the region’s 
border to legitimate the state leadership. In this sense, the media are a tool in the party-state’s 
repertoire with the power to influence perception and interpretation of the Xinjiang conflict 
(for more details, see the following section on the ‘implications from terrorism news framing 
studies beyond China’). My understanding of a frame in the news content overlaps with and 
extends on Entman’s above quoted definition as any word, phrase or sentence(s) that is 
prevalent in the data and therefore is a characterising feature of the news construction, 
involving, but not being limited to those that define the reported problems, its causes, 
evaluation, treatment (for more detail on these frames, see Figure 5-1 and examples in 
Chapter 5). 
 
Framing research has long focused on attempts to mobilize people to act, yet much less 
research is available on how these are used by state leaders to reproduce political legitimacy. 
Drawing on Beetham’s (1991) theory of legitimacy6, Bondes and Heep (2012) argue that the 
beliefs of the people are critical to a regime’s legitimacy insofar as they provide the 
normative foundation for its power. Therefore, persuasion, and more specifically official 
frames, are ‘soft’ party-state strategies in contrast to the ‘hard’ measures of repression and 
coercion (see also Edel and Josua 2017; Omelicheva 2016). The notion of using official 
frames to strengthen people’s beliefs in leadership qualities and providing ideological 
frameworks that guide the interpretation of concrete policies and events are well supported 
in China studies, such as with the importance of CCP ideology to maintain power over the 
party-state (Brown and Berzina-Cerenkova 2018; Klimes 2018; Lams 2018) or the use of 
media coordination to achieve positive publicity on public affairs (Kingsley 2014; Zeng et 
al. 2015). 
 
Bondes and Heep (2012) argue that the success, or resonance, of frames depends on their 
consistency, their compatibility with the society’s ‘cultural stock,’ i.e. existing cultural 
 
6 He argues that regardless of the characteristics of the political system, ‘[p]ower can be said to be legitimate 
to the extent that (i) it conforms to established rules, (ii) [these] rules can be justified by reference to beliefs 
shared by both dominant and subordinate, and (iii) there is evidence of consent by the subordinate to the 
particular power relation’ (Beetham 1991: 16). 
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narrations, heritage and symbols, as well as their relevance for the addressees’ everyday life 
and experiences. By integrating individual frames into a big picture, such overarching 
ideological frameworks not only facilitate the frames’ consistency with each other, but also 
link them with the country’s collective memory and culture. While I contend that further 
empirical research is necessary on the drivers of successful framing, their notion of framing 
depending on the ‘cultural’ environment aligns with the earlier discussed de-Westernisation 
theory in the sense that frames can differ by geographic location. Both debates underline the 
point this thesis is trying to make: terrorism news framing in China is not the same as in 
other countries, it demands exploration. 
 
Evidently, Chinese news content undergoes various layers of monitoring by editorial and 
propaganda professional, leaving the common notion among researchers that news frames 
are a reproduction of the official frames by the party-state. While this is well evidenced in 
the academic literature (Bandurski 2012/2016, Singh 2016, Brady 2017), Xi Jinping stressed 
this himself as part of his media policies, which are also available in a compilation of 
‘important speeches’ published in the People’s Daily, titled ‘Xi Jinping’s view on news and 
public opinion (ᵟ廐⵲䖃㒯擺儅媹壁)’ (People’s Daily 2016). China media expert David 
Bandurski (2016) translated and highlighted one example of Xi Jinping’s view on the 
media’s role: ‘raise high the banner [of Marxism-Leninism], direct [proper] guidance [of 
public opinion], unite the people, encourage high morale, spread public morals, create 
cohesion, clear up fallacies, distinguish between truth and falsehood’ (儈Ѯᰇᑌᕅ亶ሬੁ
ത㔅ѝᗳഒ㔃Ӫ≁啃㡎༛≄ᡀ仾ॆӪࠍᗳ㚊࣋▴␵䉜䈟᰾䗘ᱟ䶎). 
 
Applying frames to the Xinjiang conflict, as Papacharissi and Oliveira (2008) point out on 
news frames on terrorism, may serve as a strategy with which to identify main causes, assign 
responsibility, make moral judgements, and suggest policy response. Consequently, the 
frames adopted by the media to cover terrorism and the ones adopted by the party-state to 
report and respond to terrorist events influence the society’s perception of activities related 
to the situation. For instance, the distinction between freedom fighters and terrorists is 
frequently blurred across political regimes (Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). While the 
action employed by one group may be outrageous in one society, these same strategies may 
be acceptable in others -as was demonstrated in earlier sections with the international 
criticism towards China’s threat perception and ethnic repression. Frames associated with 
these strategies play a major role in how these acts are perceived and therefore are resilience 
strategies with potential legitimation effect. 
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News censorship and coordination in China’s censored media environment  
There is a good amount of research that relates the party-state’s pursuit of regime 
legitimation back to the state mechanisms of media control. The party-state supervision and 
coordination of media content has been a steady characteristic of China throughout PRC 
history, though media reforms since the 1990s have led to the emergence of party-market 
corporatism with the following characteristics. First, there is the propaganda work which 
underpins all social, media and political life to facilitate ideological control over public 
opinion. According to Brady (2008), the propaganda work received new impetus in the wake 
of the major legitimacy crisis of the Tiananmen protests in 1989. It taught the political 
leadership to renew the emphasis on propaganda work for public opinion guidance in 
addition to their long-standing strategy of legitimation through economic development: 
‘seize with both hands, both hands must be strong’ (є᡻ᣃˈє᡻䜭㾱⺜). Second, there is 
media censorship, that is the omitting of media content that received much attention 
regarding self-censorship, party-state regulations, and editorial supervision. This is common 
knowledge among China media researchers (i.e. King et al. 2013, Stockmann 2013). Third, 
there is a body of literature on media management that has slowly grown since the SARS 
outbreak in 2003 into a vibrant area for research. These sources show that China has moved 
away from the initial strategy of denial and lockdown with SARS outbreak to the attempt of 
a ‘controlled’ media openness – as observed by China scholars with the Sichuan earthquake 
in 2008 (Yang 2012) and the Urumqi riot in 2009 (Barbour and Jones 2013; Zeng et al. 2013). 
The use of news conferences, investigative journalism and interviews with party-state 
officials are examples of the new media management strategy. 
 
Like with previous leaders, media management continues under President Xi to be an 
important tactic in the regime’s repertoire to maintain political stability (Repnikova 2017).  
By ‘party-state corporatism’, Lee et al. (2007) highlight that China’s media industry has 
changed in favour of content diversity due to market commercialisation, featuring a mix of 
market demands and the party-state mandate. Accordingly, the party-state plays the role of 
primary definer of news, while journalists in the commercialised media are secondary 
definers who can deviate to some extent from the official line. On the one hand, there are 
measures in place to make sure that media actors comply with the party-state, such as a 
constant stream of directives regarding what news items can be reported and how to report 
them (Hung 2010; Lorentzen 2014), the repackaging of propaganda for more discriminating 
audiences (Brady 2008), market incentives for media actors to comply with censorship 
guidelines (Esaray 2005), and an environment of restrictive uncertainty among journalists. 
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On the other hand, there are many publications showing how market competition drives the 
press away from propagandistic discourses and pulls it towards sensational news that cater 
to popular interests and advertisers (Stockmann 2013; Wang and Chew 2016).  
 
Over the last decade, scholars confirm that the growing media commercialisation under Hu, 
with its market driven competition and media professionalism, has eroded the CCP’s prior 
monolithic power over media content. Beside from new classifications of China’s media 
system, as the one mentioned by Lee et al. (2007) above, researchers like Stockmann (2013) 
began to account for this change in the media system by distinguishing the Chinese press 
into official, semi-official and commercial newspapers. China’s changing media 
environment is a very deeply studied field of scholarship, its review is beyond the scope of 
this project, but the table below shall provide a simple introduction into the topic by 
contrasting the greater media openness under the Hu administration to the previous 
administrations, before focusing on the Xi administration in line with the focus of this project.  
Table 2-1: Reported changes in China’s news media industry 
 Media as ‘party mouthpiece’ 
Pre-1992 media reform 
Media as ‘party-state corporatism’ 
Hu Jintao administration (2003 – 2013) 
Functions of 
the media  
Single function: Mouthpiece of the 
party – Ideological indoctrination  
Multiple functions:  
• Mouthpiece of the party  
• Source for advertising  
• High circulation and audience  
Media content  Official government news  • News  
• Entertainment  
• Advertising  
• Foreign programmes and independently produced 
programmes  
Nature of 
media product  
Political and ideological 
propaganda  
Propaganda as well as market commodity  
Actors  Party and government 
representatives  
• Party and government representatives  
• Entrepreneurs  
• Media professionals  
• Advertisers  
• Semi-official interest groups  
• Entertainers 
Ownership  Directly state-owned, highly 
centralised for all information and 
distribution  
• In theory and officially, still state-owned  
• Indirect ownership by collective and private 
businesses  
• Publicly listed news agencies  
Financial 
support  
Government-funded  Chiefly through advertising, circulation, financial 
investment  
Management 
and editorial 
personnel  
Government appointed  • Government appoints key leading positions in major 
state and local government news media  
• Market hiring for professional management and 
editorial positions in non-key media units  
Source: Winfield and Peng (2005: 263) with updates based on Chen and Naughton 2016; Creemers 2017; 
Dai 2014; Huang 2018; Stockmann 2013. 
 
What seems certain from the above review is that the Chinese news media could no longer 
simply be called ‘mouth piece’ of the party-state, yet Beijing’s continuous control over the 
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news media still makes China inherently different to pluralist media environments. Ge (2016) 
observes that the increasing commercial pressures force newspaper organisations to 
incorporate more sensationalist reporting strategies to attract readers, many scholars trace 
this trend back to the party-state reducing funds for news organisations (i.e. Li and Sparks 
2016; Ngai and Jin 2016; Simons et al. 2016; Tong 2015; Wang 2016). Pan and Lu (2009, 
Hassid 2016) observed the professionalization of the media industry that resulted from the 
profit-orientation in the dramatic increase of the number of journalism schools, the teaching 
of professional journalistic values such as timeliness, objectivism and newsworthiness, the 
activism in social media and investigative reporting, and the audience orientation of news 
agencies as imperative for commercial survival. In this light, Yu (2009) and Ren et al. (2014) 
refer to the work of Chinese journalists as ‘double clientelism’ – the need to balance the 
opposing ideologies of the ‘free’ market economy and party line. While accounts differ as 
to whether Chinese journalists adopt the same kind of professional norms as are 
characteristic of (some) Western journalists (Sparks 2010), the growing professionalism has 
been reflected in more diverse media coverage. 
 
However, commentators and scholars alike highlight how the repression under Xi is more 
reminiscent of Mao Zedong times instead of the ‘party-state corporatism’ of the Hu 
administration (2003-2013). Creemers (2017) shows how party-state institutions continue to 
promulgate policies, laws and regulations and officers of the propaganda system control the 
implementation of the current Chinese ideology at every level of the bureaucracy. Examples 
of party-state institutions that engage in media ‘managing’ she gave are party organs, state 
departments, state-owned enterprises and industrial associations. Anne-Marie Brady (2008), 
a leading scholar on the role of propaganda in Chinese politics, focused with several 
publications stronger on the propaganda aspect, arguing that propaganda work is the very 
lifeblood of the party’s ongoing legitimacy and hold on power. A multi-layered grouping of 
agencies with overlapping functions together form the propaganda system and is overseen 
at the very top by a handful of leading Figures in the Propaganda and Thought Work Leading 
Group (ѝཞᇓՐᙍᜣᐕ֌亶ሬሿ㓴ᡀઈ) and CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping (ѝཞҖ䇠༴). 
As their top administrative body, the Central Propaganda Department (ѝཞᇓՐ䜘) is a party 
institution that guides the entire propaganda system by determining general policy pertaining 
to all propaganda activities, supervising its execution and having authority over the party 
units that are mandatorily present in all levels of state institutions (national, provincial, city, 
and district level). Creemers (2017) further shows that at the lower level of administration, 
a network of propaganda cadres and officers are installed in state bureaucracies (i.e. 
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education and health), security forces (i.e. People’s Liberation Army), and mass 
organisations (i.e. journalist associations, neighbourhood committees).  
 
The above apparatus is controlled through both party and state documents. National (or 
central) bodies, such as the Central Propaganda Department, issue guiding opinions, plans 
and policy documents outlining the direction media regulation will take in the future (Brady 
2008, Creemers 2017). These documents outline objectives, list tasks and policy steps, and 
as such form the basis for the drafting of further regulations. At the next level, there are the 
‘management regulations’ (㇑⨶ᶑֻ). On the basis of these, the individual ministries and 
administrations then formulate more detailed management rules and regulations, each 
further detailing and interpreting the rules of higher-level regulations. For instance, as a 
follow up China’s first national counter-terrorism law issued in 2015, the Xinjiang 
provincial-level government issued several revisions that add implementing measures to the 
law.7 Moreover, there are the Notices (䙊⸕), that are used to deal with ad hoc issues, publish 
administrative decisions, or bring attention to enforcement of specific regulation (Hearns-
Branaman 2009).  
 
In addition, a legislative framework of censorship together with at least partly party-state 
ownership of news organisations closely tie media organisations to the political leadership 
and thus are responsible for bias in news reporting (Abbott et al. 2013; Hassid and Stern 
2012; Hearns-Branaman 2009). The legislation gives freedom to the party-state to censor 
articles, harass journalists and shut down media outlets. However, Creemers (2017) showed 
that, with the exception of copyright and advertising, China’s media sector is not governed 
by law, but by administrative regulation. This subtle difference indicates that the party-state 
wants to maintain over the media sector: any law or law revision must be approved by the 
National People’s Congress, in contrast, administrative organs retain a free hand to make 
changes administrative regulations and remain responsible for implementing these 
regulations. Accordingly, Creemers (2015) found that hundreds of media-related documents 
with regulatory effect have been released since 1979, constructing an intricate web of 
prohibitions, obligations, procedures and responsibilities (see also Pan 2016; Xu 2014; 
Zhang and Fleming 2005). 
 
 
7 For instance, see the document titled ‘Xinjiang implementing measures for the P.R.C. counter-terrorism law 
(2018) in China Law Translate (2018). 
37 
 
Most accounts of party-state control in China stop here, with the tangle of news content 
supervision and regulations, at times emphasising the importance of censorship (Xie 2014), 
but without looking into the journalist’s self-censorship as another form of media control. In 
this realm, it appears from the literature that uncertainty over the limits of political tolerance 
and potential retribution as part of everyday life work drives Chinese journalists to back 
down, change emphasis or avoid topics altogether (O’Brien 2008). One example that 
attracted international and scholarly attention was the Chinese news reporting on the Sun 
Zhigang case in 2003. After Sun Zhigang (ᆉᘇࡊ), a migrant, was detained for not carrying 
his temporary residence permit and beaten to death by staff members and other inmates while 
in custody in a detention facility, the Southern Metropolis Daily’s report on his death sparked 
a media storm that spread over the country and generated a national uproar (Hand 2006; 
Liebman 2005). While the central party-state then repealed the law authorising detention 
facilities so that this can be considered a victory for a watchdog press, a few months later 
police raided the Southern Metropolis Daily, and detained and sentenced top editors in what 
was regarded by others as retribution for aggressive reporting on this (Stern and O’Brien 
2011). The Sun Zhigang case therefore seems to be a case of media control rather than self-
censorship. 
 
Another example of the party-state ‘managing’ the media is with self-censorship. Xie (2014) 
notes that the party-state regulates entry into the journalist profession by requiring the 
journalists hold a state-issued press card compulsory for journalists. This card in turn 
requires attending frequent training sessions covering topics such as journalistic ethics and 
Marxist-Leninist press theory. In case of disobedience, various sources describe party-state 
responses that threaten the professional career. For example, the Hsu (2019) mentions 
warning phone calls from unlisted numbers threatening with fines, closure or chat invitations 
to the Judicial Bureau. As Stern and Hassid (2012) confirmed in interviews with journalists, 
this can go so far that license renewals are delayed, pressure is exercised to find a new 
employee or press cards are revoked. Therefore, they conclude, losing a livelihood is a potent 
threat that keeps the majority of journalists from considering controversial issues. 
Furthermore, daily briefings from the Central Propaganda Department outlining which 
current topics are unacceptable for press coverage on internal websites (Hassid 2011) and 
the differing state policies in each province contribute to the atmospheric uncertainty 
punctuated by occasional crackdowns. To sum up, it becomes clear these media strategies 
are a continuation of the previous era, but they have intensified and expanded under Xi’s 
leadership (Repnikova 2017). 
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The empirical gap 
The previous section showed how the Xi administration continue and altered the censoring 
mechanisms for media content in comparison to its predecessor, sections prior to that 
explained the relevance of these changes in media control as an important tactic of the regime 
to maintain stability. Though this dissertation’s research was rooted in Bondes and Heep’s 
(2012) conceptual framework of framing, persuasion, legitimacy and authoritarian resilience, 
further application of it had been necessary for empirical support. The literature review 
showed the growing awareness of legitimation as an important subject in the authoritarian 
resilience debate as well as indicated with China studies the variety of legitimation strategies. 
Among these claims to legitimacy, this PhD project focused on China’s persuasion tactics 
by following the framework introduced by Bondes and Heep (2012). As they note, and this 
literature review demonstrates, the relationship between a regime’s legitimacy and 
persuasion is well acknowledged among scholars but it was their contribution that 
conceptualised this connection by introducing the framing perspective. Framing theory 
asserts the ability of an entity to emphasises or de-emphasises aspects of a topic. Therefore, 
framing can be employed by authoritarian rulers as legitimation strategy towards the 
populace. 
 
China media researchers have often made this connection between framing and legitimation 
automatically without introducing this, or any, conceptual foundation. For instance, Barbour 
and Jones (2013) or Zeng et al.’s (2015) analysis of the news construction of the Urumqi 
2009 terrorist attack took place without considering party-state itnereference with media 
content. While Bondes and Heep (2012) applied their conceptual framework to China, their 
research focus did not go beyond party-state official frames presented in policy documents. 
I demonstrate with this thesis that the analysis of the Chinese media portrayal of terrorism 
can further benefit from this conceptual framework. First, the scholarship confirms China to 
employ various legitimation strategies and that the use of media control is one of these (i.e. 
King et al. 2013, see Chapter 4). Second, framing research is well recognised as useful tool 
to examine Chinese news content (see next section for more detail) and received 
conceptualisation with Bondes and Heep’s (2012) contribution. Third, the Xinjiang terrorism 
problem is a top national security concerns that has received party-state interreference. The 
analysis of news content on China’s terrorism will not just provide insight into how the news 
media cover the events but will show what frames the party-state used in the media discourse 
of the Xinjiang conflict. Thus, it expands Bondes and Heep’s (2012) conceptual framework 
to the media domain as well as provide empirical evidence to support it.  
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Terrorism news framing in China and beyond 
Chinese media portrayals of terrorism  
There is no systematic analysis of how Chinese news media cover domestic terrorism. 
Closest to the topic are the two news framing studies by Barbour and Jones (2013) and Zeng 
et al. (2015), both of which focus on a single ‘terrorist’ attack, the Urumqi riot on 5 July 
2009. These two studies both examined the party-state’s capacity to define how a violent 
incident is described in the media and thereby control the symbolic significance of the events 
in Xinjiang, creating a framework for future media interpretations of violence or party-state 
operations. Barbour and Jones (2013) drew on 150 articles from China Daily and Xinhua8 
covering the month after the incident. They sought to understand the portrayal of identity 
boundaries between the Uyghur, Han and ‘the terrorist’ in the news. They conclude that ‘the 
ambiguities of what actually occurred were repackaged into a narrative of order, civilised 
behaviour, and justice on the one hand, and violence, barbarity, and anti-state activities on 
the other’ (Barbour and Jones 2013: 16). In this sense, the authors found a ‘us’ versus ‘them’ 
framing of violence (sometimes referred to as ‘adversarial framing’, i.e. Norris et al. 2003, 
Powell 2011/2018, Steuter and Wills 2008) that criminalises and links the Uyghur to the 
‘three evil forces’, standing in contrast to the civilised Han and the Chinese state that 
guarantees justice and security. Zeng et al. (2015) compared framing differences across three 
news agencies, Xinhua, Reuters and Associated Press, focussing on which sources are used 
in their reporting and frame changes over nine weeks following the incident. They find that 
Xinhua more strongly and continuously relied on government sources.  
 
Both studies indicate that in China the ‘official’ news portrayal of terrorism is a party-state 
construction, and they suggest that adversarial framing is prevalent. Yet, they focus on a 
single case and on identity boundaries or sourcing patterns, and provide neither a 
comprehensive, empirical analysis of news frames nor a multi-case study that can deliver 
more generalisable observations and to compare frame changes over time. Neither study 
examined the terrorism framing, therefore missed out how the party-state portrays the 
terrorist threat in the media and how this possibly legitimises the party-state’s counter-
terrorism operations in Xinjiang. 
 
Though not specifically discussing the news framing of terrorism, a few further studies have 
explored the Chinese party-state’s media crisis management after the Urumqi riot in 2009 or 
 
8 The Xinhua is the party-state’s official and biggest press agency. For details see Hong 2011. 
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have examined the news framing of two major national crises, the SARS epidemic in 2003 
and the Sichuan earthquake in 2008.9 Chen (2012) analysed how Beijing communicated with 
the media over the 2009 Urumqi incident by looking at news conferences and conducting 
interviews with party-officials. Chen concludes that Beijing was aiming for controlled and 
positive publicity of the party-state by engaging with the domestic and international media 
instead of restricting reporting. This aligns well with Zeng et al.’s (2015) finding mentioned 
above that party-state information has been the main source of information in the 
international news. Yang’s (2012) news framing study of the 2003 SARS epidemic and the 
2008Sichuan earthquake, which she interprets as public crises, reaches the same conclusion 
on the stronger ‘media openness’ of the party-state over time. She also found difference in 
framing between the party-controlled (People’s Daily Ӫ≁ᰕᣕ ) and commercialised 
(Southern Weekend ইᯩઘᵛ) press, arguing that the former focuses on the party-state as 
leading force in solving the crisis whereas the latter focuses on the victims and losses. While 
both studies suggest a changing party-state media strategy with the 2003 SARS epidemic – 
from a closed information system to a ‘managed’ open one, this needs to be tested further 
by examining a wider range of news content. Indeed, Zhang and Fleming’s (2006) study 
concluded, based on their analysis of SARS framing, that the diversity of frames in the news 
varies with the party-state leadership and their media control. 
 
Though scarce, studies on the representation of Muslims and Islam in the Chinese media 
provide a further indication of how the Muslim Uyghur might be portrayed in the Chinese 
media’s terrorism coverage. Luqiu and Yang (2018) studied news reports on Muslims and 
Islam in the party-state mouthpieces People’s Daily, Xinhua and the CCTV website 
spanning over ten years, arguing that real-life discrimination of Chinese Muslims might be 
the consequence of negative stereotyping in the media. Their study revealed a negative 
framing of Muslims and Islam in news coverage and a survey of Chinese Muslims that 
revealed their increased daily discrimination since 2009. This finding aligns well with the 
findings of Barbour and Jones (2013), whose study on the news framing of the Urumqi 2009 
incident uncovered the division between Uyghur and Han Chinese in the news. Kanat (2012) 
offers a possible explanation for this news pattern, arguing that the presence of an ethnic 
‘other’ presents the party-state with an opportunity exploit the society’s fragmentation in 
favour of the leader by making the ethnic minority play the domestic target as an enemy 
 
9 Some studies examined the Urumqi riot in 2009 not as terrorist attack but as crisis. These crisis news 
framing studies provide further insight into how the party-state responds with the media in cases in the public 
spotlight.  
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outsider. Though requiring empirical testing, Kanat’s (2012) argument aligns with the other 
studies discussed above that see the party-state attempting to construct an enemy other and 
framing the news to favour its own responses to that enemy. 
 
Implications from terrorism news framing studies beyond China  
The scholarship on the terrorism media relationship has been flourishing over the last two 
decades, with seminal work by Nacos (1994, 2002, 2006), Norris et al. (2003), Papacharissi 
and Oliveira (2008), and others, focusing on Western countries with the US as strong focus 
point. They lack a comparative perspective on the terrorism media relationship in 
authoritarian regimes and specifically China. Nonetheless, they demonstrate the importance 
of understanding the terrorism news construction with the power the media has by 
reinforcing and altering public perception of the political leadership and the terrorist threat. 
For example, Brinson and Stohl’s (2012) experimental findings on the impact of the media 
framing of the 2005 London bombing on US and UK citizens shows that attacks framed as 
‘homegrown’ increase fear of terrorism more than attacks framed as international terrorism. 
They found that this enhanced fear led in turn to greater support for restricting the civil 
liberties of Muslims and generally a more negative attitude towards them. The authors see 
this framing effect manifested in the UK’s substantial programme of monitoring and 
surveillance of the UK’s Muslim community as part of the counterterrorism strategy 
(CONTEST) and the PREVENT policy (see also Heath-Kelly 2012). Sikorski et al. (2017) 
conducted research on the effect of Islamic State terrorism news framing with students of 
the University of Vienna, concluding that it increases the fear of terrorism. These findings 
resemble those of Luqiu and Yang (2018) in China, which showed that the overall negative 
framing of news reports on Islam or Muslims increases negative stereotypes non-Muslim 
Chinese towards Muslims. 
 
Further details on the influence of frames on the audience is available through experimental 
studies. Wood’s (2011) experiment with US students, who were exposed to different news 
articles on terrorism. While his findings align with the above studies in that the identification 
of ‘radical Islamic groups’ as terrorist suspects increased the threat perception, he found that 
the term ‘terrorism’ itself did not affect the perceived threat. The implication from this 
research is that understanding the effect of terrorism framing on the people’s mind requires 
examination of how the media frame terrorism. This particular finding highlights once again 
the importance of this dissertation examining how the Chinese media frame terrorism, 
together with prior studies demonstrating that ‘news frames do matter’ in their effect on 
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public opinion. Since extensive research on this subject is yet missing for China, the existing 
terrorism framing studies on ‘Western’ pluralist media environments provide implications 
for China.  
 
‘Western’ terrorism framing studies claim the following frames prevalent in the print media, 
namely the ‘war on terror’ frame, episodic and thematic frames, the adversarial frame and 
Islamophobia. The ‘war on terror’ frame has been the most commonly studied in research 
on terrorism framing, though it is often under-specified  Any study of this frame, and even 
many of those studying terrorism framing of other kinds, begin by describing how the Bush 
administration perceived the September 11 attacks as the beginning of a global ‘war on terror’ 
and how the media, both national and international, internalised this frame in future coverage 
of terrorist events (i.e. Norris et al. 2003, Steuter and Wills 2016). What some scholars even 
call a macro-frame, hinting at the possibility of including various frames, still lacks 
specification on what it includes (i.e. Matthews 2015; Merz 2014). For instance, the well-
cited work of Reese and Lewis (2009) on the US print media’s adaptation of the war on 
terror frame only describes how the Bush administration interpreted the 9/11 events does not 
precisely identify what the ‘war on terror’ frame actually consists of. Steuter and Wills (2016) 
devoted their book ‘At war with metaphor’ to their observation that the ‘war on terror’ frame 
is highly abstract to ‘construct’ an archetypical enemy that might or might not be true but 
can be applied to a range of perceived threats of states. Accordingly, a key ingredient of this 
frame is the ‘othering’ of the enemy and the de-humanisation of that enemy. In agreement 
with this, Reese and Lewis describe the frame as portraying an abstract enemy that threatens 
the ‘freedoms and way of life’ of the US citizens, separating ‘us’ from ‘them’, juxtaposing 
Iraq and 9/11 to provide the rationale for the invasion of Iraq.10 
 
The study of ‘us’ versus ‘them’, also known as adversarial framing, became a centrepiece in 
terrorism framing research, though it has been studied from different angles. Some scholars 
focus on ‘them’, what some called the ‘othering’, instead of the adversarial framing. Steuter 
and Wills (2016) are one example of this category, highlighting that the constructed enemy 
is indistinguishable, so terrorist come to stand for all Arabs, or religious extremists for all 
Muslims, so broadening the target from immediate actors to encompass all Arabs.  
 
10 Their finding was that the US print media quickly accepted, post-September 11, the ‘war on terror’ framing 
of the Bush administration, confirming Entman’s (2003) famous cascading model on the power of the political 
elite over the direction of the news discourse (see also Glazier and Boydstun 2012). In line with this observation, 
Norris et al. (2003) in their seminal work on US terrorism news framing also found the prevalence of 
adversarial frames that distinguish between the US citizens and the radical Islamist other. 
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Another trait of this ‘other’ is the separation from ‘us’ by highlighting their bestial nature, 
such as by picturing their brutality. Steuter and Wills highlight on this point the dichotomy 
between the Other as evil to Our good. It has become a common argument among academics 
that this form of adversarial framing has the effect of strengthening the public sense of unity 
while also legitimising a wide range of measures, national and international, in the name of 
counter-terrorism. In this vein, Norris et al. (2003) conclude that the terrorism frames serve 
both a cognitive function, by linking together disparate facts, events and leaders, and an 
evaluative function, by naming perpetrators, identifying victims and attributing blame. They 
therefore allow political leaders to communicate a coherent simple message to the public, 
while also reshaping perceptions of ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. Common examples can be 
found not only in the US but also in authoritarian regimes such as Russia. Several 
publications at the beginning of the millennium described how Putin declared the Russo-
Chechen conflict as Russia’s frontline in the international ‘war on terror’. For instance, 
Russel (2005) described the demonization of the Chechens by both the authorities and public 
by branding the resistance as ‘bandits’, mentally ill and culturally backward. The first 
indication of ‘the othering’ of Muslims in Chinese news and public was already confirmed 
by Luqiu and Yang (2018), though their research did not consider the domestic terrorist 
threat perception but the daily representation of Chinese Muslims. In sum, the terrorism 
framing scholarship clearly suggests the prevalence of adversarial framing, or ‘othering’, yet 
there is still no research on whether and how the Chinese media portray the terrorist enemy. 
 
Islamophobia has been another common object of study in terrorism framing research. 
Previous research has argued that Muslim identity of terrorist perpetrators increases media 
coverage (Kearns 2019; West and Lloyd 2017), that the terms terrorist and Muslim as 
frequent associated, that Muslims are portrayed as irrational and radicalised and that using 
negative stereotypes of Muslims or Islam in the media heightens public fear (i.e. Brinson 
and Stohl 2012; Sikorski et al. 2017). These observations are well supported empirically. 
One of the often-cited sources on this subject is Powell’s (2011) news framing analysis of 
US terrorist attacks between 2001 and 2010. Powell showed that across all US terrorist 
attacks (in the period she studied), terrorist perpetrators were quickly labelled or suspected 
as Muslim. Event coverage, for example, began by stating or asking if the perpetrator was 
Muslim, before there was certainty. Moreover, Powell confirmed the dualisation of victims 
and terrorists in this context. Victims were portrayed as undeserving of the attack and as 
spiritual, often Christian. Victims who tried to stop the terrorist actors were portrayed as 
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heroes, though this was also commonly used for victims who were not doing anything 
extraordinary. Powell showed that this perception was pitted against the ‘bad guys’, such as 
the radicalised Muslim. Revisiting the more recent terrorism coverage, Powell (2018) 
confirmed the continuation of these reporting patterns for the US print media. Other studies, 
such as Matthews (2015), who looked at British terrorism news coverage, also observe the 
association between terrorism and Muslim identity and how these created frames of 
Islamophobia and the dichotomy of good versus evil. 
 
The news focus on a global ‘war on terror’ implicates another reporting pattern, that is the 
prevalence of the thematic frame on the larger terrorism issue over an episodic one. 
Introduced by Iyengar (1990), episodic frames report on concrete events without placing 
them into the broader context, whereas thematic frames focus on issues in a broader context 
and present general and abstract information. Previous research suggests that coverage of 
terrorist events features both thematic and episodic frames (Berbers et al. 2015; Nacos and 
Torres-Reyna 2007; Papacharissi and Oliveira 2008). Analysis of US terrorism coverage 
demonstrates that although episodic frames directly follow an event, news content becomes 
increasingly thematic in the context of the global war on terror (Powell 2011). The thematic 
framing entails comments on the future threat. Powell (2011) confirmed that the majority of 
news stories alluded to the possibility of more strikes from the attack, thus keeping a future 
threat of terrorism salient. 
 
The need to ‘de-Westernise’ the scholarship on terrorism news framing  
As demonstrated above, there is a significant imbalance between the breadth of findings on 
terrorism framing in US-centred scholarship and in the scholarship on China. This 
observation echoes a concern at the heart of the de-Westernisation of media theory debate, 
that there is a shortage of media studies research outside ‘the West’ and an over-reliance on 
‘Western’ media theory when discussing other parts of the world (Curran and Park 2000, 
Gunaratne 2010/2011, Miike 2006/2007, Thussu 2009). The early epistemological 
foundation for ‘de-westernising’ media research stems from the notion that the US-centric 
perspective does not acknowledge the different Asian communication traditions nor their 
cultural, historical and social context. Generally, the term ‘de-Westernisation’ indicates the 
removal of things that are ‘Western’, but conceptually it says very little about which 
elements should be removed and which should be included. Nonetheless contributions point 
towards differences between ‘the West’ and China in the media environments – including, 
for example, state-media relations (Nerone 1995; Nip and Fu 2016; Rawnsley and Rawnsley 
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2015), limited pluralism due serving both the market and political authority (Becker 2004; 
Lee 2015; Lei 2016; Stockmann 2013), and the democratising or sustain media effect on 
regime durability.11 The key message from these sources is that news coverage in the ‘West’ 
and China is not identical, therefore the terrorism news coverage in China demands studying. 
 
While differences in the media systems between China and the ‘West’ suggest difference in 
news coverage, it would be too simple to claim no diversity in media content due to its non-
pluralist media environment. The commercialisation of China’s media after the 1990s led to 
a perceived transition from party-led propaganda tool to a market-oriented product (Brady 
2011; Haern 2016; Hong 2011; Lee 2015; Simons et al. 2016; Stockmann 2013; Walker and 
Orttung 2014; Xie 2014; Young 2013). While these studies show no doubt about the weak 
watchdog function of the Chinese media, they also stress growing diversity in media content 
during the Hu Jintao administration (2002-2012) and the emergence of media sensationalism 
due the development of professionalism in journalistic practices. Nonetheless, the same 
scholarship continues to provide examples of party-state supervision and interference 
through media ownership, editorial censorship, ideological training, and encouragement of 
self-censorship (King et al. 2013; Lin et al. 2015; Lorentzen 2014; Nip and Fu 2016; for 
more details see chapter 4). More recent studies also indicated tightening media control since 
2012 under Xi Jinping’s leadership (Brady 2016; Gill 2017; Hadland 2015; Ranade 2017).  
 
Trends in loosening and tightening of controls over media content has also been observed in 
studies of public crises and terrorism in China. For instance, Yang (2012) found considerable 
framing differences in how official and commercial Chinese press covered the 2003 SARS 
and 2008 Sichuan earthquake. She argues that the party-state has learned from denying 
media communication to intensify the SARS outbreak, turning since then towards ‘managed’ 
media openness. Yang found examples not just in the framing of the rescue and treatment of 
the victims, or the losses of the victims, but also how commercialised media criticised 
government officials for their response to the events. However, even though the grip of the 
party-state seems to sometimes have loosened over the commercial media during natural 
disasters and health crises, Chen (2012) found with the 2009 Urumqi riot that crisis 
communication was highly centralised, and that the Chinese media closely followed the 
government line to focus on injured Han whilst ignoring the Uyghur background story. Zeng 
et al. (2015) confirmed this observation for the initial stage of reporting but found news 
 
11 For a comprehensive list of media studies on China, see Zhao 2009; Tong 2012. 
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content to diverge over time after the incident. Returning to the de-Westernisation issue, 
research on the Chinese press demonstrates that framing cannot simply be assumed to be 
diverse, as it is in the US and UK, and yet should not be assumed to be straightforwardly 
controlled and unified. Even in the Chinese studies research, scholarship remains 
inconclusive on the extent of framing differences between commercialised and party-
controlled media. There is lack of empirical research on the Chinese media’s framing of 
terrorism and its change over time.  
 
The analytical gap in the terrorism media scholarship 
The first observation from the literature review is the obvious lack of a systematic analysis 
of Chinese terrorism coverage. While there are two framing studies on Chinese terrorism, 
their authors entrenched their focus on a single incident in 2009 and findings remain limited 
to sourcing patterns and the media representation of the division between Uyghur and Han 
Chinese. A systematic analysis would uncover a wider range of the news frames and 
incorporates a larger number of terrorist attacks to enhance generalisability of the findings.  
Second, the framing studies on China’s terrorism missed analysing how the media portray 
the terrorist threat. Both Barbour and Jones (2013) and Zeng et al. (2015) discussed the 2009 
Urumqi attack from the crisis communication perspective, therefore avoided a discussion of 
the party-state’s interpretation and designation of the events. Such consideration involves an 
understanding of how the terrorist threat is portrayed by the media and how any operations 
are legitimised in the name of fighting this threat. Therefore, there has been thus far no 
analysis how the media define the terrorist threat and legitimise any counter-terrorist 
operation in the name of fighting this threat. 
 
Third, the de-Westernisation debate on media theory has demonstrated that news content is 
not identical between the pluralist media environment in the ‘West’ and China’s censored 
media environment. Thus, an exploration of the Chinese terrorism coverage is necessary to 
compare it with what is known in the ‘Western’-centred scholarship. This way, the 
comparison would heighten scholarly awareness of alternative media models by 
incorporating Asian examples more strongly in the discourse. 
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The literature on the Xinjiang conflict and the party state’s counter-operations 
Studies of China’s designation of the Xinjiang conflict 
Since the beginning of the millennium, scholars were in consensus when criticising the 
Chinese party-state for using the terrorism label to the Xinjiang conflict. Yet from around 
2009 they increasingly adopted the term in publications and considered terrorism to be 
among tactics Uyghurs use to express discontent with CCP rule (i.e. Clarke; Cunningham 
2012; Smith-Finley 2019; Tschantret 2016). These scholars commonly see in the party-
state’s issuing of the document titled ‘East Turkistan terrorist forces cannot get away with 
impunity’ shortly after the September 11 attacks the beginning of China’s still ongoing fight 
against terrorism.  
 
In 2002, the party-state sent a list of alleged terrorist groups to the United States and NATO 
in which China identified its terrorist enemies, both only recognised the previously unknown 
East Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM) as terrorist group and said group has since 
then become the archetype of the terrorist enemy (Cunningham 2012). Until this time, the 
international community had seen the Uyghurs as a repressed ethnic group in authoritarian 
China. Scholars outside of China therefore interpreted these Chinese government’s actions 
so soon after 9/11 as jumping on the bandwagon of the US global ‘war on terror’ and seeking 
to change the international narrative by declaring Xinjiang the frontline of their own 
terrorism problem. The timing of the terrorism designation, the retrospective designation of 
incidents from the previous ten years as acts of terrorism, and the attribution of responsibility 
to previously almost unknown terrorist groups led these scholars to conclude that the Chinese 
party-state was constructing a terrorist threat to legitimise the securitisation of the region and 
the continuing repression of the Uyghurs.  
 
With news on re-education camps popularising the Xinjiang conflict issue worldwide, 2019 
has seen a surge in scholars presenting their newest evaluation of what the party-state is 
doing in the region. These voices picture images of wide-ranging party-state aggression 
against the local minorities in the name of fighting terrorism. Smith-Finley (2019) speaks of 
state terror – as terrorising a population in the short term by instilling fear to ensure the 
state’s continued political control in the long term – by drawing the de-extremisation 
campaigns and mass internments in the region as examples for the ideological turn of the 
CCP under Xi towards Xinjiang. To my knowledge, Smith-Finley was the first to introduce 
the term state terrorism to the debate, yet the notion of the incubation of violence is a 
common feature in studies on the Xinjiang conflict. For instance, Anand (2019) sees in the 
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securitisation of Xinjiang and Tibet a modern form of colonialism, stressing the asymmetry 
of power between the Han Chinese and the ethnic minorities. While Rodriguez-Merino 
(2019) agrees with the party-state construction argument, he calls it unstable as it would be 
contingent on the global war on terror and further aggravate local grievances towards an 
endless cycle of mutually depending violence and repression induced by the party-state. Both 
Clarke (2008) and Tredaniel and Lee (2018) reach the same conclusion the radicalising effect 
of the party-state’s Xinjiang strategy.  
 
The literature on the China’s Xinjiang operations 
The literature on the Xinjiang conflict presents an image of a wide-ranging array of party-
state strategies to achieve stability in the region, yet lack consideration of the media as 
another tool. Leibold and Grose (2017) argue that ethnic minority12 and Han cultures have 
long been at odds in modern China with the Chinese party-state portraying the former as 
symbolising ‘backwardness’ and ‘tradition’, and the latter ‘modernity’ and ‘progress’. For 
example, it frames forms of veiling not just as expressions of religious extremism and 
cultural backwardness, but also as outcome of foreign (i.e. Middle Eastern) influences. 
China’s claim after September 11 of the existence of previously unknown terrorist groups, 
and specifically the acknowledgement of ETIM, left observers genuinely surprised 
(Cunningham 2012).  
 
Tanner and Ballacqua (2016) analysed the Chinese party-state’s overall approach to counter-
terrorism by examining key party-state documents on the subject that have been made 
available in the public domain. Their examination suggests it has made a three-pronged 
effort that comprises promoting economic development, strengthening internal security 
capabilities and restricting unauthorised religious activities. Key components of this effort 
include: Strengthening counter-terrorism legislation; expanding the counter-terrorism 
bureaucracy; increasing law enforcement operations in Xinjiang; promoting economic 
growth and other development initiatives in Xinjiang; promoting ethnic unity and combating 
religious extremism. Odgaard and Nielsen (2014) explain that many of these actions have 
their origins in the Chinese party-state’s post-September 11 re-assessment of China’s 
vulnerabilities to terrorist threats. Prior to 2001, China had no police force dedicated to 
combatting terrorism, no laws governing how to deal with it, and no organisation dedicated 
 
12 In China, the Han Chinese are the dominant ethnic group forming more than 90% of the population. The 
largest ethnic minority in Xinjiang are the Uyghur people (see chapter 1). 
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to coordinating the efforts of the institutions charged with preventing and responding to 
terrorist incidents. 
 
Among the above strategies, most scholars discussed the long-running party-state strategy 
of promoting economic growth as the ‘carrot’ in the ‘carrot and stick’ approach for the region 
(Wayne 2009; Wei and Cuifen 2010; Yang 2015/2016). Tranner and Bellacqua (2016) show 
that the party-state has invested heavily in developing of the region’s infrastructure and 
tourism industries and to attract foreign investment, while several white papers on Xinjiang 
describe economic development as the top priority for the region and trumpet the 
improvement in living standards. However, Kutkauskaite (2012) points out that preferential 
socio-economic policies on the one side and exploitation of the rich natural resources on the 
other side deepened the cleavages between Uyghur and Han Chinese in the region. In 
addition, facing the many years of unsettling situation, Zhu and Blachford (2016) emphasise 
that development is just one element in China’s governance strategy of combining hard and 
soft policy.  
 
Possibly the most studied topic in the context of the Xinjiang terrorism is the securitisation 
of the region, specifically ‘strike hard’ campaigns and surveillance (Kutkauskaite 2012; 
O’Brien and Deng 2015; Lu and Chan 2016). Zenz and Leibold (2017, also Clarke 2018) 
describe the party-state’s securitisation strategy in Xinjiang to occur in stages over the course 
of the past decade, starting with the Urumqi 2009 incident. They show how, after the 
dispatch of 14,000 People’s Armed Police (PAP) forces to regain control of Xinjiang after 
the Urumqi incident, authorities responded by boosting personnel recruitment efforts across 
public security organs in the region, rising the number of security related position from 
almost 7,000 in 2006-8 to almost 16,000 in 2009-11 with continuing growth in numbers over 
the following years. Meanwhile, the party-state used grid-style social management technique 
that divides communities into smaller units in which surveillance technology and personnel 
monitor activities.  
 
Zenz and Leibold (2017) argue that there was a change in around 2013 that marked a new 
surveillance-oriented, technology-focused security strategy. Other observers confirm the 
expansion of a ‘surveillance state’ in both Xinjiang and the rest of China. Wayne (2007) 
points particularly towards the creation of a ‘four-in-one’ system of defence, consisting of 
the People’s Liberation Army, the paramilitary People’s Armed Police, the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps, and the people. Wayne’s inclusion of ‘the people’ as 
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one of the defence forces resonates with the party-state’s prevalent use of the adversarial 
framing as part of the war on terror, stressing that part of the party-state’s terrorism 
construction is aimed at motivating public support for counter-terrorist operations. It 
highlights again the importance for the party-state to ‘win the people’s mind’ and the media 
construction of terrorism as one tool to do so. Wayne further observed after 2009 the brutal 
use of military force and yearly ‘strike hard campaigns’, accelerating arrests, trials, and 
sentencing of Uyghur terrorists, extremists, and separatists to punish and deter terrorism 
commensurate with the state’s inclination of employing harshness and swiftness to curb 
crime down (see also Becquelin 2004; Hastings 2011; Li 2016). Repressive measures 
including arbitrary and large-scale arrests, containment strategies, harsh punishment and the 
violation of basic human rights have gained strong international criticism, with interment 
camps receiving currently much attention by Human Rights Organisation and others 
(Amnesty 2018; CFR 2019; Marquest 2019).  
 
As part of the securitisation of the region, scholars also recently began growingly to discuss 
the party-state strengthening of the counter-terrorism legislation with the issuing of China’s 
first counter-terrorism law in 2015. Clarke (2018) further stresses with 2015 a new emphasis 
on strengthening legal provisions and procedures to replace government directives with 
written regulations. One can characterise such efforts as attempts to further normalise and 
standardise the management of ethnic and religious affairs. Yet he warns that China is 
conflating ‘normal’ religious activities with ‘abnormal’ and ‘illegal’ ones, is creating a 
hotbed of further violence. Starting in 2001, China made several piecemeal amendments to 
its criminal law, criminal procedure law, and a number of administrative laws regarding the 
regulation of terrorism (Roach 2015). However, as Li (2016) notes, it was not until 2015 that 
China passed its first comprehensive counter-terrorism law after many years of policy review. 
Tanner and Bellacqua (2016) comment that the new law, which will form the blueprint for 
China’s counter-terrorism strategy, conflates ‘terrorism’ with an undefined ‘extremism’ 
linked to religion, and gives scope to follow the imposition of oppressive and counter-
productive policies in Tibet and Xinjiang, involving extra-judicial killings, torture and 
imprisonment, and crackdowns on even mild expressions of religious identity and culture. 
Little attention has yet been drawn toward the legal response to the terrorist threat (Clarke 
2018; Li 2016; Tursun 2008). It has yet remained unstudied how the Chinese party-state 
explained these legislative changes. 
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Along with the legislative changes, the counter-terrorism bureaucracy has grown 
substantially as the Mercator Institute for China Studies (2016) explained. Accordingly, in 
August 2013, the State Council established the Leading Small Group on Counter-Terrorism 
(৽ ᙆᐕ֌亶ሬሿ㓴), which is a top-level body in charge of advising and implementing 
counter-terrorism work, led by the Minister of Public Security. Along with the establishment 
of the National Security Commission (ѝཞഭᇦᆹޘငઈՊ), which is headed by Xi Jinping 
himself, this led to the centralisation and prioritisation of counter-terror policy-making at the 
highest level (Tanner and Bellacqua 2016). Wayne (2009) observed that controlling, 
constraining and steering Islam in Xinjiang is an important feature of their work, 
Kutkauskaite (2012) notes foreign policy measures on the issue involve transnational 
cooperation in fighting terrorism and the minimisation of foreign discourse on Xinjiang’s 
territorial integrity.13 There has been no research that examined how the media portrayed 
these changes to China’s counter-terrorism apparatus, despite its large impact on the Chinese 
people in form of the emerging surveillance state.  
 
Finally, studies on the party-state ideology show the long-standing strategies of sustaining 
political authority by promoting economic growth, stability and ethnic solidarity under the 
leadership of the CCP. Wayne (2007) contends that the party-state’s ambition in influencing 
public opinion through strategic narratives aims to maintain stability and gain the support of 
the public in counter-terrorist efforts. More recent studies continue to highlight the party-
state’s attempt of transforming the Chinese society through strategic communication into an 
environment hostile to terrorism, a society that is tied to and intertwined with the state (Lams 
2018; Lorentzen 2014). Brady (2012) demonstrates this with the 2009 Urumqi attack, after 
which the party-state immediately shut down of Xinjiang’s internet connections, using brute 
force and, a few weeks later, launching a new ethnic unity campaign with the slogan ‘we are 
all part of the same family’. New sources on the Xi administration argue that Xi Jinping’s 
centenary goal for China is to enhance the assimilation of all ethnic groups in China with the 
Han population, by continuing the promotion of national unity and economic growth as the 
benefit of stability (Clarke 2018). Given that the literature confirms the importance of the 
promotion of economic growth, stability and national unity, no study has yet examined to 
which extent the Chinese media frame these party-state ideals in the terrorism coverage. 
 
 
13 An example of Beijing expanding its counter-terrorist measures beyond the national border lies in counter-
terrorism cooperations with neighbouring states in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), with the 
five member states Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Russia (Chung 2004; Guang 2006; 
Wallace 2014). 
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The media gap  
Studies on the Xinjiang conflict and the party-state’s counter-operations have largely 
neglected media control as another tool for the party-state to try and achieve stability in the 
region and the nation. Instead, scholars who have investigated the Xinjiang conflict 
concentrate on either the party-state use of the terrorism label or describe the securitisation 
of the region in the form of counter-terrorism bureaucratisation and legislation, strike hard 
campaigns, economic development initiatives. Media coordination efforts would add to this 
list a consideration of the ‘hearts and mind’ approach Xi spoke of, in the sense that gaining 
public support is a strategy in addition to the regional securitisation to win public support 
for the party-state operations in Xinjiang. The section on Xinjiang operations highlights both 
soft approaches (economic development) and hard approaches (securitisation of the region), 
yet the two studies of the Urumqi riot in 2009 discussed in the first section of this chapter 
did mention that media coordination was one of these strategies. Until now, there was little 
consideration of the media’s role in the Xinjiang conflict for other cases after 2009 as well 
as well as more generally on the media communicating the terrorist threat construction of 
the party-state.  
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Situating the PhD research focus in the scholarship on China’s ‘terrorism’ problem 
Filling the gaps in the academic literature on China’s ‘terrorism’ threat 
The above literature review has uncovered an analytical gap that comprises of a lack of 
understanding of both how the Chinese news cover terrorism and how this differs from 
terrorism news framing in pluralist media environments. Regarding the former, the thesis 
presents empirical findings on the news media’s terrorism construction based on inductive 
qualitative content analysis and quantitative text analysis. These findings are compared and 
contrasted with common terrorism news framing patterns in the pluralist media environment 
of the US. This contribution opens up a debate on the party-state’s construction of terrorism, 
specifically in the media, as well as demonstrate in the spirit of the de-westernisation theory 
that terrorism framing theories are not universal across regime types. 
 
Regarding the media gap in studies of the conflict in Xinjiang, this dissertation adds insights 
on how the print media report on terrorism and how reporting relates to the party-state 
strategies of hard and soft power in Xinjiang. In doing so, it demonstrates media coordination 
efforts as another Xinjiang strategy as well as its link to other Xinjiang strategies, for 
example by framing an urgent and grave terrorist threat to back up the securitisation in 
Xinjiang. Theoretical research has established a connection between framing and 
authoritarian resilience, yet there had been a lack of an empirical analysis to demonstrate 
this link. The literature has shown China to be an ideal case for examining the relationship: 
there is a great deal of research available on both China’s authoritarian resilience strategies 
and media coordination efforts outside of the topic of terrorism. Additionally, consensus 
among studies on the Xinjiang conflict confirm the terrorist threat as party-state tactic to 
employ a wide-range of measures to stabilise the region as well as a few studies on the 
Urumqi riot in 2009 confirm media coordination efforts by Beijing. To conclude, the extant 
literature acknowledges the terrorism designation as framing strategy by the party-state but 
was up to this point lacking research situating this in the realm of the authoritarian resilience 
debate as well as exploring how the print media frame the constructed terrorist threat. 
 
The implications from the literature and the linkage to the research questions 
Aiming to fill the above-mentioned gaps in the literature on China’s terrorist threat 
perception, this dissertation’s research was guided by three core research questions:  
 
v To what extent can traditional predictors of (US-centred) terrorism coverage explain the 
amount of Chinese news attention for Chinese terrorist attacks?  
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v What are the prevalent frames in Chinese newspaper reports on domestic terrorism?  
v How did the prevalent frames change from 2009 to 2015?  
 
The literature review revealed the absence of studies that test what determines the amount 
of Chinese terrorism coverage, although this is well-studied for the US. However, following 
the debate on the de-Westernisation of media theory, findings from pluralist media 
environments of Western democracies require testing on whether they hold true for China 
with its media supervision and control by the party-state. Therefore, the analysis for this 
research question involved testing whether determinants of terrorism coverage in the US 
hold true for China as well (see chapter 4 for details on the hypotheses, determinants under 
analysis and the literature-driven rationale). The comparison with the US coverage continues 
regarding the news content with an inductive approach by answering the second research 
question. Following up on the analytical gap, this analysis uncovers how the Chinese news 
media portray terrorism and suggests differences to the US media’s terrorism construction. 
These findings will fill the media gap and empirical gap by not just adding the media 
perspective to the Xinjiang conflict scholarship but also establishing the relationship 
between the media construction of terrorism and the authoritarian resilience of party-state 
rule in China.  
 
The third research question emerged since the reviewed literature points towards an evolving 
party-state threat perception over time in China (i.e. the terrorism designation and the 
escalation of violence since 2014) and the ideological turn under the Xi administration. 
Therefore, the third part of the project was to identify changes in prevalent frames over time. 
The time period stretches from 2009 to 2015 since (1) the beginning of the millennium was 
relatively tranquil in regard to unrests in Xinjiang and the shift in terrorism designation after 
9/11 is well acknowledged by scholars, and (2) 2009 marks the Urumqi high-casualty riot a 
turning point in the escalation of violence and the party-state’s threat perception, until the 
number of unrests decreased after 2015 (RFA 2018). Therefore, altogether, these three 
research questions aimed to uncover the Chinese print media’s portrayal of terrorism by 
examining both the amount and content of news reports, as well as exploring prevalent 
changes over time. 
 
While a systematic analysis of Chinese terrorism coverage had been absent to this point, the 
literature review distilled several implications for the Chinese media coverage of terrorist 
events. The conceptual framework on the connection between authoritarian resilience and 
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framing suggests that Chinese leaders would employ media management tactics to cover the 
Xinjiang conflict in ways favourable to the party-state. Chen’s (2012) study of the Urumqi 
incident in 2009 confirmed this, demonstrating that the party-state has shifted over the years 
from denial to news coordination efforts aimed at positive publicity. This observation 
provides insight on how terrorism is constructed as party-state tactic and to examine how the 
news media communicate this construction to the public within a censored media 
environment. 
 
The few existing framing studies on the Urumqi 2009 incident, expanded by the rich US-
centric terrorism-media scholarship, provide further expectations on the Chinese news 
construction. For instance, the former indicates negative stereotypes of Uyghur and strong 
reliance on government sources in the press coverage. The US sources further suggest the 
prevalence of adversarial frames, Islamophobia, both episodic and thematic frames, the 
abstraction and demonization of the enemy other, and the urgency of preventive counter-
terrorism efforts, the notion of a ‘war on terror’ and success of these efforts if the US people 
stand united and supportive of these actions. Nonetheless, the framing analysis for this thesis 
was conducted inductively to avoid bias as the result of the scholarship’s focus on pluralist 
media environments. China scholars often speak of China’s ‘war on terror’ when referring 
to the Xinjiang conflict, yet it remains to be tested with this is a common frame in the Chinese 
news portrayal or a US feature.  
 
Moreover, the literature revealed a shift in the party-state’s Xinjiang strategies since Xi 
Jinping took over in 2013. With Xinjiang ‘under new circumstances’ during the Xi 
administration, scholars already identified comprehensive securitisation efforts, stronger 
public opinion guidance to distinguish between official truths and ‘rumours’, and stronger 
reinforcing of party ideology of ethnic solidarity and economic development. This 
comprehensive package of party-state measures suggests the media to reflect the Xinjiang 
conflict and counter-operations in accordance with the party-state policies. The thesis will 
be the first study that contributes with insight to which extent the news media cover and 
reinforce the necessity of securitisation, ideology and public opinion guidance in accordance 
with the party-state’s Xinjiang efforts. 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
Chapter 3: Methodology 
 
To answer each research question, the research for this dissertation involved a combination 
of qualitative and quantitative methods. The methodological decisions reflect the purposes 
of this study: on the one hand, taking an inductive approach by exploring the Chinese 
media’s construction of terrorism; on the other hand, testing deductively whether Western 
media theories on the determinants of terrorism coverage hold true for China. Regarding the 
latter, I discuss the variables and hypotheses related to the analysis in a separate methodology 
section in Chapter 4.  
 
The first research asked how well US determinants of terrorism coverage can explain the 
Chinese terrorism coverage. To answer this question, I used regression region analysis in 
which I tested the explanatory power of the number of deaths, proximity of the news 
organisation to the attack, tactic variables and target variables for the extent of Chinese 
terrorism coverage. I also tested for the relevance of whether the newspaper is an official 
party-state press or commercial; I also tested whether party-state claims of ETIM’s 
responsibility for the attack increased media attention, given that this terrorist group is a key 
actor in the party-state’s terrorist threat construction. In addition, I analysed leaked 
censorship instruction of the party-state to gain insight in how well China’s censored media 
environment can explain why some terrorist attacks receive more media attention than others. 
For the second research on prevalent news frames, I used qualitative content analysis and 
quantitative text analysis. I began with the former by open coding a sub-sample of 458 news 
articles to identify and formulate framing categories. Based on the open coding observations, 
I used indicator questions to gain empirical evidence on framing patterns in the sub-sample. 
In addition, quantitative analysis of the most frequently occurring words and their 
relationships to each other in the full data set of 2291 collected news reports not just validates 
the qualitative observations but visualises framing patterns in word networks. These methods 
led to the discovery of ten prevalent frames in Chinese terrorism coverage. 
 
The third research question asked for the prevalent frame changes over time. I analysed the 
frame changes over time by comparing the news coverage across eight terrorist attacks that 
range from 2009 to 2015. I used the indicator questions on framing patterns to identify 
changes across cases. Quantitative similarity tests and structural topic modelling provided 
further insight into the extent of framing differences across cases.  
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The chapter begins by reviewing the research aim and purposes, before moving to the data 
collection and analysis strategies. A discussion on the validity of the research findings 
complements this insight into the project’s methodology. Chapter 4 on the determinants of 
terrorism coverage provides an additional research design section that centres around the 
regression analysis process and the selection of the variables for testing. 
 
Research aim, purposes, and approach 
The aim of my research project was to understand how Chinese newspaper reports portray 
the (domestic) terrorist attacks and whether determinants of the extent of US terrorism news 
coverage are equally relevant in China. The project involved a combination of quantitative 
and qualitative methods with various research purposes. The research is: 
 
v Exploratory purpose: The research explored inductively what prevalent frames exist in 
Chinese terrorism coverage. This exploration involved a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. 
v Descriptive purpose: The dissertation’s purpose is to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the news frames portray the terrorist threat in the Chinese media. The 
research focused on the news output, aiming to present an image of the prevalent 
reporting patterns that reach the Chinese public. 
v Explanatory purpose: The research also involved testing to what extent determinants of 
US terrorism coverage are of relevance in China’s censored media environment. 
Therefore, the purpose of the dissertation was also to discuss the explanatory power of 
Western media theory on the extent of Chinese terrorism coverage. 
 
The analysis used a mixed-method approach, comprising both inductive and deductive 
components. An inductive approach to examining terrorism news framing in China was 
needed due the lack of systematic analysis on the subject. Rather than merely testing whether 
findings from the Western-centred scholarship on terrorism news framing hold true for 
China, the inductive approach allows an exploration of news frames that can bring forward 
both similarities and differences in news content between China and ‘the West’. The 
literature review in Chapter 2 demonstrates that terrorism news frames found in pluralist 
media environments may not be the same as those in China’s censored media environment.  
 
I used a deductive approach in two parts of the project. First, I analysed the determinants of 
the extent of terrorism coverage using predictor variables that had been found in previous 
studies (see chapter 4 for a discussion of these variables). This allowed me to explore 
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deductively whether US determinants of terrorism coverage hold true in China, therefore 
contributing to the de-Westernisation of media theory debate. Second, although my news 
content analysis relies on an inductive open coding process, my findings on prevalent news 
frames are compared to what is known on US terrorism news frames. This involves an 
inductive approach using both qualitative content analysis and quantitative text analysis, 
supported by the use of indicator questions.  
 
The data collection process 
Case selection 
My analysis is based on a multi-case study design using eight ‘terrorist’ attacks that occurred 
between 2009 and 2015. The attacks are as follows: 
 
Table 3-1: Selected cases (with brief event description) 
v Case 1: July 5, 2009 (Xinjiang): A series of protests that were sparked by a migrant Uyghur who was 
accused in South China of sexually assaulting a Han female (and groups of both ethnicities fought with 
several deaths). The protests escalated in violent attacks with around 200 people dead and 1800 people 
injured.  
 
v Case 2: June 26, 2013 (Xinjiang): 35 people were reportedly killed in a conflict between Uyghurs and 
police in the town of Lukqin. The Xinjiang regional government blamed the incident on a 17-member 
terrorist group. In the following security crackdown in Xinjiang by the People’s Liberation Army, 380 
Uyghurs were arrested and officially 3 were executed for leading terrorist groups. 
 
v Case 3: October 23, 2013 (Beijing): An SUV plowed into a group of tourists and burst into flames at 
Beijing’s historic Tiananmen Square, killing the three occupants as well as two pedestrians. The Beijing 
Municipal Public Security Bureau described the incident as rigorously planned, organised, 
premeditated, and violent terrorist attack. 
 
v Case 4: March 1, 2014 (Yunnan): Eight individuals armed with knives attacked passengers at the 
Kunming train station, killing 29 and injuring 140. PRC authorities described the incident as an 
organised, premeditated, serious and violent terrorist attack. 
 
v Case 5: April 30, 2014 (Xinjiang): Two assailants attacked bystanders with knives and bombs at 
Urumqi’s train station, killing 3 and injuring 79 people. The attack occurred just hours after the 
conclusion of President Xi Jinping’s inspection tour of Xinjiang. 
 
v Case 6: May 22, 2014 (Xinjiang): Two cars crashed into and Urumqi market and suspects reportedly 
threw up to a dozen explosives into the crowded street market, killing 43 and wounding another 90 
people. 
 
v Case 7: July 28, 2014 (Xinjiang): Armed gang of Uyghurs attacked police station and government 
offices before moving to other cities. Xinhua reported that nearly 100 people were killed (37 civilians, 
59 attacks, 4 security officers) and over 200 arrested following a allegedly premeditated terrorist attack 
on a police station in Shache County.  
 
v Case 8: September 18, 2015 (Xinjiang): Uyghurs with knives struck at a coal mine at night, killed the 
security guards and the sleeping miners. At least 50 people, most Han Chinese, were killed in an attack 
on a coal mine in Aksu County by knife-wielding assailants. This attack happened during national 
celebrations to mark the 60th anniversary of the establishment of the Xinjiang region.  
Source: Tanner and Bellacqua 2016. See also Clarke 2012/2018; Godbole and Goud 2012; Roberts 2018; 
Tredaniel and Lee 2018. 
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A challenge in the case selection came with the question of what counts as a terrorist attack 
and according to whom. The first chapter already highlighted the definitional debate around 
the term ‘terrorism’ as well as the global questioning of the party state’s terrorist threat 
designation. To avoid a definitional debate on what counts as terrorism, I selected incidents 
for study which the party-state labelled as acts of terrorism. I began the search for appropriate 
cases by searching for ‘terrorism’ (⽏⼕) in the newspaper databases Wisesearch and CND 
(see next section for detail). Among these news reports, incidents in the years 2013 to 2015 
were covered most frequently as terrorist acts, including the above listed cases. Additionally, 
although there is no full list of how many incidents the party-state has labelled as terrorist 
attacks, the eight cases under study were consistently discussed by scholars of the Xinjiang 
conflict as party-state labelled acts of terrorism (see sources for Table 3-1). These lists 
pointed to the July 2009 riot (Case 1) as the first clearly party-state defined terrorist attack 
since September 11 2001 and listed additional incidents for the following years with the 
above cases appearing in these publications consistently as party-state labelled terrorist acts. 
Furthermore, I used the University of Maryland’s Global Terrorism Database (START 2018, 
see next chapter for details) to get a sense of the estimated total number of terrorist attacks 
in China for the time period the above eight cases cover. It showed that between 2009 and 
2015 65 terrorist attacks occurred in China, eight of these attacks were used for this research 
project. 
 
Beyond receiving the terrorism label by the party-state, I selected the Cases 1, 2, 6, 7 and 8 
due the high number of casualties that led to strong party-state attention according to the 
above-mentioned sources. For the other three cases, the selection criteria were contextual 
factors that possibly increase media attention. Starting with case 1, the Urumqi 2009 incident 
is the only terrorist attack that has received attention by media researchers, therefore made a 
good starting point for this research project to compare observations (Barbour and Jones 
2013; Zeng et al. 2013). Moreover, it was the first high-casualty terrorist attack of the 21st 
century in China was interpreted by the party-state as ‘China’s 9/11’ (Roberts 2012; Clarke 
2018). Case 2 in Xinjiang’s Lukqin was another high-casualty incident with 35 deaths. The 
third case occurred in October 2013 at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing with a car crash 
resulting in three deaths. Although the number of casualties is lower than in the previous 
cases, I included it for the cultural and political significance the Tiananmen Square has to 
China and the party-state (i.e. see Cheng 2011; Fewsmith 2001). The next case occurred in 
March 2014 at Kunming train station (Yunnan province in South China), where 29 people 
died in a knife attack – both a high number of casualties as well as an attack outside of 
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Xinjiang. Case 5 one month later in Urumqi’s largest train station involved fewer casualties, 
but it coincided with Xi Jinping’s speech in Xinjiang on the successful fight against terrorism 
and received attention due to the brutality of knife attacks at a central station. Both cases 6 
and 7 again were a high-casualty incident that involved a series of explosions in a street 
market as well as knife attacks. The final case in Xinjiang’s Baicheng was the latest incident 
at the time of data collection, while receiving much publicity due to the number of casualties 
as well as this being an assault at night. 
 
Newspaper articles as unit of analysis, the data sources and the time frame 
The study’s units of analysis are newspaper articles published in the 30 days following each 
of the eight selected domestic ‘terrorist’ events. To my knowledge, publicly available 
databases for television and radio do not exist in China (Stockmann 2013). My focus is 
therefore on traditional print media. Unlike other studies that tend to examine only 
newspapers’ front pages as indicators of their coverage, the analysis here examined all 
coverage in the aftermath of the terrorist events in the newspapers listed in the next section.  
The population of news reports was gathered from two online Chinese newspaper databases, 
(1) Wisesearch, and (2) Qinghua Tongfang’s China National Knowledge Infrastructure Core 
Newspaper Database (CNKI-CND). Not only does the use of these databases make the 
newspaper content easier to collect, it also contains the articles in their print version. The 
CND newspaper database of CNKI is commonly used in Chinese media research (i.e. 
Carlson et al. 2010; Stockmann 2013; Wang 2018; Ye and Pang 2011); it was launched in 
1999 by Tsinghua Tongfang Knowledge Network Technology Company and includes over 
700 Chinese newspapers, covering from 2000 to date. Wisesearch is a Chinese and English 
database of over 900 media sources aggregated by Wisers Information Ltd base in Hong 
Kong. It claims to offer the world’s largest archive of Chinese language newspapers and has 
been increasingly used in China media studies for this reason and because of its user-friendly 
interface (Cheng 2016; Du 2016; Tong 2014). Both databases are the most comprehensive 
full-text databases for Chinese newspapers and have gained academic recognition as such. 
These two databases were used to extend the range of accessible newspapers and thus 
partially overcome the newspaper selection bias that results from the use of a single database. 
 
Turning to the time frame of the analysis, I chose the first four weeks after each incident for 
the exploration of news frames. Time periods for news coverage analysis vary widely, 
ranging from those that look at major frames which have become established over several 
years (Chermak and Gruenewald 2006; Ruigrock and van Atteveldt 2007) to those of few 
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weeks or days which aim to identify prevalent frames after terrorist threats or assess their 
ephemerality (Chyi and McCombs 2004; Falkheimer and Olsson 2014; Matthews 2015; 
Nevalsky 2015; Roy and Ross 2011; Zeng et al. 2015). To my knowledge, two to four weeks 
is the most commonly used time frame in framing analysis of terrorism coverage. I chose to 
analyse reports in the four weeks after each terrorist event because with a lack of systematic 
analysis of Chinese terrorism coverage it was ‘safer’ to go for the longer time frame.  
 
Newspaper selection 
Twelve Chinese newspapers made up the data source (see Table 3-2 for name and brief 
description). The newspapers are listed below by the main area of circulation; an additional 
list of sources that also used the listed newspaper is available for further reference.  
 
Table 3-2. Selected newspapers (and further readings)  
National circulation Academic studies 
People’s Daily  
(Ӫ≁ᰕᣕ) 
Official party-state press, representing the 
opinion of the head of the CCP and the 
national government of China, and published 
worldwide with a circulation of 3 to 4 million. 
Lee 2015; Tang 2012; Tang and 
Bie 2016; Tong 2014; Yang 2012; 
Zhang 2012 
Southern Metropolis 
Daily (ইᯩ䜭ᐲᣕ) 
Market-oriented newspaper with 1.6 million 
daily circulation.; it is also the largest daily 
newspaper in Guangdong. 
Dai 2014; Tang and Bie 2016; 
Tong 2014/2015; Wu et al. 
2015; Yan and Kim 2015 
Yangzi Evening News 
(ᢜᆀᲊᣕ) 
Market-oriented newspaper with a 
circulation of 1.74 Mio. Daily, based in 
Nanjing. 
Tang 2012; Yan and Kim 2015 
Xinmin Evening News 
(ᯠ≁ᲊᣕ) 
Market oriented newspaper with circulation 
of 1 million. 
Han et al. 2017; Peng and Tang 
2010. 
 
Beijing Region Academic studies 
Beijing Daily 
(ेӜᰕᣕ) 
Official party-state press (of the CCP Beijing 
Municipal Committee) with a circulation of 
400.000 daily. 
Lee 2015; Repnikova 2017; 
Stockmann 2013; Zhao 2018 
Beijing Youth Daily 
(ेӜ䶂ᒤᣕ) 
Official newspaper of the Communist Youth 
League committee in Beijing. It is very and 
with 5 million daily circulation very popular. 
Lee 2015; Zhang 2009 
Beijing Evening News  
(ेӜᲊᣕ) 
Market-oriented newspaper with a daily 
circulation of 800.000. 
Lee 2015; Rui 2010; Stockmann 
2013; Tang and Bie 2016; Tang 
and Iyengar 2012 
Beijing News 
(ᯠӜᣕ) 
Market-oriented newspaper with a daily 
circulation of 576.000. 
Lee 2015; Li and Sparks 2016; 
Tong 2014 
 
Xinjiang Region Academic studies 
Xinjiang Daily 
(ᯠ⮶ᰕᣕ) 
Official party-state press with daily 
circulation of 124.000 in Xinjiang. 
 
 
Guangdong Region Academic studies 
Nanfang Daily/ 
Southern Daily (ইᯩᰕ
ᣕ) 
Official party-state press with daily 
circulation of 1.7 million. However, it is 
known to be more market-driven than other 
party-state daily’s and is very popular. 
Yang 2012 
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Guangzhou Daily 
(ᒯᐎᰕᣕ) 
Official party-state press with daily 
circulation of 1.9 million. Again, known 
among academics to be more market-
oriented than other party-state papers. 
Peng and Tang 2010; Tang 2012; 
Wu et al. 2015; Qin et al. 2018; 
Zhang and Fleming 2005; Zhou 
et al. 2008 
Yangcheng Evening 
News (㖺෾ᲊᣕ) 
Market-oriented newspaper with a daily 
circulation of 1.4 million. 
Chia 2018; Duan and Takahashi 
2016; Yan and Kim 2015 
 
I developed a three-level criteria model for the newspaper selection in order to include in the 
analysis papers that have (1) high circulation rates, (2) varying areas of circulation, (3) are 
considered by media researchers to be more or less commercialised (see Figure 3-1). This 
model goes beyond the usual selection based just on popularity (measured by selling rates) 
as it also accounts for the proximity to the terrorist event and the ties to the party-state 
supervision. I deem this approach necessary to ensure that the diverse newspaper universe 
in China was well-represented in the dataset. All of them are daily newspapers to ensure that 
each newspaper is equally represented in the news frame analysis. An analysis of any photos 
that might be published together with the articles was not possible since either database did 
not provide access to these. The rationale for each of the three selection criteria was as 
follows: 
 
Figure 3-1: Newspaper selection criteria 
 
 
a) Area of circulation. Nationally circulating newspapers were selected for the large reader 
base across the country. Beijing and Xinjiang press was selected based on my theory that 
event coverage in the news media varies across the country. This perspective was 
grounded in two reasons. First, proximity theory in media research suggests that events 
gain more media attention the closer they happen to the audience or news organisation 
(Ruigrok 2007; Woods 2011; Zeng 2015). Said literature often argues that this is the 
result of increased relevance assigned to the news event. Second, with media 
coordination efforts confirmed earlier as strategic tool of the authoritarian leader, I 
suggest that the news product is different depending on whether it circulates in Xinjiang 
Degree of party-state supervision
Official press Commercial press
Circulation rate
Newspapers with high selling rates
Area of circulation
Circulation in Xinjiang, Beijing, Guangdong and national
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as the nexus of terrorism and ethnic unrest, or the distant centre of political power of the 
party-state in Beijing. Guangdong province was included as control case, to include 
newspapers that are well-studied in China research in terms of media reporting and act 
as a reference point for comparison with the other newspapers in the dataset.14  
 
b) Circulation rate: In the second step, I follow the footsteps of most news media 
researchers by identifying those newspapers that have a high readership and thus appear 
influential in setting the tone for coverage in their respective areas and have the greatest 
impact on the Chinese public (i.e. Lee 2015; Xie 2012; Yang 2012; Zeng 2015; Zhang 
and Fleming 2005). The information is drawn mostly from academic research (see Table 
3-2) but was also cross-checked and updated using internet sources that facilitate current 
selling numbers (Bandurski 2018; People’s Daily Online 2010; Wang 2017).   
 
c) Degree of party-state supervision: This selection criteria is the result of scholars, such as 
Stockmann (2013), distinguishing newspapers by the extent of received media control 
into official (⁙ᣕ), semi-official (㕙ㆤ) and commercial newspapers (忼ⴁㆤ) (see also 
Yang 2012; Tang and Tang 2016). A first reference point was Stockmann’s surveys with 
Chinese journalists on the matter. She distinguished Chinese newspapers into the above 
three levels of reporting autonomy based on the opinions of domestic media practitioners. 
 
Figure 3-2: Overview of newspapers by level of commercialisation 
 
Source: Stockmann 2013: 71. 
 
14 The theory on framing variance posited here has not yet been tested for China and will object to another 
future research project with the dataset (i.e. comparison of frames between newspapers), yet it is a measure to 
ensure a good representation of the available newspapers in the large country of China. As such, it is also a 
necessity to include newspapers other than those circulating in Xinjiang in order to make conclusion on how 
the Chinese press more generally portray terrorism. 
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A second reference point was that of media ownership. Different publisher groups (ㆤ
ᴙ旅◡) responsible for issuing newspapers have a varying number of CCP officials 
represented in the editorial board, thus suggesting they are likely to follow official press 
content to different degrees (more when they have more CCP officials on their board) 
(Lee 2015; Zhang 2010). Moreover, by doing so I wanted to make sure to avoid selecting 
newspapers in the same circulation area that all come from the same publishing house to 
ensure better representation of the local press. However, recent publications on the 
tightening of media control under the Xi administration as well as the rather unclear 
division of what counts as semi-official or commercial lead me to distinguish newspapers 
by two categories, into the official party-state press (i.e. People’s Daily, Beijing Daily) 
and their more commercialised competition (i.e. Southern Metropolis Daily, Beijing 
Evening news).  
 
The search string for data collection 
Most studies on terrorism news coverage use the word terrorism to identify news reports for 
the data analysis and therefore lost the chance in obtaining a representative sample of the 
universe of news coverage on the topic. While I agree that this strategy allows researchers 
to identify news reports that are strongly related to the terrorist event and makes the data 
collection faster, the sample would exclude articles that refer to the events differently, such 
as by riot, crisis, conflict. I consider this approach as not advisable for this research project 
as it would introduce a selection bias. First, this is the first in-depth analysis of Chinese 
terrorism coverage and as such limiting the search radius to those articles that refer to the 
events as terrorism would contradict the exploratory nature of this project. Although the 
party-state labels the incidents as terrorist acts, this approach allows consideration of any 
articles that use other terms to describe the events. Second, several studies show the Xinjiang 
conflict as a multi-faceted one with much room for labels to be chosen by journalists (i.e. 
ethnic conflict or terminology for the types of attacks), making the sole use of the terrorism 
label a selection bias in the data collection.  
 
I developed what I call a ‘minimal consensus approach’ to formulate a search string for the 
collection of news reports. The idea behind this approach is to identify search criteria that 
can be applied to all cases despite their unique event characteristics. The result was for each 
case a search string that includes for the ‘terrorist’ event: (1) the location (province, city, and 
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other sub-provincial units if the reports seem to use these as well); (2) date; (3) the ‘9/11’ 
label used to refer to the incident. This process is outlined below in detail. 
 
i. In the first stage of exploring terrorism reporting, I used ‘terrorism’ ( ᙆѫѹ) as the 
search word in combination with the date of the incident. This was necessary to gain 
first insight into how Chinese newspapers report on the event. The reports commonly 
showed the date and location as reference points for the event. Moreover, the reports 
showed the use of a ‘9/11’ label to stress the gravity of the incident (i.e. for the July 
5th, 2009 Urumqi riot it was ‘7·5’) and employ other terms of classification in 
addition to terrorism (i.e. violent incident, riot, knife attacks). The conclusion was 
the aforementioned position that merely using the term terrorism (and date for 
specification) would result in selection bias. 
 
ii. Searching for other event characteristics as search word criteria, I explored news 
reporting with search words for: (1) What --classification of the event; (2) Who -- 
label of the offender (i.e. terrorist, criminal, Uyghur); (3) When -- when it happened; 
(4) Where -- where it happened; (5) How -- what happened. Through this approach, 
I learned that only the location and date are search criteria that can be applied across 
the cases to ensure consistency in how news articles were collected for all cases.  
 
iii. Further exploration of the search string included the exact configuration of the date 
and location criteria. For instance, theoretically it would be plausible that reports 
would not just use the date but refer to it as occurring yesterday, two days ago, last 
week and so on. However, I did not find this to be the case. Instead, articles used the 
date (day and month) as reference (i.e. for case 1, ‘5㓤 7㘇’ for the 5th July 2009). 
Regarding the location, I theorised that local press might specific the location 
differently to other newspapers (i.e. to the district or prefecture, while the latter might 
refer Xinjiang more generally). This has been the case where the attack did not occur 
in the capital city (i.e. Urumqi in Xinjiang, Kunming in Yunnan). For the cases 2 and 
8 (see table 3-3), I have found prefecture or district names being used in some reports 
as well. 
 
The result of this process is a search string for each case that includes a combination of the 
variables location, data and event label. A very small number of articles were manually 
removed from the dataset because there was no relevance to the topic at all (i.e. description 
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of the weather in the province on that day without any relation to the event). This was a 
necessity due to the general search word criteria, yet only those articles that included no 
relation to the conflict in Xinjiang were removed from the analysis (less than 1%). The search 
strings for each case were as presented in Table 3-3. Case 1 serves as example for translation, 
the search string in English is: ‘(Xinjiang and (date or label)) or (Urumqi and (date or label))’. 
So, news reports are available that either include the combination of Xinjiang and date/label 
or Urumqi and date/label in the headline or news body of the article. 
 
Table 3-3. Search string for data collection, sorted by case                              
 Case Date Search string 
1 Urumqi 
2009 
05/07/2009 (㒯䒅 and (7㘇 5㓤 or ‘7·5’)) or (ᵋ殀㘧湏 and (7㘇 5㓤 or ‘7·5’)) 
2 Lukqun 
2013 
26/06/2013 (㒯䒅 and (6㘇 26㓤 or ‘6·26’)) or (殀⁊㮀 and (6㘇 26㓤 OR ‘6·26’)) 
or (怮⒃ and (6㘇 26㓤 or ‘6·26’)) or (⌏殀䑩 AND (6㘇 26㓤 or ‘6·26’)) 
3 Beijing 
2013 
28/10/2013 (∖ᶫ and (10㘇 28㓤 or ‘10·28’)) or (⠨⪈擧 and (10㘇 28㓤 or ‘10·28’)) 
4 Kunming 
2014 
01/03/2014 (ᶐ≖ and (3㘇 1㓤 or ‘3·1’)) or (㔅㔍 and (3㘇 1㓤 or ‘3·1’)) 
5 Urumqi 
2014 
30/04/2014 (㒯䒅 and (4㘇 30㓤 or ‘4·30’)) or (ᵋ殀㘧湏 and (4㘇 30㓤 or ‘4·30’)) 
6 Urumqi 
2014 
22/05/2014 (㒯䒅 and (5㘇 22㓤 or ‘5·22’)) or (ᵋ殀㘧湏 and (5㘇 22㓤 or ‘5·22’)) 
7 Shache 
2014  
28/07/2014 (㒯䒅 and (7㘇 28㓤 or ‘7·28’)) or (劍幥 and (7㘇 28㓤 or ‘7·28’)) 
8 Baicheng 
2015 
18/09/2015 (㒯䒅 and (9㘇 18㓤 or ‘9·18’)) or (放⁊凎 and (9㘇 18㓤 or ‘9·18’)) or 
(㇛⛍ and (9㘇 18㓤 or ‘9·18’)) or (凎⵱ and (9㘇 18㓤 or ‘9·18’)) 
Research validity 
Given that the primary purpose of all types of research is to reach valid conclusions, most 
books on social science research methodology cover validity as an important criterion for 
the research project’s quality. Validity refers to what the research measures and how well it 
does so. The two distinct types of validity are internal validity and external validity. Internal 
validity is the ability of a research design to rule out or make implausible alternative 
explanations of the findings, thus leaving confidence in the prescribed findings. External 
validity is concerned with the generalisability of the results of a research study (for further 
details, see Bryman 2004; King et al. 1994; Marczyk et al. 2005). 
 
High internal validity is challenging with the exploration of news frames as main part of the 
research project, yet my use of triangulating qualitative and quantitative methods led to 
arguments with high levels of certainty. Triangulation is the use of a diverse set of methods 
and sources of evidence to investigate research problems through multiple forms of exposure. 
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Regarding the news framing analysis in this project, the news data came from two 
academically well-acknowledged databases for Chinese newspaper content. I was able to 
consider a larger range of newspaper due to access to these two databases, therefore reducing 
selection bias which is a potential risk when access is limited to a single database. 15 
Furthermore, the analysis included twelve newspapers with various areas of circulation, 
therefore enabling the best possible representation of the universe of newspapers given the 
scope of the project. The same argument can be made on the multi-case study. Moreover, 
the exploration of news frames entailed various methods, that is the inductive open coding 
process of 20 per cent of the data population (which was empirically evidenced with 
indicator questions in the appendix), with high intercoder reliability, and the exploratory 
quantitative text analysis. The congruent observations from the qualitative analysis, 
quantitative analysis and the second coder provide a high level of internal validity and strong 
confidence in the findings presented in this dissertation. 
 
Several choices in the research design were made to achieve high external validity, mainly 
the multi-case study design, the large number of newspapers, and the inductive approach in 
exploring news frames instead of limiting the research to frames found in Western news 
content. Both the framing observations from the sample analysis and the quantitative text 
analysis of the full dataset clearly point towards the existence of two main frames that define 
the terrorism news construction (for further detail, see Figure 5.1 and Chapter 5). The strong 
confidence in this observation resulting from the triangulation of methods, and the 
comparative perspective by analysing various newspapers and cases suggest a high level of 
external validity. Nonetheless, of course, the framing observations need further testing with 
a larger dataset. In this regard, the role of this research was to first explore news frames so 
that follow-up studies can take a more deductive approach in testing frame prevalence across 
a larger dataset. 
 
The framing analysis process 
The framing analysis comprised of a combination of inductive qualitative content analysis 
and quantitative text analysis. The initial exploratory analysis for frames began with the open 
coding of 20 per cent (n=458) of the collected news articles in NVivo. This process took 
 
15 Some readers might have concerns on any Chinese newspaper database providing merely censored news 
content. I contend that this possibility is part of this dissertation’ argument: the news product communicated 
to the public has overcome various layers of party-state monitoring and amendments, therefore allowing 
conclusions on what the party-state wants the public to know about the terrorist events. As such, the news 
construction is a product of China’s censored media environment. 
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place with a representative sample, created by using a random number generator for 
assigning the articles from the study population randomly (King et al. 1994). 
 
The open coding process relied on close reading of the data, aiming to classify news content 
as belonging to particular coding categories and thus identifying prevalent frames. In the 
first step, the material was read through and headings written down to describe aspects of 
the content. These headings were collected and grouped into more abstract categories. This 
process continued until the prevalence of frames became visible. Therefore, I understand a 
frame as a coding category that establishes, based on combining sub-categories, a defining 
feature of the terrorism news construction. This process is illustrated in Figure 3-3 below 
(for more information on the open coding process, see Elo and Kyngäs 2007; Krippendorff 
2012; Saldana 2016). 
 
Figure 3-3. Example of the open coding process 
 
Source: Elo and Kyngäs 2007: 111. 
 
Since this was the first comprehensive analysis of Chinese terrorism coverage, an inductive 
approach was necessary to minimise preconceptions from the Western-focused terrorism 
media scholarship and to be open to new frames that appear due to China’s different media 
environment (see Chapter 2). As explained in the literature review on framing theory As 
explained in the beginning of the literature where I looked at framing theory, the framing 
analysis process I describe a more flexible definition of frame in comparison to Entman’s 
definition to avoid limiting the exploration of Chinese news content with his observations 
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from Western pluralist media environments. As Chapter 5 will show in more detail, I 
discovered frames on moral evaluation, problem definition, cause and treatment as 
mentioned in Entman’s definition of frames, but also discovered additional frames that 
would not be found unless taking an open coding approach. While I argue that this is of merit 
for this first systematic analysis of Chinese terrorism news coverage, the limitations of the 
subjective nature of the open coding process is further discussed in the conclusion (for 
additional discussion on this and qualitative content analysis, see Blair 2015, Braun and 
Clarke 2019, Hsie and Shannon 2005, Schreier 2013).  Many studies have demonstrated that 
the strength of the open coding lies in the exploration of and immersion in the data (Corbin 
and Strauss 2015; Saldana 2016). While there is simply a need to explore what is yet barely 
studied, I also gained deep insight into the news content which in turn enriches the discussion 
in the following chapters though various examples and observations.  
 
However, this manual coding process is time-consuming because of the interpretation and 
classification tasks it involves by the researcher. Therefore, the analysis was limited to a 
sample size of 20% of the study population (2291 articles). Also, since the open coding 
process relied on subjective judgements, a second coder analysed 100 randomly selected 
articles (from the sample) to ensure the validity of the framing observations. The second 
coder was a Chinese student at the University of Glasgow, and I trained the student in the 
open coding analysis by drawing on the terrorism news content under analysis. This allowed 
an understanding of frames as main coding categories that are made up of sub-categories 
and help the second coder to find examples for the frames under analysis. The second coder 
was involved in testing the coding process twice, with 50 articles each time, after the first 
stage of formulating main coding categories and after the second stage of improving these 
codes. The first time, the primary and secondary coder reached identical framing 
observations at an average of 75% per article, ranging between 63% and 92%. A discussion 
with the second coder revealed that the initially lower similarities in the 60s and low 70s was 
mainly due to misunderstandings of what later in this thesis is classified as counter-terrorism 
frames (Figure 5-1). Where the counter-terrorism frames involved moral evaluations of the 
terrorist act or the state response to it (i.e. demonization frame, aptness frame), the second 
coder would not classify descriptions of the terrorist’s brutality as fitting the demonization 
frame and would not classify blood donations as fitting the aptness frame. The second time, 
the student seemed to have a clearer sense of the meaning of each frame and several 
examples for each frame led to strong agreement in the framing observations. On average, 
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there was 84% agreement between the two coders, ranging across the sample between 78% 
and 100%. This left strong confidence in the inter-coder reliability of the findings. 
 
Based on the open coding observation, I designed 16 indicator questions to further analyse 
each newspaper article in the sample. The purpose of these indicator questions was to garner 
empirical evidence for the initial exploratory analysis. Answers to these indicator questions 
provided an understanding of the prevalence of particular frames (for Chapter 5) and served 
to identify changes in frame prevalence over time (for Chapter 6). The second coder agreed 
with this list of indicator questions to reflect the open coding findings on prevalent frames. 
Chapter 5 draws on these findings, together with the findings from the open coding process. 
 
I then quantitatively analysed all 2291 articles in R. I did this for two reasons. First, the 
quantitative analysis served as measure for backward validation. Since the qualitative and 
quantitative analyses ran separately from each other, an overlap in the observations leaves 
strong confidence in the findings on frame prevalence. Second, the quantitative and 
qualitative analyses complemented each other. The qualitative analysis enabled an 
understanding of the news content yet was constrained to a small sample size, whereas the 
quantitative analysis explored frames for the full body of the study population but requires 
understanding based on qualitative readings in order to interpret the findings. The 
quantitative analysis output, such as the word network analysis (see Chapter 5), demonstrate 
that the findings aligned. 
 
Several steps of pre-processing the news data were necessary for the quantitative text 
analysis. First, all documents were converted into “.txt” files to ensure that the corpus was 
machine-readable for the text analysis in R. For this purpose, I used the suite of tools 
available in the Chinese Natural Language processing toolkit of the Stanford Natural 
Language Group (2018).  This approach was also employed by Roberts et al. (2013) when 
analysing Chinese newspaper content by the use of unsupervised text analysis.  Chinese 
word segmentation and the removal of a standard set of Chinese stop words was processed 
before analysis. Chinese word segmentation is discussed by a growing number of China 
quantitative researchers as a crucial step towards Chinese language processing tasks, due to 
the unique characteristics of Chinese language structure. Chinese words are generally 
composed of multiple characters without any delimiter appearing between words. Chinese 
has no spaces between words and therefore text analysis techniques that rely on the word as 
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the unit of analysis cannot naturally parse the word into individual units (Chen and Xu 2015; 
Shu et al. 2017; Zeng et al. 2008; Zhao et al. 2013).   
 
Afterwards, the text analysis comprised of: frequency analysis to identify the most common 
words in the dataset; word network analysis that visualises the associations between words; 
and structural topic modelling to identify themes and similarity analysis for comparison of 
news content over time. The structural topic model developed by Roberts et al. (2013) is an 
unsupervised text analysis approach that does not require prior analysis of the data, assumes 
a mixture of topics in each document and estimates these topics based on word frequencies 
and correlations in the corpus. It was built on well-established topic models, such as the 
latent dirichlet allocation, and is to the best of my knowledge the only unsupervised model 
that has yet been applied to Chinese news content (Roberts and Stewart 2014). Moreover, it 
has received recognition as useful tool for the exploration of themes in text in other fields 
(i.e. Bauer et al 2016; Grimmer and Stewart 2013; Munksgaard and Demant 2016; Roberts 
et al. 2016; Truex 2016). Altogether, the quantitative text analysis methods provide insight 
into prevalent frames by use of frequent terms and their relationship to each other. 
 
Research strategies by chapter 
Following this methodology chapter are three analysis chapters, each oriented towards 
answering one research question and using different research strategies. These analysis 
chapters also have their own research design sections to describe the concrete approach for 
the analysis and specify the variables and hypotheses relevant for the discussion. Below is a 
brief overview of the research strategies. 
 
Chapter Four presents findings on the extent to which ‘traditional’ determinants of terrorism 
news coverage hold true in China. The analysis involved a deductive approach in which the 
literature on terrorism coverage was reviewed to identify the determinants of terrorism 
coverage. This was then tested by fitting negative binomial regression models to the dataset, 
with the number of news reports for each case and newspaper as the response variable (also 
called dependent variable). The analysis comprised of two parts. In the first part, the 
regression analysis was used for all 65 terrorist attacks listed for China in the Global 
Terrorism Database (START 2018) from 2009 to 2015. While the inclusion of all listed 
terrorist attacks enabled the discovery of findings on the explanatory power of the 
determinants with the highest possible level of external validity, the second analysis focused 
on the eight cases of the same time period, which were further investigated as part of the 
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news framing analysis. Contrasting the observations from both datasets provided further 
insight into the similarities and differences in the determinants of terrorism coverage. 
 
Chapter Five elaborates on the prevalent frames of the Chinese news construction of 
terrorism. These findings derived from a combination of inductive qualitative and 
quantitative methods. The research process began with an open coding analysis of a 
representative sample that comprised of 20 per cent of the collected newspaper article 
population (2291 articles), with articles assigned to the sample by use of a random number 
generation. The open coding process of the sample took place in NVivo, aiming to gain first 
understanding of how the news report on terrorism and to identify the frames for analysis. 
To provide empirical support for framing observations, 14 indicator questions were 
developed which were answered with each news report as unit of analysis. A second coder 
coded 100 randomly selected articles from the sample using the developed codebook on the 
news frames, with high inter-coder reliability confirming the coding observations. The 
second coder further agreed with the indicator question representing well the most prevalent 
frames in the dataset. This exploratory process was followed by various text mining methods 
(frequency analysis, word network analysis, topic modelling) as another method to validate 
the coding observations. These text mining measures were conducted in R. The text mining 
approach drew on the full population of news reports collected and identified prevalent key 
words and the strength of their relationship in the news text independently of the previous 
qualitative process. Thus, both methods mutually validate and contextualise each other in 
their findings. 
 
Chapter Six is a continuation of the methods used in Chapter Five. The aforementioned 
indicator questions were here divided by case (each terrorist attack) in order to identify 
changes in the news framing over time. I used structural topic modelling and similarity tests 
which, together with the insights from the open coding process, further aided in the pursuit 
of identifying prevalent changes over the time period 2009 to 2015.  
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Chapter 4: The Determinants of Chinese Terrorism Coverage 
 
The motivating question for this chapter was why some terrorist attacks in China receive 
more news coverage than others. This led to posing the research question of the extent to 
which traditionally strong determinants of (US-centred) terrorism coverage can explain the 
extent of terrorism coverage in China. This chapter will conclude on this question that the 
existing literature with its US focus is only moderately able to explain Chinese terrorism 
coverage. This is important because the quantity of coverage can be an important influence 
on the public perception of terrorism (see Kearns et al. 2019 for further details).  
 
The chapter starts with a visual overview of the number of newspaper articles identified 
across the eight cases listed in the previous chapter, which illustrates that news coverage 
varies strongly by case and therefore raises the question of its determinants. The subsequent 
research design section then draws on the extant literature to explain the determinants under 
study and formulate the hypotheses.  
 
The analysis section that then follows, is comprised of three parts. The first part draws on 
all 65 terrorist attacks listed by the Global Terrorism Database for the time period 2009 – 
2015 to answer the research question with the highest level of external validity possible. The 
second part narrows the research focus to the eight cases that received further scrutiny as 
part of the news framing component of my thesis project, both to understand what 
determined their coverage specifically while also contrasting it to the population of terrorist 
attacks analysed in the first part. The final part draws on leaked censorship instructions that 
provide case-relevant information on the media environment in which the terrorism coverage 
took place. Together, these findings demonstrate that US determinants have only moderate 
explanatory power for the extent of Chinese terrorism coverage. The Chapter will further 
conclude that the combined research observations empirically confirm the tight grip of the 
party-state over the media coverage of the domestic terrorism as well as suggest the party-
state constructing the terrorist threat. 
 
The research context: The news coverage data and prevalent trends 
I collected 2,291 articles from 12 Chinese newspapers, covering 8 ‘terrorist’ attacks that 
occurred in the period 2009-2015. Figure 4-1 illustrates the amount of news coverage each 
case received in the Chinese press, while also contrasting it to the number of deaths displayed 
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on the secondary vertical axis since scholars discuss casualties as a traditionally strong 
determinant of news attention (Harcup and O’Neill 2017). 
 
 Figure 4-1: Total number of news reports by case (with number of deaths) 
 
Source: START (2018) on deaths; CNKI-CND (2019) and Wisesearch (2019) on news reports. 
 
The Figure shows strongly varying numbers of both news reports and deaths across cases, 
while also showing an inconclusive relationship between these two factors. The first three 
cases seem to have a positive relationship between number of articles and deaths, with the 
first case having high numbers of deaths and reports, while cases two and three have small 
numbers in both these categories. The other cases do not share this pattern. Cases 4, 5 and 6 
had a similar number of deaths as the two previous terrorist attacks yet the former received 
three to four times the amount of news coverage. In the last two cases, the death toll even 
exceeds the number of news reports, with the eighth case receiving almost no coverage. The 
collected data might already suggest that the number of deaths is not a good determinant for 
the news media attention the eight terrorist attacks received. It further reveals strong 
variation of attention across cases, therefore raising the question of what determines the 
extent of terrorism coverage. 
 
Further insight can be gained from Figure 4-2, where the collected data is separated by the 
newspaper and its main area of circulation. As explained in the previous Chapter, the area 
of newspaper circulation was divided into National, Beijing, Guangdong, Xinjiang, with a 
total number of 12 newspapers. The additional average line in each diagram shall facilitate 
easier comparison of the news coverage between areas of circulation, which would otherwise 
be difficult with the stacked bars for each newspaper. Thus, Figure 2 allows a comparison 
of trends in news coverage across cases, areas of circulation and newspapers. 
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Figure 4-2: Number of news reports by case, circulation area and newspaper 
 
 
 
 
Source: CNKI-CND (2019) and Wisesearch (2019) on news reports. 
 
In all four areas of circulation, the average line shows a similar pattern across cases. That is, 
the average number of news reports decreased from case 1 to 3, increased slightly and 
remained relatively stable in the following three cases, before then decreasing further on the 
last two attacks. The similar trend in the average number of news reports by case might 
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suggest that the location of the terrorist attacks and newspaper is not a strong predictor of 
the extent of terrorism coverage each event received. One exception to this observation 
occurred in Xinjiang with case 4 (terrorist attack in Yunnan, outside of Xinjiang), when the 
Xinjiang Daily covered the event with less than 10 newspaper articles and therefore issued 
a quarter of what newspapers in the other areas devoted to the subject. 
 
Another observation from the Figure is the higher amount of coverage by newspapers that 
circulate on the national level, while official party-state press (People’s Daily, Beijing Daily, 
Guangzhou Daily, Nanfang Daily, Xinjiang Daily) seem to publish a slightly higher number 
of articles on each terrorist attack in comparison to local papers. Further insight from the 
data can be gained by visualising the extent of news coverage over the period of four weeks 
after each terrorist attack. Figure 3 presents the average number of newspaper articles 
published on each day of the four weeks following each incident. It is the average behaviour 
of the media for all eight cases taken together, this should be interpreted with caution in 
consideration of the strongly deviating behaviour of the Xinjiang press and the differences 
across cases shown in the previous graph. 
 
Figure 4-3: Average number of reports published over 4 weeks after terrorist attacks 
 
 Source: CNKI-CND (2019) and Wisesearch (2019) on news reports. 
 
The above trend in news coverage aligns with the phases of public opinion trends Tsai (2016) 
described for China. Accordingly, there are periods of incubation, development, upsurge and 
fall-back. During the incubation period (the day of the event and the following day), social 
media posts remain minor due to the party-state immediate employing information control 
to prevent escalation of public communication on the issue. After the first day, in the 
development period, posts were surging up in number and continued to reach their peak 
during the upsurge period in the following days. A slow fall-back period would continue. In 
the case of the news data presented above, news coverage is already surging up strongly on 
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the following day of the event, therefore skipping Tsai’s incubation period. Indeed, studies 
on the Urumqi 2009 event reviewed in Chapter 2 suggested strong party-state interest in 
managing media reporting on the event. The above data might suggest that the party-state 
was immediately able to coordinate news coverage so that reporting began quickly the 
following day of the event. Media reporting peaked in daily average on the second day 
already (upsurge period) and remained stable for a few days. The fall-back period on around 
the 5th day after the event yet the incident continued to receive (minor) media attention for 
the following weeks. Reading the news data as part of the open coding process (see Chapter 
5) revealed that the news reports in the third and fourth week usually just refer in a single 
sentence to the incident when highlighting its severity. 
 
In conclusion, three main observations can be taken away from the data presentation. First, 
the number of deaths seems to be no strong determinant of media attention for the eight cases. 
Second, there seem to be no vast differences in the amount of coverage that party and 
commercial press have devoted to the incidents. Third, news media attention seems to follow 
the usual media behaviour of a ‘media hype’ shortly after the event and slowly falls back. 
Overall, the data demonstrates variation in media attention across cases, illustrating the need 
for a thorough research into what determines the amount of news coverage.  
 
Research design 
Media coverage is best analysed quantitatively using count models, among which recent 
studies have found negative binomial regression models to be most suitable to account for 
overdispersion of the count response variable (Hilbe 2011/2014, Stroup 2012).16 The next 
section begins with analysis of the data for the response variable (also called dependent 
variable) to explain the reason for using the negative binomial regression model to fit the 
data. Further tests on the data structure made the use of a multi-level design necessary, in 
which I tested the relationship between the response and predictor variables by accounting 
for variation of the number of news articles across each of the eight cases and each of the 
twelve newspapers within these cases.  
 
The selection of the predictor variables under study derived from the scholarship on 
terrorism coverage which receives review on the following pages. The data on the predictor 
 
16 This is because the news data violates the Poisson assumption that the variance is equal to the expected value. 
Because the variance far exceeds the expected number of occurrences, the data exhibit considerable 
overdispersion. For further details see the citations in the text. 
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variables came from the global terrorism database (START 2019), a database collected and 
maintained under the auspices of the START Centre (Centre for the study of terrorism and 
responses to terrorism) at the University of Maryland. Global terrorism database (GTD) 
captures a variety of information on terrorist attacks, including – but not limited to – date, 
geographical location, perpetrators, targets, weapons and methods used, number of victims 
killed and wounded, and an estimate of material damage (for more on GTD, see LaFree et 
al. 2015). It has already gained academic recognition in other studies on terrorism coverage 
as useful source for terrorist event characteristics (i.e. Behlendorf et al. 2016; Berkebile 2016; 
Jetter 2014/2017).  
 
The analysis of the correlation between response and predictor variables for this Chapter 
comprised of two parts. First, the correlation was conducted for all 65 terrorist attacks listed 
in the Global Terrorism Database and other studies on the course of China’s terrorism 
(Roberts 2018, Tanner and Bellaqua 2016) for the time period 2009 to 2015. Conducting the 
analysis with all available attacks for the time period enables conclusions on the 
determinants of Chinese terrorism coverage with the highest level of external validity 
possible. Second, I conducted another regression analysis with the eight terrorist attacks, 
listed in Chapter 3, which I analysed in more depth in the framing analysis. While the focus 
of this PhD project rested with an understanding of the eight cases (see Chapter 3 for the 
reasons), comparison on the findings between these two parts of the analysis provided more 
insight in in which aspects these attacks might differ. 
 
Regarding the eight cases of ‘terrorism’ under study in this dissertation, insight into the 
censored environment was available with leaked censorship instruction provided by the 
China Digital Times (2019) on most of the cases under study, which confirm party-state 
efforts to control or censor aspects of the events (for their detailed analysis in combination 
with the following regression analysis findings, see Chapter 4). The extant literature on 
authoritarian resilience (discussed in Chapter 2) further suggests that violent public unrest is 
a politically sensitive issue that is likely to attract strong news coordination efforts by party-
state organs. Moreover, beginning in 2014, the Xi administration issued a string of policies 
to tighten up the regulation of the entertainment, media, and culture industries and urge them 
to follow the party line and avoid ‘becoming the slave of the market and bearing the stench 
of money’ (Hobbs and Roberts 2018). The party-state’s attempt to ‘manage’ the media 
reporting of ‘terrorist’ events has already been noted (in the literature review in Chapter 2) 
for the Urumqi riot in 2009. While this observation raises questions about how the Chinese 
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news media portray the terrorism in a controlled media environment, scholarly observations 
on media commercialisation in China also demand framing analysis to examine the diversity 
of framing across newspapers. 
 
The response variable: The count of newspaper articles 
The response variable (variable name: ‘articles’) was a raw count of Chinese newspaper 
articles that reported the eight terrorist attacks in 2009 – 2015. This number of news reports 
derived from the data collection using the CNKI-CND (2019) and Wisesearch (2019) 
newspaper databases, as outlined in the previous Chapter. To confirm whether the data ought 
to be modelled using a poisson or negative binomial model, I began the analysis by testing 
the amount of overdispersion in the data set. The fundamental characteristic of a poisson 
distribution is equidispersion, meaning that the mean is equal to the variance of the 
distribution. As a benchmark, without taking any predictors into account, a simple variation 
calculation of the response variable already suggested substantial overdispersion, with the 
variance being nearly 21 times the mean (see Appendix 1 for the test results). Below 
histogram displays the overdispersion in the long right tail of observations.  
 
Figure 4-4: Frequency distribution of the response variable ‘articles’ 
 
 
While the histogram confirms the overdispersion issue, it also shows that the data set did not 
contain a large number of zeros. Therefore, zero inflation was not a primary concern and the 
utilisation of a zero-inflated model was not necessary. One additional standard approach to 
test the better fit of the poisson over negative binomial regression model is the Likelihood 
Ratio Test (LR test). The test confirmed that the negative binomial regression model a better 
fit for the count data, with a p-value less than 0.01 (see Appendix 1 for the test results). 
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Applying a Poisson model, which assumes the variance is equal to the mean, would lead to 
type I errors. All these diagnostic tests confirmed the negative binomial estimation being a 
better fit to the data set than the poisson model.  
 
The negative binomial regression is a generalisation of the poisson model that accounts for 
over dispersed count observations (Hilbe 2014/2017). This model is relatively free from the 
overdispersion problem, as it adds a dispersion parameter in the relational equation of the 
mean and the variance. It has been confirmed in recent analyses of news coverage as being 
highly appropriate for count variables (i.e. Friendly 2017; Hilbe 2017), as was the case for 
this research. The next part of the diagnostic tests involved the decision on whether to use 
of a single-level or multi-level negative binomial regression model. Instead of fitting a 
regression for each case separately, I ran multi-level model tests for the correlation between 
response and predictor variables while controlling for the variation between each case and 
each newspaper within each of these cases (also called random effect). The units are 
newspapers and cases which form two levels (see Figure 4-5). The lower units form the 
newspapers and the higher units form the cases in the analysis.   
 
Figure 4-5. Two-level structure of the news data set 
 
Level 2: 
Case 
 
 
 
 
Level 1: 
Newspaper 
Note: For further sources on multi-level data structures, see Gelman and Hill 2006. 
 
Following Hajduk’s (2017) suggestion, another likelihood ratio test was run that compared 
the single-level and multi-level model in order to conclude on the importance of accounting 
for the variation in the count observation across newspapers and cases by using a two-level 
model. The output provides conclusive evidence of case effects on article, with a p-value 
again being close to zero. Below, Figure 4-6 further displays this by plotting the case-level 
residuals and their associated standard errors for all 65 cases in the data set. 
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Figure 4-6. Ranked case residual estimates and standard errors 
 
Note: Random effect residuals with standard errors to examine the differences between the 
cases, confirming the importance of accounting for the case effect in the multilevel model.  
 
The caterpillar presents the estimated level 2 residuals which is accompanied by 95% 
confidence intervals to demonstrate the uncertainty of their estimation due to sampling 
variability. The horizontal line to y=0 corresponds to the average case. There are 65 residuals, 
one for each case. The residuals represent case departures from the overall mean, so a case 
in which the confidence interval does not overlap with the line at y=0 (representing the mean 
article value across all cases) differs significantly from the average at a 5% level. The width 
of the confidence interval associated with a particular case depends on the standard error of 
that case’s residual estimate, here, the intervals are narrow and of similar width. Figure 4-6 
shows that approximately a quarter of the intervals do not overlap with the zero line, which 
means that choosing a case at random has a probability of roughly 25% that it will have a 
residual judged significantly different from the mean. This confirms a two-level negative 
binomial regression model is necessary to account for the variation of predictor effects across 
the cases. With the model selected and the response variable tested, the next step is the 
literature review on the predictors under study.  
 
The predictor variables: The ‘traditional’ determinants of terrorism news coverage 
Studies on what determines the extent of terrorism coverage is often situated in the larger 
debate on ‘newsworthiness’, with strong research focus on why terrorism receives more 
media attention than other public issues and why some terrorist attacks receive substantially 
more attention than others. Galtung and Ruge (1965) coined with their work the term 
newsworthiness by putting forward a list of twelve factors which they argued determine how 
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much attention a media outlet devotes to a news story.17 Galtung and Ruge (1965) distilled 
these factors, or news values as they called them, from Norwegian newspaper coverage of 
crises in the 1960s in Congo, Cuba and Cyprus, though their greatest contribution to media 
studies seems to be the observation itself that the news media attention and content depends 
on certain criteria. 
 
Newsworthiness further became a common term in news journalism. For instance, Boyd 
(1994) explained that news journalism follows a broadly agreed set of values, which editors 
and journalists are trained in through practice to determine ‘what sells’. Since Galtung and 
Ruge’s (1965) contribution, manifold empirical studies, such as Shoemaker and Cohen’s 
(2006) news analysis in ten countries, supported the argument that certain events are 
similarly newsworthy around the world. Shoemaker and Cohen found this shared notion of 
newsworthiness in the popularity of sports, international or national politics, cultural events, 
human interest, and other topics. While there certainly has been no end to the list of news 
values over the last 50 years, some of the most agreed news criteria for news stories involve 
the geographic proximity of the events, topicality, relevance, human interest, entertainment 
and conflict (for further details on news values, see Harcup and O’Neill 2001;Semetko and 
Valkenburg 2000;Yan and Kim 2015;  Zillich et al. 2012). 
 
Research on news values has largely followed two theoretical streams: one is event-oriented 
and the other focuses on contextual factors. Geographic proximity, for instance, has long 
been held as a determinants of news media attention under the assumption that neighbouring 
events are more salient than news stories of distant locales. Violence is one of the most 
prominent topics in the news media, as Kearns et al. (2019) states, of which the severity of 
an event tends to statistically account for media attention. Context-oriented research focuses 
on underlying news factors, investigating political, economic, and demographic traits that 
influence media coverage. Common context-oriented factors evaluated as determinants 
include press freedom (Gottlieb 2010) and human rights issues (Maier 2019). McCombs 
(2005) made clear why understanding the drivers of media attention is so important: while 
media coverage does not necessarily determine how people feel about an issue, it still sets 
the tone for which issues they discuss and how they discuss them. In re-visiting Galtung and 
Ruge’s list of news value, Harcup and O’Neill’s (2001) own study has become one of the 
 
17 These news criteria include frequency, threshold, unambiguity, meaningfulness, consonance, 
unexpectedness, continuity, composition, reference to elite nations, reference to elite persons, reference to 
people, reference to something negative.  
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most cited articles of the journal Journalism Studies. In another revision of theirs in 2017, 
they developed a list of 15 news values for any type of news story, showing similarities with 
Galtung and Ruge’s list while also accounting for changes since then (see Table 4-2).18 
 
Table 4-2: Contemporary news values according to Harcup and O’Neill 
· Exclusivity: Stories generated by, or available first to, the news organisation as a result of 
interviews, letters, investigations, surveys, polls, and so on. 
· Bad news: Stories with particularly negative overtones such as death, injury, defeat and loss (of a 
job, for example). 
· Conflict: Stories concerning conflict such as controversies, arguments, splits, strikes, fights, 
insurrections and warfare. 
· Surprise: Stories that have an element of surprise, contrast and/or the unusual about them. 
· Audio-visuals: Stories that have arresting photographs, video, audio and/or which can be illustrated 
with infographics. 
· Shareability: Stories that are thought likely to generate sharing and comments via Facebook, 
Twitter and other forms of social media. 
· Entertainment: Soft stories concerning sex, showbusiness, sport, lighter human interest, animals, 
or offering opportunities for humorous treatment, witty headlines or lists. 
· Drama: Stories concerning an unfolding drama such as escapes, accidents, searches, sieges, 
rescues, battles or court cases. 
· Follow-up: Stories about subjects already in the news. 
· The power elite: Stories concerning powerful individuals, organisations, institutions or 
corporations. 
· Relevance: Stories about groups or nations perceived to be influential with, or culturally or 
historically familiar to, the audience. 
· Magnitude: Stories perceived as sufficiently significant in the large numbers of people involved or 
in potential impact or involving a degree of extreme behaviour or extreme occurrence. 
· Celebrity: Stories concerning people who are already famous. 
· Good news: Stories with particularly positive overtones such as recoveries, breakthroughs, cures, 
wins and celebrations. 
· News organisation's agenda: Stories that set or fit the news organisation's own agenda, whether 
ideological, commercial or as part of a specific campaign. 
Source: Harcup and O’Neill (2017): p. 1482 
 
Many of the above news values were found to be strong determinants of terrorism coverage 
in the US context or other democracies. For instance, violence is a key theme in news 
coverage of terrorism and covers in the above list the factors bad news, conflict, surprise, 
drama, relevance, and magnitude, if not even more.  
 
Research has found that the most common determinant of terrorism coverage associated with 
violence is severity, measured by the number of deaths or injured (Shoemaker and Cohen 
2006; Kearns et al. 2019). Another related determinant is the type of tactic involved in 
terrorist attacks, as, for example, with explosives or hijacking, attracting more media 
attention. The second component is information about whom the violence was against, 
conveyed through either the type of target or the proximity of the incident. The third 
component accounts for the nature of the study object: the terrorist organisation ETIM has 
 
18 Caple and Bednarek (2013) published a comprehensive overview of the news value research, including a list 
of news values with the respective studies that stretches over twelve pages.   
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since 2001 become key scapegoat in the party-state’s construction of the terrorist threat. 
Thus, another key theme in Chinese terrorism coverage might be whether there is an increase 
in press coverage when the party-state official claims ETIM/ is responsible for a terrorist 
attack. These five categories of news values were tested as determinants of Chinese terrorism 
coverage. Table 1 displays the above five categories and all variables included in the data 
analysis by name. The number of deaths was included in the model as count variable; 
whereas all other variables were binary coded as 0 and 1 for the absence or existence of an 
observation with the respective variable. 
Table 4-3: List of variable names in the data analysis 
Category Variable names 
1. Severity Deaths 
Deaths_30up 
Deaths_50up 
2. Location Location 
 
3. Tactic 
Multitactics 
Assault 
Explosive 
Transportation 
 Othertactic 
 
 
4. Target 
Multitargets 
Government 
Security 
Business 
Citizens 
Infrastructure 
 Othertarget 
5. ETIM    
   responsibility 
Claimed 
6. Newspaper type Official_press  
 
The following paragraphs provide further detail on each predictor and the related hypotheses. 
 
· Severity and tactic 
Terrorism media studies suggest that violence observed in terrorist incidents strongly affects 
the amount of news coverage along two dimensions – severity and tactic. In one of the first 
extensive studies on the predictors of terrorism coverage, Shoemaker and Cohen’s (2006) 
study of US terrorism coverage between 1998 and 2005 proposed deviance from the ‘average’ 
terrorist attack was an important indicator of the extent of news media attention. It sets an 
event aside as different from others and was operationalised into indicators such as novelty, 
oddity, unusualness, conflict, controversy and sensationalism (see also Yan and Bissell 
2018). Future studies followed this line of thought, though they usually became more 
concrete in the type of deviance tested. This has often been measured by the seriousness of 
the event, specifically the number of deaths or injured. Focusing on terrorism in the US 
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between 1980 and 2001, Chermak and Gruenewald (2006) found that attacks received more 
news coverage if there were casualties involved. Revisiting their findings for post-9/11 US 
coverage, Mitnik et al.’s (2018) analysis of the determinants of terrorism coverage in The 
Times confirmed that attacks that involved casualties are more likely to be covered and 
receive more detailed coverage. Kearns et al. (2019) continued this observation based on 
newspaper coverage from five national media outlets in the US. The finding on the 
continuing relevance of casualties is in line with the human negativity bias integrated into 
journalism routine as violence ‘sells’ (Albertson and Gadarian 2015; Miller and Albert 2015; 
Soroka and McAdams 2015).19 Comparing US and Chinese terrorism coverage determinants, 
Zhang et al. (2013) drew on 137 international terrorist attacks between 2004 and 2010 by 
testing statistically the predictive power of casualties in addition to measurements for the 
significance the terrorist attacks had for the respective country. They concluded that the 
number of casualties is the strongest predictor of terrorism coverage in both countries. To 
conclude, the above literature highlights that a high number of casualties, specifically the 
number of deaths, leads to higher amounts of news coverage. This is intertwined with a 
second empirical implication: the number of deaths will have a large effect on the amount 
of news coverage.20 
 
Hypothesis 1: Terrorist attacks with more deaths receive more Chinese news coverage 
 
Another relevant predictor is the tactic employed by the perpetrators, as also structuring the 
perceptions of its gravity. For example, Barack Obama’s statement following the Boston 
Marathon Bombing in 2013 is emblematic of this link between type of violence and threat 
perception: ‘any time bombs are used to target innocent civilians, it is an act of terror’ 
(Landler 2013). Huff and Kertzer’s (2018) research into public understanding of the term 
terrorism further shows that violent tactics are more likely to be classified as terrorism than 
non-violent ones, with those incidents involving bombings being more likely classified as 
terrorism than other forms of violence. Tactic types were coded based on GTD 
classifications, including assault, explosion, hijacking and ‘other tactics’. Creating an 
equally large number of tactic type variables was not deemed necessary for this study, given 
that the literature on China’s terrorist attacks highlights the above-mentioned ones as the 
 
19 The same observation was made in other types of crises that involved casualties, such as by Yan and Bissell’s 
(2018) analysis of natural disaster coverage, and Silva and Capellan’s (2018) research on mass shooting 
coverage. 
20 The model included the number of deaths as predictor variable rather than casualties. The reason for this is 
the strong variation in quantity of injured victims depending on the source of information. 
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most common tactics employed by the terrorists. The predictor category ‘other tactic’ 
includes any other tactic type but remained small in quantity, while the variable multitactics 
accounts for a combination of tactics involved in the attacks. Opposite to Chermark and 
Gruenewald (2006), Mitnik et al. (2018) found that explosives no longer draw much news 
media attention post 9/11. Armed assaults continue to receive considerable amount of media 
attention, whereas the use of transportation devices remains a weak predictor of media 
attention. The empirical implications of this prior research are that the extent of news 
coverage varies with the different tactics, with armed assaults receiving more news coverage 
and the use of transportation devices not having much impact on media attention. The 
expectation on the small effect of explosives derives from Mitnik et al.’s (2018) study, 
though more research remained necessary since his finding opposes studies that claim 
explosives highly salient among the public and therefore would attract media attention due 
to their audience orientation. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Terrorist attacks that involve armed assaults receive more Chinese news 
coverage, whereas the use of transportation devices or explosive has smaller effects. 
 
· Target and location 
In a study of international terrorism, Zhang et al. (2013) found attacks against politically 
significant targets, such as the government facilities or employees, to receive more coverage. 
Kearns et al. (2019) reached the same observation on the prevalence of attacks against the 
government by looking into US coverage analysis of terrorist attacks between 2006 and 2015, 
explaining this observation with the political dimension terrorism has (sending a clearer 
signal about intent). The publicity of government attacks appears to be a post-9/11 
phenomenon, given that Chermak and Gruenewald (2006) did not make this observation for 
pre-9/11. Furthermore, Huff and Kertzer’s (2018) analysis of the public ‘s interpretation of 
events as terrorism suggests further prevalence of attacks against civilians, though this yet 
had to be tested as news determinant. Nonetheless, attacks against civilians align with 
Harcup and O’Neill’s (2017) list of news value, as being a surprise, has high relevance and 
involves drama. Following the GTD’s categorisation of targets, though again limiting it to a 
few predictor variables while accounting for less frequent target types by inclusion in the 
variable other targets, the following target-level predictors were tested: multipletargets, 
government, police, business, citizen, infrastructure, othertarget. To my knowledge, there is 
no study that has tested attacks on the police, business and infrastructure as determinants for 
news coverage, yet the previously discussed Xinjiang studies suggest that the party-state 
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devotes great attention to economic and security stability. Therefore, I would expect that the 
occurrence of these target types would increase news coverage. The empirical driven 
expectation is that attacks against the government and civilians have a large, positive, effect 
on the amount of news coverage. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Terrorist attacks that involve attacks against the party-state, police, business, 
citizen, infrastructure, or multiple targets receive more news coverage, with civilian and 
party-state targets have a larger effect. 
 
The inclusion of the proximity between the place of the terrorist attack and the place of the 
news organisation was inspired by the proximity theory in media studies, arguing that 
relevance and interest for news stories increase with decreasing geographic and social 
distance (Liberman et al. 2007; Rosengren 1970). Huff and Kertzer (2018) exemplified this 
relationship between proximity and event newsworthiness by comparing the public response 
for the terrorist attacks in Paris and Lebanon that occurred in the fall of 2015. Western 
publics were criticised for selective empathy – as revealed by their willingness to change 
their Facebook profile pictures in solidarity with Paris, while mostly ignoring the attacks that 
had occurred in Lebanon the previous day. Several decades of research have confirmed 
empirically proximity as an important news value (Chang et al. 1987, Tunez and Guevara 
2009), research into the determinants of terrorism coverage reached the same conclusion on 
proximity. For instance, when it comes to international terrorism, both Jetter (2014) and Sui 
et al. (2017) demonstrated that terrorism coverage by US media outlets is largely dependent 
on proximity to and affinity with the United States. Ruigrok and van Atteveldt (2007) noted 
the same observation for newspapers in the US, UK and the Netherlands.  
 
Meanwhile, other scholars question the simplicity of the relationship between proximity and 
event newsworthiness, suggesting contextual factors as additional drivers for that 
relationship. Donnelly (2005), while supporting the proximity theory, argues that a single 
terrorist event can rarely usurp the proximity effect in the news but requires contextual 
factors to raise newsworthiness for the media. In their framing analysis of tweets on terrorism 
news, Kwon et al. (2017) gave the example of what they called social proximity as contextual 
factor. They showed that reference to outsiders (defined as socially distant others, with tweet 
examples given on immigrants, refugees and religious groups) led to more abstract news 
storytelling and reinforced social categorisation through ‘them’ versus ‘us’ portrayal. Wu 
(2007) adds historical, economic and social ties to the terrorist event as determinants of news 
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coverage. As it stands, the proximity theory still required testing for Chinese terrorism 
coverage. To apply proximity theory in the Chinese terrorism coverage model, I created a 
dummy variable measuring whether a terrorist incident took place in the same province in 
which the news organisation is located. The extant literature suggests that proximity plays a 
key role in the extent of news coverage. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Terrorist attacks that occurred in the same province as the location of the 
newspaper organisation receive more news coverage. 
 
· Perpetrator identity and newspaper type 
My regression model also included perpetrator identity as well as the reporting newspaper 
type as predictor variables to account for the findings on China’s media environment and 
terrorist threat perception. The incentive to do so came from Kearns et al.’s (2019) recent 
study on the determinants of US coverage in which he not only introduced the perpetrator’s 
Muslim identity as a potential news value but showed it to have the largest effect on the 
amount of US news coverage. The same argument can be found in Powell’s (2011/2018) 
framing analysis of US terrorism coverage. He argued that President George W. Bush has 
frequently juxtaposed Iraq and 9/11, resulting in a climate of fear of terrorism that is linked 
repeatedly to Muslims (Sikorski et al. 2018). According to Powell, this climate feeds further 
speculation about the possibility of future attacks and generates increasing amount of 
coverage. For China, data on the perpetrator’s identity for all terrorist attacks for the time 
period 2009 to 2015 does not exist to my knowledge and an information on their identity 
remains highly speculative given China’s earlier described efforts in constructing the 
terrorist threat with links to al-Qaeda. Instead, I created a binary variable for whether ETIM 
were claimed by the party-state responsible for the terrorist attack. The rationale for choosing 
the association to these terrorist groups as perpetrator identity variable is because the 
literature on the party-state’s terrorist threat construction emphasised East Turkestan 
independence movement, specifically ETIM, to be mainly responsible for China’s terrorism 
problem.21 Following research that shows ETIM/ to be at the centre of China’s ‘war on terror’ 
framing strategy, I hypothesise that ETIM/ claimed attacks receive more news coverage. The 
data on their accountability derived from the GTD database as well as non-empirical studies 
 
21 While various non-empirical studies even question the existence of these terrorist groups (i.e. Robertson 
2010, Tanner and Bellaqua 2016), it nevertheless remains a relevant factor in the news coverage when the 
Chinese party-state is suggesting them publicly to be responsible for the attack since it could lead to increased 
news coverage. Gunaratne et al. (2010). 
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that covered the course of terrorist attacks in China (Roberts 2018; Tanner and Bellacqua 
2016; Wayne 2007). 
 
Hypothesis 5: Terrorist attacks receive more news coverage when ETIM or are held 
responsible by the party-state for the events. 
 
Finally, a binary variable for the newspaper type shall account for the censored media 
environment covered at the beginning of this Chapter by testing for difference in the extent 
of news coverage between official party-state press and more commercialised press (i.e. 
Stockmann 2013, Lee 2015). Zeng et al.’s (2015) small-scale framing analysis of the Urumqi 
2009 news coverage suggests considerate differences between newspaper types. Although 
the analysis remained limited to news framing, not the extent of news coverage, he 
demonstrated that commercialised Chinese press developed more diverse news frame over 
time of the event coverage. In line with this, Zheng (2015) and Ho and Liu’s (2015) suggest 
that less commercialised press, specifically party-state press, cover daily events less than 
their more commercialised competition.  
 
Hypothesis 6: The party-state press produces fewer articles on terrorist attacks than their 
more commercialised competition. 
 
Regression findings for all cases from 2009 to 2015 
The small number of observations that is the result of the relatively low number of terrorist 
attacks from 2009 to 2015 made it necessary to replace the top-down approach of statistical 
modelling by an exploratory bottom-up approach. The top-down approach involves the use 
of a model with all theoretically relevant predictor variables at the outset, removing or re-
arranging variable to find the best fitted model. The benefit of this approach is the inclusion 
of all selected predictor variables (see Table 4-3) and through a step-by-step elimination 
method aims for a fitted model with the largest number of possible variables for analysis. 
However, the full model output (Model 20, see Figure 4-7) showed in the higher Akaike 
Inferential Criteria (AIC) and the lack of significant predictors not a good starting point for 
the top-down elimination method. Therefore, I designed an exploratory approach that 
involves producing a range of regression models with each model adding a single predictor 
variable to test the impact on the model fit and to identify patterns in the predictor effects 
across the regression models. Figure 4-7 displays the results of 20 two-level negative 
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binomial regression models with the count of newspaper articles as response variable, fitted 
to the data set for all terrorist attacks that occurred in China between 2009 and 2015. 
 
Figure 4-7: Negative binomial regression results for all terrorist attacks in China from 2009 - 2015 
 
Note: The regression output for each model involves the predictor estimates and robust standard error in 
brackets below. The asterisk over the estimates signals the significance level. Each of the models is the result 
of two-level negative binomial regression with the case-level as random effect and the listed predictor variables 
list on the left side of the Table as fixed effects. The estimates are log odds, so require exponentiation to 
interpret the effect on the number of news articles (presented on the following pages). 
 
The models 1 to 19 are part of the exploratory approach and the best-fitting model was 
defined as the one with a low AIC. The effect of the predictor variable on the response 
variable can be determined by the regression estimate listed in Figure 4-7 (Appendix 1). 
Since count regression techniques model the log of incident counts, the estimates are 
interpreted as follows: for a one unit change in the predictor variable (in the case of a binary 
variable that is the change between absence and occurrence of the factor), the log of the 
response variable is expected to change by the value of the regression estimate. For instance, 
in Model 10, for terrorist attacks that are in the same location as the newspaper organisation, 
the log count of newspaper articles is expected to increase by approximately 0.66. The 
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statistical significance of the coefficient is displayed by the p-value as asterisk in Figure 4-8 
(and is listed in the full summary Table in the appendix 1 under the column ‘P>|z|’). In this 
example, the p-value is below the standard threshold of 0.05, meaning that the finding is 
statistically significant, and the estimate can be interpreted. 
 
Starting with the Null model (Model 1), the addition of the location as predictor variable 
improved the model fit, as is signalled by the lower AIC of Model 2. Continuing on, the next 
models include measures of the number of deaths (‘deaths’ for the effect of one additional 
death, ‘deaths_20up’ and ‘deaths_50up’ on whether the death toll was equal to or higher 
than 20 and 50 respectively), tactic-level variables, target-level variables, ‘claimed’ where 
the authorities claimed ETIM responsible, and ‘official-press’ for the newspaper type. 
Across the Models 2-20, the location of attack and number of ‘deaths’ are significant and 
robust predictors of the amount of terrorism coverage, with a significance level below 0.05.22 
The predictor ‘claimed’ varied slightly across models, yet its significance level remains close 
to the desired 0.05 to allow for careful interpretation. The ‘official_press’ predictor appears 
non-interpretable due to low significance level, however, both the robust standard error in 
brackets and summary statistics across the regression models confirm the variable being 
close to the desired significance level and within the 0.10 range. Therefore, cautious 
interpretation of the estimate was accepted. The tactic-level and target-level variables appear 
insignificant across models, so their effect on the extent of terrorism coverage cannot be 
further interpreted. Both the location as well as ‘claimed’ show relatively strong effect on 
the number of articles, whereas the number of deaths and newspaper types remain weak 
predictors.  
 
Since the estimates in the regression models are log odds, exponentiation is required to 
interpret the extent of their effect on the number of news articles. Among the models with 
the lowest AIC, Model 10 was selected for further interpretation of the predictor effects on 
the response variable since the tactic-variable explosive with significance level lower than 
0.10 additionally allows cautions interpretation. The two alternatives, Model 8 with 
multitactics included and Model 19 with othertarget as additional predictor, deem 
theoretically less insightful on what exactly determines terrorism coverage in comparison to 
the specific tactic use of explosives. Additional diagnostic tests of Model 10 confirmed its 
 
22  Following common practice in political science, 0.05 has become the standard significance level for 
interpretation of regression estimates. Some scholars also interpret estimates below the 0.10 significance level, 
though with caution. 
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good fit to the data, therefore giving room for interpretation of the determinants of terrorism 
coverage. Following both Hartig’s (2018) and Friendly and Meyer’s (2016) suggestions, the 
diagnostic tests comprised of the calculation of scaled (quantile) residuals and plotting these 
against the predicted values to detect overall deviations from the expected distribution, and 
overdispersion tests (for the diagnostic test results, see Appendix 1). Model 10 is displayed 
below in Figure 4-8 and includes the seven predictor variables: location, deaths, deaths_30up, 
deaths_50up, explosive, claimed, official_press.  
 
Rather than reporting the results as log odds estimates (as in Figure 4-8), analysts usually 
measure their effect on the response variable by exponentiating the estimates (see also 
Incidence Rate Ratio for more details, i.e. Piza 2015). The exponentiated regression estimate 
represents the change in the response variable in terms of a percentage increase or decrease, 
with the precise percentage determined by the amount the estimate is either above or below 
1. This allows for a clearer communication of the predictor’s influence instead of using log 
odds. Below, Figure 4-8 displays the exponentiated estimates of regression Model 10. 
Continuing the previous example for the variable location in this model, the exponentiated 
estimate of location (1.93 at p<0.01) suggests that article counts increase by approximately 
93% if the terrorist attack occurs in the same region as the location of the news organisation. 
Conversely, the IRR of 0.70 for the predictor ‘explosive’ reports a 30% decrease when 
terrorist attacks involved explosives. The strength of the effect of each variable was 
illustrated by the dot, with residual errors indicating the confidence levels. Those variables 
with exponentiated estimates on the rights side of the red line, in blue, show a positive impact 
on the amount of terrorism coverage. Only the explosive and deaths_50up estimates shows 
a negative effect on the response variable.  
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Figure 4-8: Exponentiated estimates for regression Model 10 
 
 
Starting from the top, ‘claimed’ and ‘location’ are the strongest determinants with a positive 
effect on the scale of news coverage. While the variable on deaths over 30 cannot be 
interpreted due to lack of significance, the measurement for attacks that involve more than 
50 deaths is statistically significant and suggests a strong negative effect on the scale of news 
coverage where the death rate was high. The effect for ‘claimed’ appears to be strong, but 
confidence intervals are wide. So, one cannot exclude the possibility that the effect is much 
weaker or stronger. The IRR shows that when the party-state officially attributed 
responsibility for the terrorist attacks to ETIM, then news coverage is 138% higher than 
without it (or in other words 2.38 times higher). An almost similarly strong predictor is 
location, yet the smaller confidence interval leaves stronger certainty in the observation. 
Accordingly, terrorist attacks that occurred in the same provincial-level unit as the news 
organisation receive almost twice as much news coverage to those that occur somewhere 
else. The effect of both ‘deaths’ and official_press predictors are almost zero and this can be 
said with good certainty. While one additional death seems to have minor effect on the extent 
of news coverage, the official_press IRR suggests that party-state press cover terrorist 
attacks minimally more than their more commercialised competition. Finally, the predictor 
‘explosive’ can just be interpreted with caution since the wide confidence intervals (as well 
as a significance level between 0.05 and 0.10) leave relatively low certainty in conclusions. 
The regression shows that attacks where explosives were used received slightly less news 
coverage.  
 
Moving on to the revision of the hypotheses, the above regression model and the regression 
overview Table 4-7 allow conclusions on the predictive power of the variables under study, 
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with high level of generalisability for the time period 2009-2015 under analysis in this 
project since all 65 terrorist attacks listed in the database were included. However, poor 
model fit of the full model and rank deficiencies showed that more observations need to be 
collected to interpret all predictor variables, such as by extending the time frame in future 
research. Nonetheless, several conclusions can be made from the analysis. 
 
Hypothesis 1 on the strong effect of deaths on the scale of coverage need to be differentiated 
further. The estimates for ‘deaths’ shows death to be a strong predictor of the scale of 
coverage but the effect is weak positive. One additional death tends to slightly increase the 
extent of news coverage. The estimate for ‘deaths_50up’ shows that the hypothesis can be 
rejected, since attacks with the high death toll of 50 or higher receive much less news 
coverage. Both variables demonstrate that measures of the death toll can help predicting the 
extent of news coverage. While the increase in the number of deaths has a weak effect on 
news coverage (constituting a difference from the US), attacks with a relatively high death 
toll of 50 or higher receive much less coverage (in agreement with the US-centred research). 
 
Hypothesis 2 on the effects of the type of tactic employed by the terrorist can neither be 
rejected or confirmed since the large confidence intervals did not allow interpretation of the 
estimates. Model 6 suggests, though with relatively low certainty, that explosives in terrorist 
attacks receive less terrorism coverage, which indicates another difference to the US news 
coverage. For the same reason as with the tactic-variables, Hypothesis 3 on the type of target 
cannot be answered for China. In both cases, an increase in the number of observations, such 
as by extending the time period of analysis in future research, might allow for new findings 
on their relevance as determinants of news coverage. 
 
Hypothesis 4 that claimed strong positive relationship between the proximity of the terrorist 
attack and the amount of news coverage can be confirmed for China with strong certainty. 
Accordingly, the proximity theory holds true for terrorism coverage in China. However, an 
increase of 93% in news coverage where the incident occurs close to the newspaper 
organisation might be understood as moderate to strong effect. 
 
Hypothesis 5 on the effect of ETIM’s accountability for attacks can be confirmed with 
moderate certainty. Model 6 showed this factor to have the strongest effect on the number 
of news articles. Although the claimed involvement of these terrorist groups has been firstly 
tested as part of this study, the finding yet aligns with Kearns et al.’s (2019) broader 
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observation that the perpetrator’s Muslim identity, though he was focusing on religious 
identity, was a strong determinant of US terrorism coverage.  
 
Finally, Hypothesis 6 suggested that the party-state press would cover terrorist attacks less 
than their more commercialised competition. This can be rejected with moderate certainty 
(based on robust estimates across models and p<0.10). Accordingly, there is almost no 
difference in the amount of news articles commercialised and less commercialised papers 
publish on terrorist attacks in China. 
 
Similarities and differences with the determinants of the 8 cases 
The model fitting process began anew with the new data set on the eight cases introduced in 
Chapter 3. Beginning with the complex model, that includes all theoretical relevant 
predictors, led to a rank deficient model, an issue that could be traced back to the low number 
of observations that comes with just looking at eight terrorist attacks. A singularity test of 
this model showed strong singularity, together with very low variance on the case level. This 
shows that there is no need to include the case level as random effect (since correlations in 
the measurements within each group is low) but instead a single-level model is a better fit 
for the eight-case dataset. Only the variable location varies on the newspaper level, so 
removing the random effect by using a single-level model requires running two regression 
models. One regression model just includes the location predictor to account for variance by 
using a two-level model. All other predictors could be tests with a single-level regression 
model. Figure 4-9 illustrates the findings from the exploratory approach. 
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Figure 4-9: Negative binomial regression analysis results for 8 terrorist attacks in China 2009 - 2015 
 
 
Diagnostic tests (see Appendix 1) confirmed the good fit of Model 8 and left room for the 
interpretation of the predictor effects. This was visualised with exponentiated estimates in 
Figure 4-10 below, while also putting the model in comparison to the best fitted Model of 
the analysis for all cases in the time period 2009 to 2015 (Model 10). Putting these models 
in contrast allows interpretation of similarities and differences in the determinants of 
terrorism coverage and adds insight on the research question with additional predictor 
variables included in either model. While I recommend not to generalise from the findings 
of the eight-case model due to the small number of terrorist attacks included in the dataset 
(relatively low external validity), this analysis was deemed necessary due to this thesis’ focus 
on these eight cases. An understanding of both what determined the extent of news coverage 
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they received as well as the news framing allows together for a comprehensive understanding 
of the terrorism news construction. 
 
Figure 4-10: Exponentiated estimates for all-case and eight-case models 
Models with log odd estimates 
 
Models with exponentiated regression estimates (IRR) 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The regression Table on the left provides coefficient estimates, with the first model being Model 10 from 
the all-case analysis and the second model being Model 8 from the eight-case analysis in Figure 4-9. The 
coefplot on the right side presents the exponentiated estimates of both models, this allows interpreting the 
predictor effects on the response variable. 
 
Similar effects were estimated in both models for the predictor deaths, claimed and 
official_press, the models differ regarding the predictive power of assault, explosives due to 
lack of statistic significance in the respective other model. However, the comparison of both 
models provides new insight into the topic of the determinants of terrorism coverage with 
significant predictors that were not included in the all-cases model.  
 
In the tactic-level category, the assault estimate is highly significant and has a relatively 
strong positive effect on press coverage (assault: 3.53 at p<0.001). Accordingly, when 
terrorist events involved assaults (i.e. use of firearms or knifes), press coverage increase by 
353 per cent. The estimate for explosives only showed low statistical significance (p<0.01), 
so can only be cautiously interpreted: in both the all case model (Model 10) and a different 
Model for the eight cases (Model 9), the estimates equally show that press coverage 
decreases when explosives were used. From these two variables it becomes clear that the 
type of tactic employed by terrorist might be a strong predictor of terrorism coverage. The 
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analysis of the location variable required to fit a separate, two-level model since the variance 
for location was strong across both the newspaper and case level. The Model result (see 
details in Appendix 1) aligns with the all-case Model, which shows the positive relationship 
with the scale of news coverage. Accordingly, when terrorist attacks occur geographically 
close to the newspaper organisation, press coverage is higher by 93% (log odds estimate: 
0.66 at p<0.05; see Appendix for full Model summaries).  
 
In sum, comparing the findings from the all case dataset and the eight-case dataset, led to 
various findings on the predictive power of the determinants under study. The all case model 
allows for generalisation of the findings to the population of Chinese terrorist attacks in 2009 
to 2015. It showed that measures for deaths are strong predictors of the scale of news 
coverage; the proximity theory was confirmed with terrorist attacks in the same region as 
the news organisation receiving stronger media attention. However, the strongest positive 
effect on media attention was generated when the party-state blamed the terrorist group 
ETIM for the attack, which led to almost 2.5 times more press coverage. The strongest 
negative effect on media attention seems to be where terrorist attacks involved a relatively 
high death toll of 50 victims or higher. Due to the lack of observations, no further 
generalisable findings could be generated. However, further indication can be gained from 
the analysis of the eight cases. Accordingly, assault generated strong increase in press 
coverage, whereas terrorist attacks that involved explosive lead to less media coverage. 
Before moving to a discussion of the findings, the next section will review the censored 
media environment as another determinant of terrorism coverage. 
 
Leaked censorship instructions confirm party-state interference with the media 
coverage of terrorism 
Leaked censorship instructions confirm party-state interference as another determinant of 
Chinese terrorism coverage, though this could be not included in the statistical analysis since 
there is no indication of the population of internal media regulations and a selection bias of 
the people leaking the instructions. However, the leaked censorship instruction, with the 
largest number available through China Digital Times (CDT, 2019) for the time period this 
PhD project was focusing on, provide the unique insight into what otherwise requires 
stronger speculation on the party-state apparatus that oversees media content. Moreover, it 
adds to the previous statistical analysis an account of China’s non-pluralist media 
environment by showing what is being omitted or highlighted in the Chinese press. Among 
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the available censorship instructions, six out of the eight terrorist attacks analysed for the 
PhD project received censorship instructions that were available in the China Digital Times. 
 
Table 4-4. Availability of leaked censorship instructions 
 Case Date Available censorship instruction? 
1 Urumqi 2009 05/07/2009 Yes  
2 Lukqun 2013 26/06/2013 Yes  
3 Beijing 2013 28/10/2013 Yes 
4 Kunming 2014 01/03/2014 No 
5 Urumqi 2014 30/04/2014 Yes  
6 Urumqi 2014 22/05/2014 Yes 
7 Shache 2014 28/07/2014 Yes  
8 Baicheng 2015 18/09/2015 No 
 
Case 1, the Urumqi riot in 2009, was the only ‘terrorist attack’ since then that received 
academic research regarding the party-state’s Xinjiang operations and media strategies (see 
Chapter 2). The CDT reveals one media directive with two main orders, issued three days 
after the incident. The first order is to block comments on the grievances between Uyghur 
and Han Chinese in Xinjiang and specifically with any relation to the incident. This was also 
the case with the Shaoguan incident, which academics, media and government (Clarke 2018) 
considered the cause of the Urumqi riot (violent conflict between Han and Uyghur in a 
Shaoguan factory in Guangdong due to allegation of the sexual assault of a Han Chinese 
female). The second order involves the identification of a long list of ‘black list’ key words, 
demanding that these are filtered in favour of promoting ‘white list’ words instead (the white 
list words were not available in the CDT archive). Black list words relate mostly to (1) the 
Shaoguan incident, (2) grievances between Uyghur and Han Chinese, (3) past unrests in 
Xinjiang and Tibet, (4) Politburo members (without further context). It appears from this list 
that particularly the topic of ethnic conflict, prior local unrest and the cause are being filtered.  
These orders confirm the use of media instructions to block, filter and promote news content, 
as was also claimed by a Chinese Web publisher reported in a Radio Free Asia report (RFA 
2014) published shortly after the incident. The CDT further presents two timely updates, 
based on news sources and press releases, demonstrating the government’s effort in 
promoting the return to order and the allegation of the World Uyghur congress and Rebiya 
Kadeer as having instigated the unrest. Altogether, these insights into the first case confirm 
the scholarship findings reviewed in Chapter 2, which highlighted a turning point in China’s 
media strategy from denial and censorship towards ‘controlled’ openness through 
coordination of news content (see Chen 2012; Roberts 2012).  
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The next case, in Xinjiang’s Lukqin in 2013, resulted in 25 deaths and received much less 
news coverage (see data presented at the beginning of this Chapter). The CDT had one 
directive from the State Council Information Office in which they demand (1) only to re-
publish Xinhua reports on the incident and (2) to remove any other coverage, discussions, 
images and opportunities ‘to attack the party and the government’. Following another 
shooting in Hotan (Xinjiang) a few days afterwards, another directive suggests the 
authorities to delete all content related to the incident as well. The tighter censorship in these 
cases (as compared to the previous one) might be explained by these two incidents 
coinciding with the anniversary of the July 2009 riot in Urumqi. This seems a possible 
explanation since the following meeting of the Communist Party chaired by Xi Jinping 
expressed their concerns over the rising violence in Xinjiang in the context of Xinjiang’s 
anniversary.  
 
Case 3 occurred in October 2013 at the Tiananmen Square in Beijing, with a car crashing 
into civilians and a bridge resulting in three deaths. The number of articles covering the 
incident was very small, which could be explained again by one directive available in the 
CDT archive. The instructions demand to follow Xinhua, the party-state ‘mouthpiece’, in 
coverage and to downplay the story. Such censorship instruction is not surprising, given the 
strong symbolic power of the Tiananmen Square to the Communist party and its popularity 
among Chinese and tourists alike. However, another explanation could be this event 
coinciding with another attack at Beijing’s Forbidden City in which two working staff of the 
local museum were stabbed. Following another series of stabbing attack from three months 
before, these incidents have led to the ban of the sale of knives in the capital. While knives 
were not used in the car crash that followed, the incident took place at a time when the 
Tiananmen Square received much negative public attention. This could explain the tight 
censorship or the lack of details on the car crash. 
 
Although no censorship directives were available for Case 4, Case 5 followed shortly after 
at the end of April 2014 with explosives at Urumqi’s largest train station. The number of 
casualties was very low, but the amount of news coverage exceeded that of the previous 
three cases. A censorship instruction from the next day demands again close adherence to 
Xinhua coverage and no additional reports. The tight grip over the media content might be 
due to Xi Jinping’s visit to Xinjiang and his speech on terrorism at the same time. This seems 
plausible since the CDT archive presents instructions shortly before the incident that already 
demand to closely follow Xinhua’s reports on Xi Jinping’s visit to Xinjiang. In this context, 
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the amount of news reports available on this case is rather surprising. One possibility is that 
the Xinhua has covered the terrorist attack or Xi Jinping’s visit extensively and other 
newspapers followed accordingly.  
 
The following case in May 2014 in Urumqi involved a series of suicide explosions in a street 
market that led to 31 deaths. The amount of coverage and casualties is similar to case 4, 
though censorship instructions on media content are available for this case. Accordingly, 
news websites were asked to promote four articles which present the people’s apathy towards 
terrorism as well as promises of the political leadership to severely punish terrorists. Two 
more directives issued in the following days prohibit the issuing of newspaper website 
articles that refer to Xinjiang as ‘hometown of terrorists’ and compare Xinjiang to Chechnya. 
Once again, these instructions demonstrate news coordination efforts by the party-state.  
Case 7 refers to several armed attackers targeting government building and police stations 
in Shache county with knives in July 2014 (Xinjiang). Different to the previous cases, the 
high number of deaths is not proportional to the small number of news reports in the Chinese 
press. The one available media directive demands no coverage of the incident. This 
instruction would well explain the low number of articles collected for the one month after 
the incident. The tightly managed information control on this case is further confirmed by 
CDT analysis and others (RFA 2014, Reuters 2014), and can further be seen in the complete 
internet shut down when unconfirmed news of the attack began circulating online. This tight 
censorship might be a result of having a series of terrorist attacks in 2014 in Xinjiang already. 
As Chapter 1 pointed out, 2014 saw strong escalation of violence. It might also be driven by 
the attempt to not shed a negative light on the yearlong crackdown campaign on terrorism 
that was running in the region at that time. 
 
The final case occurred in a coal mine in Baicheng (Xinjiang) in which 50 miners and 
security guards were stabbed in September 2015.  Unfortunately, no censorship instructions 
were leaked on this case. However, the CDT (2019), RFA (2015) and other media sources 
observed that, similar to the previous case, the government kept tight lid on the coal mine 
incident. For example, New York Times reporter Andrew Jacobs describes local officials 
denying it even took place and citizens being reluctant to talk about it. He related this 
observation back to Xinjiang’s coinciding 60th anniversary and the placards condemning 
terrorism. These sources further show that the investigations lasted for two months. While 
the reasons for this remains unclear, this long-lasting investigation would explain the minor 
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amount of collected media coverage and suggests the use of censorship instructions 
demanding to refrain from coverage. 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
Answering the research question, determinants of US terrorism coverage can only 
moderately explain the extent of Chinese news coverage on the domestic terrorism. 
Similarities exist in the positive effect of the location, the tactic-variable assault, yet 
differences exceed with the effects of deaths (respectively ‘deaths’ and ‘deaths_50up’), the 
tactic variable explosive. Further insight on potential determinants was gained by including 
factors unique to China (claimed, newspaper type, censorship instructions). Various 
potential determinants of terrorism coverage could not be interpreted in the regression 
analysis due to lack of observations. Altogether, the moderate applicability of US-centred 
theory on the determinants of terrorism coverage as well as the lack of observations highlight 
the need in future research to expand the scope of the study and explore for additional 
explanatory factors. These findings empirically support the argument to further de-
westernise media theory. 
 
Beginning with the predictors that are relevant in both media contexts, the analysis 
confirmed the proximity to terrorist attacks as a moderately strong determinant of news 
media attention. However, assaults seemed to have a stronger effect. For instance, where 
assaults was a tactic, the effect on press coverage was two times higher than the location 
effect. In contrast, explosives only had weak predictive power and suggest that media 
attention would decrease in case they would be used. 
 
Turning towards differing conclusions on the predictive power of US determinants, the 
number of additional deaths leads to minor increase in news attention, yet attacks that 
involved a high number of deaths seem to receive much less media coverage in comparison 
to attacks that have less deaths. Similarly, the use of explosives leads to less news coverage. 
The inclusion of the ETIM/ responsibility of the attacks and the newspaper type led to further 
conclusion, while testing the explanatory power of factors deriving from the literature on 
Chinese media. When the party-state blamed ETIM responsible for the terrorist attacks, the 
amount of press coverage increases even more than with the proximity effect. The strong 
effect of the accountability of ETIM for the terrorist attacks aligns with Kearns et al.’s (2019) 
observation for the US that the perpetrator’s Muslim identity matters for the media attention. 
In contrast, whether the newspaper is an official party-state paper, or its more 
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commercialised alternative, has almost no effect on the amount of news coverage. The 
leaked censorship instructions on the eight cases selected for this research project further 
confirmed attempts by the party-state to (1) refrain from covering the events, or specifically 
content that relates to ethnic or social grievances, (2) promote or follow party-state press 
event coverage.  
 
Various arguments can be distilled from the above observations. First, the minor difference 
in news coverage between party-state and commercial press as well as the leaked censorship 
instructions empirically demonstrates the close grip that the party-state holds over the news 
coverage of terrorism. It also confirms the previously laid out scholarly claims of media 
censorship and coordination efforts in China. Second, the estimates for various predictors 
could be interpreted as confirming the previously discussed idea of the terrorist threat being 
a party-state construction. To begin with, the number of additional deaths is of minor 
importance to the news media attention, while a high death toll seems to be very important 
leads to much less news coverage. The proximity of the attack only has a moderate effect. 
Instead, various factors which scholars signalled as indicative of terrorist construction efforts 
were stronger in the analysis. The involvement of ETIM, introduced by the party-state in 
2001 as main responsible group for China’s terrorism, leads to strong increase in press 
coverage. Other models seem to suggest that attacks against party-state officials and 
buildings or attacks that involved armed assaults, receive much stronger news media 
attention. Attack characteristics that indicate the escalation of violence, such as multiple 
targets, attacks against the security forces that are Figures that ‘uphold stability’, and 
explosives – receive less press coverage. In conclusion, these findings suggest party-state 
interference with the news coverage, therefore demonstrating the importance of the 
subsequent analysis of the terrorism ‘construction’ in the Chinese media.  
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Chapter 5: The Chinese Print Media’s Framing  
of Domestic Terrorism 
 
The motivating research question for this chapter was how Chinese newspapers frame the 
domestic terrorism. Based on findings from data analysis, this Chapter presents the argument 
that the Chinese party-state created a terrorism construction, that it promoted through the 
media. This brand employs a highly abstract construction of the terrorist threat that enables 
the party-state to run a mediated campaign against all the ‘three evils’ of terrorism, religious 
extremism and separatism simultaneously. It legitimises action in light of claimed 
emergency, while also promoting the CCP’s rhetoric of a harmonious society under the 
leadership of the Party.  
 
This chapter’s findings contribute to the academic literature reviewed in Chapter 2 by filling 
the analytical gap through discovery of prevalent news frames, the media gap by showing 
that the media reinforces CCP ideology and terrorist threat perception and therefore serves 
as additional tool to the CCP’s Xinjiang conflict strategies. It further fills the analytical gap 
by showing that the media legitimise the securitisation of Xinjiang and the CCP leadership 
by exaggerating the terrorist threat. Combined, the findings demonstrate that the media are 
not just a party-state tool in the Xinjiang conflict but also construct a terrorist threat so as to 
promote social values that favour stability as well as legitimise securitisation efforts.  
 
This chapter begins with an overview of the three main components of the Chinese news 
construction. What follows are three main analysis sections, each presenting one overarching 
argument that contributes to this Chapter’s conclusion. The first analysis section reports the 
empirically observed party-state measures aimed at constructing a terrorism brand for the 
Xinjiang conflict. The second analysis Chapter reviews the content of the terrorism brand, 
focusing what will be introduced as the counter-terrorism framing. It argues that the Xinjiang 
conflict has been used by the party-state to initiate a media campaign against all ‘three evils’ 
by constructing terrorism as an ideograph. The final section reviews the social values, 
presenting the argument that the terrorism coverage also serves as platform for promoting 
CCP ideology. These findings are derived from quantitative text analysis, in-depth reading 
of the material during open coding, and the analysis of 16 indicator questions (see Appendix 
2 for the questions and answers).  
 
105 
 
The main components of China’s terrorism construction: Social values, counter-
terrorism frames and the attack itself 
The qualitative and quantitative data analysis found that the Chinese news portrayal of 
terrorism centres around three main building blocks, these are an event description of the 
terrorist attack, a counter-terrorism main-frame, and a social value main-frame.23 Regarding 
the proportion of media attention to these three parts, both coders agreed in the impression 
that the event description received the least amount of media attention and social values the 
most. 
 
Articles frequently described the terrorist attack at the beginning of news coverage. For all 
cases and newspapers, news coverage began on the first or second day after the attack and 
involved a brief event description that was identical in content across newspapers. This 
description comprised of information on the location of the attack, the number of casualties, 
the rescue and treatment of the victims and confirmation of the police being in control of the 
situation. The consistent mentioning of Xinhua as the source at the beginning of these reports 
as well as the identical content clearly suggest the party-state to hold a tight grip over media 
reporting shortly after the attack. Example 1 presents such event description, issued two days 
after the terrorist attack in Lukeqin in 2013 (Case 2).24 
 
     Example 1: Early event description of the terrorist attack 
Beijing News (28/6/2013) 
24 people were killed in Xinjiang terrorist attacks. 11 thugs were killed. At 5:50am on the 26th, 
thugs attacked special patrol squadrons, town governments and migrant worker construction 
sites, and set fire to police cars  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
According to Xinhua News Agency, at about 5:50am on the 26th, a violent terrorist attack occurred in 
Lukeqin town, Shanshan county, Turpan prefecture, Xinjiang. Several thugs attacked the Lukeqin police 
station, special patrol police squadron, town government building, migrant worker construction sites 
and set fire to police cars. 
 
At present, 24 people have been killed (including 16 Uyghurs), including 2 police officers; a further 21 
police officers and people have been injured. At the scene, the police killed 11 thugs, wounded and 
captured four. Public security organs are doing their best, and the current situation is under control. 
      
Within a few days, a more comprehensive account of the events appeared for each case, yet 
the newspapers showed greater diversity in how they presented the information. A slight 
majority (58 per cent in the sub-sample) issued the same piece of text with only different 
headlines, whereas the rest divided and mixed the information. The result were news 
 
23 A ‘main-frame’ includes several sub-frames, Figure 5-1 lists these frames. For simplicity, I use the term 
‘frame’ for the counter-terrorism and social value framing, though continue to understand these as main-frames. 
24 In this and the following examples, the translations provide the newspaper name and publication date. The 
newspaper article and news content follow underneath. The Chinese originals are in Appendix 2. 
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products with different headlines and articles that on the first glance appear to present 
different news stories. While there were differences due to omitting or adding content from 
other articles, the news stories remained similar. Besides repeating event characteristics, 
reporters tended to either re-construct several periods of the day in more detail, describe the 
brutality of the terrorists, or focus more strongly on the rescue and treatment strategies of 
the party-state.25 The following piece is an example of the latter approach, focusing in the 
first half on the event and casualties, then turning in the second half to a detailed summary 
on the treatment of the wounded. 
 
      Example 2: Detailed event description of the terrorist attack 
Beijing News (30/10/2013) 
Beijing gives all-out support for the rescue and treatment of wounded in the ‘10.28’ incident 
On October 28, a jeep crashed into the Jinshui Bridge [in front of Tiananmen], causing five deaths and 
38 injuries. Five of the injured required surgery, 12 are staying in intensive care units. The remaining 
21 are staying in general hospitalisation and shared their observation of the ‘Oct. 28 Jinshui Bridge car 
crash incident’ with the Beijing News.  
 
At about 12:05pm on the 28th, a jeep broke into Chang'an Street sidewalk from Nanchizi Nankou, 
Beijing. Coming from the East to the West, it crashed into the guardrail of the Jinshui Bridge in 
Tiananmen and caught fire. Many tourists and policemen on duty were injured in the process. 
According to preliminary data, five people were killed and 38 injured in the accident. Three of them 
died in the car, two tourists died as well (one Filipino female tourist and one Guangdong male tourist). 
Among the 38 injured, there were three Filipino tourists (two women and one man) and one Japanese 
male tourist. 
 
After the incident, Beijing immediately organised the rescue and treatment of the wounded. The heads 
of the Municipal Party Committee and the Municipal Government asked the health departments to 
spare no effort in rescuing the wounded at all costs. The Municipal Health Bureau quickly set up a 
specialist group for medical treatment, formulated a treatment plan, and centralized the city's high-
quality medical resources to set up a municipal expert group that provides consultation and guidance 
for each of the wounded one by one, and to guide the rescue of critically injured people at all time. 
 
At present, among the 38 hospitalised victims, five have undergone surgical treatment, 12 have been 
treated in ICU, and the remaining 21 have been transported for general hospitalization and continued 
observation. 
       
After the brief event description, the news direction quickly shifted away from the attack to 
the larger terrorist threat, with the counter-terrorism and social value frames gaining 
prevalence in the news coverage. The name counter-terrorism for the first main-frame 
derived from the continuous emphasis by the media to ‘resolutely fight terrorism’ (ඊߣ৽
 ᙆ) against the terrorist enemy in the name of justice. I decided against naming the frame 
‘terrorism’ to avoid reinforcing the party-state perception of a terrorist threat in this thesis. 
Instead, the counter-terrorism designation emphasises the party-state’s quest to legitimise its 
fight against terrorism by communicating a constructed enemy portrayal. Therefore, the 
 
25 See Appendix 2 for an indicative example of a news article that provided a detailed re-construction of a 
terrorist attack. 
107 
 
terminology aligns with the discussion on authoritarian resilience reviewed in Chapter 2 in 
the sense that the framing of the Xinjiang conflict as terrorism is a legitimation strategy and 
more generally a resilience strategy.  
 
The prevalent frames of the terrorism construction are outlined in Figure 5-1. A frame can 
be a word, phrase or sentence(s) that relate to the frame description provided underneath the 
following graph. Each one is further discussed (with examples) in the following discussion 
of this Chapter. Another reference point are the indicator questions listed in Appendix 2. 
When discussing the frames, I relate the frames back to the indicator question by using 
references; the indicator questions (IQ) are straightforward yes or no questions that can help 
to recognise frames and understand the description of the frames in the following discussion 
better. While their main role was to illustrate changes in framing patterns across cases for 
Chapter 6, they also serve here as an additional empirical tool to evidence framing 
observations in addition to the quantitative text analysis and the open coding observations. 
Following Figure 5-1, I explain each frame briefly, they receive further detail and examples 
in the rest of this Chapter. 
 
Figure 5-1: Frames in Chinese news coverage of terrorism 
 
 
The most prevalent counter-terrorism frames, covered on the following two pages with 
reference to the Indicator Question 7 in Appendix 2, were the ‘extremism-phobia’ and the 
‘injustice and gravity’ sub-frames, signalling the serious threat the party-state perceives in 
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terrorism. The prevalence of this ‘injustice and gravity’ frame mainly lies in the news 
consistently referring to the incident as ‘serious’ (ѕ䟽) or ‘pre-meditated’ (亴䈻) terrorist 
attack. Further details on what is in grave threat commonly occurs in relation to the social 
values, for instance, terrorism threating the economic growth and stability in China. For 
instance, the news pictured the image of improved living standards for all people in Xinjiang 
and define the seriousness of the terrorist attack not by the human lives it has cost but 
potentially destabilising effect on the people’s living standards. Locals cited in news 
coverage of Case 1 describe the financial losses as a result of terrorism generally, such as 
the decreasing income in the tourism industry. 
 
‘Extremism-phobia’ is another highly prevalent frame that portrays ‘extremism’ (ᶱㄟ) as 
the ideological root cause of terrorism and the central threat to the Chinese society. The news 
did not just focus on terrorism but link all the ‘three evils’ together by using these 
interchangeably. The media rarely referred to the terrorists as separatists, more commonly 
was the emphasis on religious extremist thought and activities being a threat to the Chinese 
people. It remained undefined what constitutes ‘extremism’, instead the media discussed 
‘extremism’ on a highly abstract level as generally ‘the archetypical enemy’ (see Appendix 
2, indicator question (‘IC’) 4). While the term ‘religious extremism’ might lead to believe 
strong defaming of the Muslim identity of the Uyghur people and Islam, the media instead 
emphasises that this issue was not linked to any specific ethnic group or religion.  
 
The terrorists, or extremists, are portrayed as epitome of evil in the demonization frame). 
The demonization frame includes the frequent condemnation of terrorist for the attack and 
the disruptions of society (see Appendix 2, IC 7). Some articles re-construction the events 
of the attack and provide a detailed account of the terrorist violence. For instance, one article 
published on the fourth case focuses on the re-emergence of life and vitality that comes in 
nature with the arrival in Spring. It then turns to the terrorist attack, describing how Spring 
has faded after the terrorist attack and left a city in fear and pain. In other reports the violence 
of the terrorists receive attention to demonstrate their brutality and thus define them as 
inhuman, such as in a report that describes the victims in a hospital corridor and that the head 
of a four- or five-years old child was cut off. 
 
The adversarial frame juxtaposed the terrorist with the good, orderly Chinese society. This 
frame was very common in the news (see Appendix 2, IC 7); it pictured the image of a 
Chinese society that embraces ethnic solidarity, economic growth and stability while 
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vilifying the enemy other as aiming to harm this society. Part of this image were appeals to 
resolutely fight terrorism, creating boundaries between ‘us’ (the Chinese people) and ‘them’ 
(the terrorists): ‘Violent terrorists are the common enemy of the people of all ethnic groups’ 
(᳤࣋ ᙆ࠶ᆀᱟᯠ⮶਴᯿Ӫ≁Ⲵޡ਼᭼Ӫ). Other statements described the harm terrorists have 
caused to lives and property or explain the struggle against terrorism as ‘safeguarding the 
motherland’ (᥽ছ⾆ഭ).   
 
In face of the ‘terrorist’ threat, the reports take a pro-active stance by mobilising the public 
for action with the aptness framing. The aptness frame emphasises the need to counter the 
terrorist threat and likely success in doing so if the Chinese people remain united. A common 
example is the just fight against terrorists, such as ‘the struggle against illegal crimes and 
violent terrorism alike is the sacred and glorious duty of all citizens given by law’ (ᢃࠫ䘍⌅
⣟㖚ˈ᳤਼࣋ ᙆ⍫ࣘ֌ᯇҹˈᱟ⌅ᖻ䍻Ҹ⇿њޜ≁Ⲵ⾎൓ᵳ઼࡙ݹ㦓ѹ࣑). The likelihood of 
success is tied to all Chinese people fighting terrorism, though without specification of what 
this involves, or abstract phrases of justice always overcoming evil. For instance, ‘Justice 
overwhelms evil and criminals cannot escape the law’ (↓ѹ঻ق䛚ᚦˈ㖚⣟䳮䘳⌅㖁). 
 
The securitisation frame most commonly involves appeals by the reporter to fight terrorism 
or to show no mercy in this struggle. Only moderate detail was given to how this should take 
place, mostly the media described the improved training of counter-terrorist forces and the 
improvements in the legislation. For instance, the media describe the increased presence of 
police and military officers to enhance safety. Yet, more attention was devoted to the 
growing counter-terrorism apparatus of the party-state, on which the media describe 
emergence of new task forces to detect and crack down on terrorist cells. Another example 
of these counter-terrorism efforts is the introduction of counter-terrorism legislation, which 
was particularly prevalent in cases during the Xi administration in references to China’s rule 
by law. Overall, the securitisation frame pictures the securitisation of Xinjiang most to take 
place in form of counter-terrorist efforts and emphasises these as part of the struggle against 
terrorism. 
 
The second main frame, which I call the ‘social value’ frame, denotes the promotion of what 
the media portrays as corner stones of the Chinese society under leadership of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) (see Appendix 2, ICs 10 and 11). The prevalent frames involve 
promotion of stability, national unity, economic growth, and the rule of law. Stability, 
national unity and economic growth usually appeared together in news reports, highlighting 
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that a ‘harmonious society’ (઼䉀⽮Պ) is stable, prosperous and shows inter-ethnic solidarity. 
The data analysis showed that social value frames do not just occur in relation to the issue 
of terrorism but also exist independently in large news section that exclusively promote these 
social values. Thus, it became evident that the Chinese news coverage of terrorism is not just 
about covering the terrorist threat but also aims to reinforce CCP ideology on these social 
values. The following pages of this Chapter elaborate on this argument. 
 
Besides the qualitative analysis, validation for the above observations was derived from 
frequency and word network analysis of the full sample of 2291 collected articles. Besides 
Xinjiang as the region of most of China’s terrorist attacks, Table 5-1 shows the most 
frequently occurring terms to be ‘ethnicity’ (≁᯿), ‘terrorism’ ( ᙆ), ‘society’ (⽮Պ), ‘work’ 
and ‘development’ (ᐕ֌ andਁኅ), ‘the [Chinese] people’ (㗔Շ andӪ≁), ‘violence’ (᳤࣋), 
‘stability’ (っᇊ), and ‘unity’ (ഒ㔃). Indeed, the open coding showed that violence and 
terrorism are strong indicators of the counter-terrorism framing, whereas all the other above-
listed terms are commonly used in the social value framing (as the names of some frames 
already suggest, i.e. [national] unity frame) 
 
Table 5-1: Most frequent terms in the new coverage 
Word Frequency Translation 
ᯠ⮶ 13012 Xinjiang 
≁᯿ 7629 Ethnic group 
 ᙆ 7437 Terrorism 
⽮Պ 7166 Society 
ᐕ֌ 7005 Work 
㗔Շ 6734 ‘The masses’ (= the Chinese people) 
᳤࣋ 6171 Violence 
һԦ 5669 Incident 
Ӫ≁ 5267 The people 
ਁኅ 5040 Development 
っᇊ 5024 Stability 
  4825 Fear/Terror (part of terrorism  ᙆ) 
Ѽ励ᵘ喀 4742 Urumqi (Capital city of Xinjiang) 
ѝഭ 4482 China 
ഒ㔃 4261 Unity 
 
The word network in the following Figure provides further context to these terms by 
illustrating the strength of their relationship to other words in the data set. To reduce 
statistical noise as a result of the large number of terms in the data set, I filtered for the most 
commonly occurring terms (with frequency over 500). The correlation test identified three 
main clusters as being prevalent in the news which overlap with the above argument on the 
prevalence of counter-terrorism and social value frames. 
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Figure 5-2: Word network analysis with frequent terms and their correlation  
 
 
The first cluster on the left evolves around the term ‘terrorism’ ( ᙆ), strongly correlating 
with ‘separatism’ (࠶㻲), ‘crime’ (⣟㖚), ‘surprise attack’ (㻝ࠫ) and ‘fear’ ( ). These words 
again correlate with ‘violence’ (᳤࣋) and the term ‘fan’ (৽), the open coding showed the 
latter to be mainly used in the context of fighting terrorism (⋌⽏⼕). The terms in this cluster 
align with the counter-terrorism framing described earlier, in that they provide various 
designations for the incident and the need to fight terrorism. The second large cluster at the 
bottom relates well to the social value framing. In the two centres of this cluster are 
‘protecting’ (㔤ᣔ) and ‘economy’ (㓿⍾). The media associated protection most frequently 
with ‘economy’, ‘harmonious [society]’ (઼䉀 [⽮Պ]) and ‘China’ (ѝॾ). When speaking of 
the economy, besides from its protection, strong correlations existed with ‘Xinjiang’ (ᯠ⮶), 
‘reform’ (᭩䶙), and ‘international’ (ഭ䱵). This cluster does not include words directly 
associated with terrorism, as can be seen in the lack of a connection to the counter-terrorism 
cluster. Nonetheless, when decreasing the filter to allow for less frequent words and 
associations, there relationship appears with the term ‘ideology’ (⌘᜿) connecting both 
clusters. This shows that social value frames and counter-terrorism frames are more 
frequently appearing separately from each other, rather than in relation to each other (i.e. 
social values as being threatened by terrorism). In conclusion, the separation of both clusters 
in the word network validates the earlier argument that the media promote social values in 
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addition to covering the terrorist threat. The analysis further confirmed social values and 
counter-terrorism frames to be a key component in the Chinese news construction of 
terrorism. 
 
The other clusters continue to confirm the earlier qualitative observations, though are less 
informative without further context. The third main cluster in the centre shows the words 
‘the people’ (Ӫ≁), ‘ethnicities’ (≁᯿), ‘cadre officials’ (ᒢ䜘), ‘religion’ (ؑᮉ) and ‘innocent’ 
(ᰐ䗌), with equally strong correlations to each other. This cluster suggests another social 
value framing that focuses on the different social groups of China. The other smaller pieces 
remain less informative. The top cluster presents several words associated with Xinhua 
reports, confirming the strong news reliance on the party-state’s official news agency, the 
Xinhua. Regarding the bottom right cluster with the terms ‘strike/attack’ (ᢃࠫ ) and 
‘hard/heavy’ (ѕ䟽), the open coding showed them commonly occur in the context of 
‘severely cracking down on terrorism’. The two clusters at the top right could not be 
interpreted without further details. 
 
In conclusion, the news construction of terrorism is made up of three main components, 
among which social values and counter-terrorism frames are the most dominant main frames. 
The prevalence of social value frames, both related to terrorism and independently of it, 
lends itself to the question of how specifically the Chinese media frame terrorism. The 
following section was motivated by this question, showing that the party-state constructed a 
terrorist threat perception for the media that also promotes the social values of the CCP 
leadership. 
 
‘Making’ a terrorism news construction for Xinjiang and China 
The party-state constructed a terrorism portrayal for the Chinese news media, various 
observations reviewed in this section led to this argument. These observations from the data 
analysis involved the continuous use of the terrorism label (called reinforcing) (see 
Appendix 2, IC 1), the thematic focus on the larger terrorist threat as opposed to a single 
terrorist attack (transcendence) (see Appendix 2, IC 4); the discussion of the terrorist threat 
without consideration of the ethnic grievances as potential root problems (de-
contextualisation) (see Appendix 2, ICs 3 and 5); and the strong reliance on party-state 
source, in addition to the media control (see Appendix 2, IC 15) confirmed by the academic 
literature on China in Chapter 2 and leaked censorship instructions in Chapter 4. Together 
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they demonstrate the party-state effort to control and shape the reporting of violent incidents 
so that these would be understood by the readership and public as ‘terrorist threat’. that is by 
defining the terrorist threat and promoting this brand to shape public interpretation of the 
Xinjiang conflict. It is an example of how the party-state’s media strategy has evolved over 
time. While Chapter 2 demonstrated that the party-state at first denied the SARS epidemic 
in 2003 and prohibited any news coverage on the issue, the party-state led public opinion on 
the Xinjiang conflict by reinforcing an interpretation of the events that is discussed on the 
following pages. 
 
As with any brand, there is a prevalent name for the product. The previous figures already 
showed that this label is ‘terrorism’ (compare also with Appendix 2, IC 1). As a reminder, 
the news data was collected by using only location and date as search words, not the term 
terrorism. This decision allowed the collection of articles that use any kind of label to refer 
to the incident, such as riot or separatism. Nonetheless, terrorism remained with great lead 
the most prevalent label for the incidents under study. Alternatives were ‘incident’ (һԦ), 
and much less frequently ‘violence’ (᳤࣋) or ‘crime’ (⣟㖚). Terms that relate to the attack 
characteristics find rarely mentioning, such as there is no mentioning of the 2009 Urumqi 
attack being a riot. When shifting direction to the larger terrorism issue, the ‘three evils’ (й
㛑࣯࣋) or ‘separatism’ (࠶㻲) were occasionally used in articles instead of terrorism, yet 
‘extremism’ (ᶱㄟ) remains far more frequently used in relation to terrorism. Figure 5-2 
illustrated the strong use of the terrorism label by positioning the term at the centre of the 
counter-terrorism cluster. 
  
A strong reliance on party-state sources, namely official media and state officials, helps the 
party-state to define the terrorism brand. For instance, brief event description issued within 
two days after each terrorist attack were identical in content, therefore demonstrate the party-
state capability to use media control to communicate a certain event portray to the public 
(see Example 1). Of the media sources named in the sample articles, 34 per cent of the reports 
named the Xinhua or the People’s Daily as source of information (see Appendix 2, IC 15). 
Of the non-media sources, over two third were party-state officials or police investigation 
reports. Where official sources were named in the reports, much or even all news content 
was found similar to articles in other newspapers, though usually different in length and 
structure. I found that the newspaper had similar sentences or full paragraphs similar to other 
newspapers, yet the news content was re-arranged so that at first glance each news report 
might appear different in news content. Meanwhile, victims are hardly mentioned at all in 
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the news (see Appendix 2, IC 13), slightly more frequently are Xinjiang locals of any 
profession who describe the emotional harm and economic loss caused by terrorism (see 
Appendix 2, IC 14). Nonetheless, their occurrence plummets to almost zero starting with 
Cases in 2014 and are replaced by Xi Jinping for commendation (for further details, see 
Chapter 6) (see Appendix 2, IC 16). 
 
Moreover, the media ignore any prior ethnic grievances or conflicts in Xinjiang prior to the 
terrorist attack (see Appendix 2, IC 3) but instead blame ‘Western hostile forces’ and East 
Turkistan movements (for more detail, see the following pages). Not even once in the sample 
did the media mention social grievances as potential cause for the terrorist attacks. This de-
contextualisation of the root problems in Xinjiang is another observation that shows the 
party-state to shape the interpretation of the Xinjiang situation by denying the ethnic issues 
that would undermine its portrayal of national unity.26 Instead, the portrayal of daily life in 
Xinjiang remained very positive with reference to the beauty of the landscape, ethnic 
solidarity, stability, and the improvement in living standards as result of economic growth. 
The following quote from Zhu Weiqun (ᵡ㔤㗔), member of the CCP’s Standing Committee 
on Religious Affairs, is an example of de-contextualising a ‘terrorist’ attack by stressing that 
there is not a relationship between terrorism and any ethnic group. The de-ethnicising of 
terrorism, together with the promotion of national unity, show the media’s framing of the 
terrorist attack to be a ‘constructed’ interpretation of the events independent of prior or 
currently existing social issues in Xinjiang.  
 
Example 3: De-contextualisation by denying ethnic grievances 
Southern Metropolitan Daily (4/3/2014) 
Zhu Weiqun, Head of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs Committee of the CPPCC: Don't Link 
Kunming's Terrorist Incident to Specific Ethnic Groups 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Zhu Weiqun, Member of the CPPCC standing committee, head of the Ethnic and Religious Affairs 
Committee, says that these terrorists are under no circumstances representing any of our ethnic groups, but 
only represent those very few who betray their motherland and their own ethnic group. 
 
‘If we associate the incident with a particular ethnic group and blame a particular one, it is not only totally 
against the reality, but also will hurt the feelings of ethnic minorities, which is exactly what the violent 
terrorist forces want’. Zhu Weiqun said that fighting violent terrorism requires the united strength of all 
ethnic groups. "I am fully convinced that the masses of all ethnic groups and cadres at the grass-roots level 
can unite against the violent terrorism. With unity as foundation, we can surely win the struggle against 
violent terrorism and against separatist forces.’ […] 
 
 
 
26 This stands in contrast to a large body of academic literature that considers ethnic conflicts between Uyghur 
and Han Chinese as essential context to understand the escalation of violence in Xinjiang since 2009 (Clarke 
2018; Roberts 2018). 
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To conclude, the above discussed coding observations, together with the findings presented 
in previous sections, confirm empirically that the party-state branded the incidents as acts of 
terrorism. Strategies of reinforcing, transcendence, denial, and party-state sourcing were 
interpreted as strategies to construct this brand. This observation confirms what Brown (2018) 
argues, that the party-state embraces unified ideology as key means of avoiding the further 
fracturing of Chinese society. The consistency in the label and news content across 
newspapers suggests an attempt of ‘unifying’ the news discourse on terrorism, while the de-
contextualisation and transcendence ‘direct’ the news portrayal towards the terrorist threat 
construction that is discussed in the following section. 
 
Constructing terrorism as ideograph to campaign against the ‘three evils’  
The party-state constructed a terrorism brand that functions as an ideograph in the Chinese 
news coverage. An ideograph, as Dobkin (1992) explained on terrorism television coverage 
in the US, is a journalistic lens with a normative commitment towards the telling of events, 
defining what is acceptable and what is to be condemned. The following sections present 
this argument through the prevalent frames listed earlier, showing from various perspectives 
the high level of abstraction of the terrorist threat, producing an epitome of evil that can be 
replaced by any of the ‘three evils’ as enemy. In addition, the news emphasis on the gravity 
of the situation and the merits of stability create a culture of fear and threat that legitimises 
immediate and comprehensive action against the terrorist threat. Therefore, the Chinese 
news coverage is not just a campaign against terrorism but against terrorism, religious 
extremism and separatism, in which the use of the ideograph brings great flexibility for the 
party-state in who is labelled a terrorist or not and legitimises any action taken in Xinjiang 
as ‘just’ in the name of counter-terrorism efforts. 
 
The terrorist threat: Prevalent Extremism-phobia, subtle Islamophobia 
Although the media most frequently speak of ‘terrorism’, the news construction of terrorism 
evolves around extremist thought as the root issue while refraining from giving more 
concrete information beyond religious fanatism and ‘Western hostile forces’ (see Appendix 
2, IC 5). While scholars found an Islamophobia in the US terrorism coverage, ‘extremism-
phobia’ defines Chinese terrorism coverage. The term ‘extremism’ (ᶱㄟѫѹ) was undefined 
in the news articles but appears to be an umbrella term for not just religious extremism 
relating to the ‘three evils’, but as any form of extremist thought or activity that harms 
Chinese society. The following quotation exemplifies both the strong danger implied to be 
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coming from extremism as well as the its abstract nature: ‘Religious extremist thought has 
become the theoretical basis and ideological support for the emergence of violent terrorist 
activities and has become a cancer seriously affecting China's social stability’ (ᇇᮉᶱㄟᙍᜣ
ᐢᡀѪۜ⭏᳤࣋ ᙆ⍫ࣘⲴ⨶䇪ส⹰઼ᙍᜣ᭟᫁ˈᡀѪѕ䟽ᖡ૽ѝഭ⽮ՊっᇊⲴањ∂ⱔ) (Case 3, 
Xinjiang Daily).27 
 
The portrayed danger of extremism, as well as terrorism, stems from its de-stabilising effect 
on Chinese society (see Appendix 2, IC 6). News articles consistently portray it either as 
having the potential to destroy all the achievements under CCP leadership, as the example 
at the end of this paragraph shows. The open coding found a small number 18 articles in the 
sample which take a retrospective view by portraying pre-terrorism Xinjiang as a place of 
inter-ethnic solidarity, beautiful landscape, economic growth and put this in contrast to their 
destruction by terrorism and extremism. For instance, ‘looking back on Xinjiang’s 60 years 
of development, when the society stabilised and the economy developed healthily, the life 
of the people of all ethnic groups has become orderly and peaceful; when the social stability 
would be destroyed, the economy would stagnate and retrogress, and the safety and 
happiness of the people of all ethnic groups will be lost’ (എ亮ᯠ⮶ 60ཊᒤⲴਁኅশ〻ˈӰѸᰦ
ى⽮Պっᇊˈ㓿⍾ቡڕᓧਁኅˈ਴᯿Ӫ≁Ⲵ⭏⍫ቡᆹᇊ⾕઼˗ӰѸᰦى⽮Պっᇊਇࡠ⹤ൿˈ㓿⍾ቡ
ڌ┎ق䘰ˈ਴᯿Ӫ≁Ⲵᆹޘǃᒨ⾿ቡՊཡ৫؍䳌) (Case 2, Beijing Daily). 
 
Yet, the media do not just portray terrorism as the result of (religious) extremist thought, but 
also as a pernicious outcome of foreign influences. Terrorism seems not ‘home-made’ but 
‘Western hostile forces’ (㾯ᯩ᭼ሩ࣯࣋) used the dispersion of extremist thought as tactic to 
harm China’s stability and development. While the reports do not specify who these 
“Western forces” are, both China’s membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
and the literature on China’s course of the Xinjiang conflict show Beijing seeing its Western 
neighbouring countries as epi-centre of the terrorism problem (Clarke 2018; Fredholm 2013). 
The concrete example are the East Turkistan terrorist groups (i.e. ETIM) that the party-state 
claimed responsible for China’s terrorism problem and to be linked to al-Qaeda. Very rarely 
and limited to Cases in 2014, the blame also shifted towards the far West, with the US being 
blamed for attempts of ‘westernisation’ of China and applying a ‘double standard’ for 
China’s and their own terrorism problem, allegedly in order to discredit China’s international 
 
27 The full article is available in Appendix 2 since it provides a detailed insight in what constitutes the terrorist 
threat. Various frames can be found in this example as well. 
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standing. Example 4 shows in detail the long-held threat of hostile forces outside of the 
Chinese border. 
Example 4: The portrayed threat from ‘Western hostile forces’  
Xinjiang Daily (7/7/2013)  
Fully recognize the long-term arduous complexity of the struggle against separatism 
 
[…] As early as the 1930s, the separatist forces at home and abroad, motivated by foreign hostile forces, 
have planned several ‘independent’ political turmoil in Xinjiang. In the 1990s, with the dramatic changes 
in Eastern Europe and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the nerves of domestic separatists were 
greatly stimulated. In addition, the Western hostile forces focused on China, and intensified their efforts 
to pursue the strategy of ‘Westernization’, ‘Differentiation’ and Containment, in an attempt to find and 
open a breakthrough into the border minority areas. They regard Xinjiang as their main target of attack, 
strive to attract and cultivate national separatist forces at home and abroad, support and manipulate 
national separatist organizations, and take various means to engage in separatist and destructive activities 
against Xinjiang. From the ‘4.5’ counter-revolutionary armed riots in Baren Township in 1990 to the ‘7.5’ 
incidents in Urumqi in 2009, and several recent violent terrorist Cases, all of them are strong reflections of 
the destruction the hostile and separatist forces bring. These facts fully show that the criminal activities of 
the hostile forces at home and abroad, which create violent and terrorist incidents, endanger national 
security, destroy national unity and social stability. They have not stopped and will not stop. We should 
have a full understanding of this and be prepared for a long-term struggle. […] 
 
Ethnic separatist forces, religious extremist forces and violent terrorist forces are united, which makes 
Xinjiang's struggle against terrorism and for stability increasingly complicated. In recent years, religious 
extremists and violent terrorists in some neighbouring countries and regions have gone rampant. They 
have set up training bases everywhere, recruited and trained violent terrorists, and carried out various 
subversive activities. Due to this, ethnic separatist activities in Xinjiang are also gradually escalating. The 
‘three forces’ at home and abroad have intensified their collusion and constantly change their tactics. They 
wear the cloak of religion and take the form of concealment or openness to carry out reactionary 
propaganda and attack the party-state's line and policies, especially the national and religious policies. 
They cultivate the backbone of resistance, incite religious fanaticism, provoke national hatred and even 
create violent and terrorist activities with great arrogance. […] 
 
The portrayed blame on ‘Western hostile’ influences, the religious extremism as foundation 
of terrorism, and the Muslim identity of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang, these factors would give 
reason to expect the Chinese media inhibiting traits of Islamophobia. However, this would 
be premature. The data analysis showed that the media used the terms Islam (എᮉ or Ժᯟ
ޠᮉ) or Muslim (ぶᯟ᷇ or Ժᯟޠᮉᗂ) sparingly, with no mention of the Uyghur’s 
Muslim identity. Where Islamic beliefs is mentioned (see Appendix 2, IC 12), the media 
framed it in in two distinctly different ways, neither involved explicitly framing Muslims or 
Uyghurs as potential terrorists. The prevalent frame was to disassociate terrorism and 
extremism from Islam by clarifying that the terrorist acts were not related to any specific 
ethnic group or religion. Less common was the subtle defaming of Islamic beliefs as 
culturally backward, yet this remained in the news stories without a clear link to terrorism. 
 
Most common were statements that disassociate terrorism from any specific ethnic group or 
religion. News reports cited Imams or Figureheads of Islamic associations who stressed 
Islam being a peaceful religion and opposing the killing of innocent people. The Southern 
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Metropolis Daily cited the party-state official Zhu Weiqun (㘰㾛亣) saying that ‘the violent 
terrorist incident in Kunming cannot be generally described as an ethnic or religious issue, 
let alone ‘linked’ to specific ethnic groups. In any Case, they do not represent any ethnic 
groups but only the very few who betray their motherland and their own identity’ (н㜭ᢺᰶ
᰾᳤࣋ ᙆһԦа㡜ൠ䈤ᡀ≁᯿ᇇᮉ䰞仈ˈᴤн㾱ᢺᆳ਼⢩ᇊ≁᯿þᤲ䫙ÿǄ䘉Ӌ ᙆ࠶ᆀᰐ䇪ྲ
օԓ㺘нҶᡁԜԫօањ≁᯿ˈਚ㜭ԓ㺘䛓Ӌ㛼਋⾆ഭˈҏ㛼਋ԆԜ㠚䓛ᡰ൘≁᯿ⲴᶱቁᮠӪ ) 
(Case 4, Southern Metropolis Daily). The media denying involvement of Islamic beliefs 
complements the earlier observation of the promotion of inter-ethnic solidarity, together 
clearly demonstrating the party-state’s ambition to maintain national unity. Nonetheless, 
Islamic beliefs remained a rare component of China’s news reporting, something which 
Luqiu and Yang’s (2018) study of Chinese news coverage of Islam and Muslims (unrelated 
to terrorism) provide a possible explanation for. They explain that Islam has been a 
traditional taboo in the Chinese news but was somewhat allowed in the Chinese news after 
9/11. Given the prevalence of religious extremism as threat in the news construction, it seems 
likely that Islam as a religion a difficult issue to report on. Thus, the impression from the 
news data is that there is no explicit stigmatisation of Islam believers as enemies, but instead 
the promotion of inter-ethnic solidarity. 
 
Yet, the second framing pattern of Islam appears somewhat counterintuitive, showing rare 
subtle comments that indicate the cultural backwardness of the Islamic way of living. While 
the terms Islam or Muslim rarely appear (see Appendix 2, IC 12), the media criticises an 
unspecified ‘other’ in Xinjiang for banning alcohol or forcing women to stay at home. 
Moreover, religious beliefs generally were then described as prone to extremist thought, such 
as by this Xinjiang Daily article: ‘In order to achieve their evil purposes, they always raise 
the banner of religion, to use the simple ethnic and religious feelings of the religious masses 
in every possible way to incite religious fanatism, provoke ethnic conflicts, and create ethnic 
barriers’ (Ѫᇎ⧠ަ㖚ᚦⴞⲴˈԆԜᙫᱟᢃ⵰ᇇᮉⲴᰇਧˈॳᯩⲮ䇑ൠ࡙⭘ؑᮉ㗔Շᵤ㍐Ⲵ≁᯿ᇇᮉ
ᝏᛵˈ➭ࣘᇇᮉ⣲✝ˈ᥁䎧≁᯿⸋⴮ˈࡦ䙐≁᯿䳄䰲) (Case 2, Xinjiang daily). Twelve articles 
across the sample data further defamed Islam as undesirable and backward, in below Case 
this is published as a comment from a Xinjiang PhD graduate who compares past and present 
Xinjiang life. 
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Example 5: Defaming Islam 
Xinjiang Daily (15/11/2013) 
Learning to come back and visit the hometown 
(Yimingjiang Maimaiti, Ph.D. Graduate from the Institute of High Energy Physics, Chinese Academy of 
Sciences) 
 
I remember when I was a child, there were very few women veiled in our countryside. In junior high school, 
the beautiful seven braids were the beauty symbol of the girl's youth. At that time, the girl’s handkerchiefs 
or hat was embroidered with flower caps as tokens of young people's love. At that time, every young man 
who went to college would take an Aidelaisi [woven silk] skirt or a Kanawayi [local clothing] shirt as a way 
of thinking of his hometown. When I returned home this time, I found veiled women in the streets of 
Urumqi, many of them being young people. In my understanding, social development should be forward 
and upward. The combination of modern civilization and excellent national traditions is the trend of the 
development of all nations in the world. Many historical experiences at home and abroad show that this 
kind of extreme development in dress and ideology often leads to extreme behaviour, and even becomes 
the preferred target of infiltration by religious extremist forces. Every Uyghur youth must reflect on the 
fundamental question of which direction our society should develop. If we don't stand up to fight those 
extreme ideas now, they won't let our women go out to work tomorrow, and they won't let our dance 
songs appear on the stage. […] 
 
Only when our people of all nationalities are in deep friendship, advance together hand in hand, then our 
farmers can live in Western-style houses, and our women can play a greater role in society instead of 
squatting at home in their Jilibafu [clothing]. Our children will have a better education and more 
employment choices. This is our future life, and it should be our future life. 
 
 
To conclude, the media framed religious extremism as imminent danger to the Chinese 
people, while simultaneously employing a twofold framing strategy on Islam. On the one 
hand, the media disassociate Islamic thought from religious extremism and keep the 
mentioning of Islam to a minimum. Extremist thought mainly remains the enemy in form of 
an abstract concept. On the other hand, above examples illustrate the news to vilify Islamic 
thought, without giving it a name, as harmful to China’s development and prone to extremist 
fanatism. Much research with focus on the US suggests that such defamation of Islamic 
believes fuels negative perception of Muslims as ‘out-group’ in society, yet this requires 
further testing for China (see the following section on adversarial framing; Luqiu and Yang 
2018). Yet, extremism remained the prevalent threat in the media portrayal of terrorism, 
suggesting an extremism-phobia rather than an Islamophobia.  
 
Polarising the Chinese people and the terrorists with ideographs 
The Chinese news grouped terrorists together, obscuring any differences between terrorists 
or acts of violence, therefore creating an archetypical enemy that stands opposed to the 
Chinese people (see Appendix 2, IC 2). The terrorist has become part of the terrorism 
ideograph, defined by its tactics alone, as religious extremist who inflicts harm to China’s 
stability without a clear or rational political motivation. While the portrayal of the religious 
fanatic gives the archetypical enemy a face, it also obscures the reality of other forms of 
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terrorism or conflicts in China. Therefore, together with the de-contextualisation and the 
extremism-phobia described earlier, the abstraction of the enemy other is another 
characteristic of the Chinese news construction on terrorism. Based on the data analysis, I 
argue that the news media vilified the image of “the terrorist” yet maintain throughout 
coverage a very abstract definition of this actor, therefore allowing the party-state to apply 
this threat construction to a wide range of threats to Beijing. There is only minor mentioning 
of individual terrorists by name and left to reports published shortly after the attack as part 
of the police investigation and detainment of terrorist suspects. Chapter 2 provided such 
examples with Falungong members or the current Hong Kong protesters being labelled as 
terrorists. 
 
The most concrete indicator of the enemy other’s identity, yet an example of its abstraction, 
is the media grouping terrorists into “East Turkistan forces”. Only ETIM is mentioned, and 
only in a very few articles, in which these groups were used interchangeably for East 
Turkistan group generally. Although East Turkistan forces were rarely mentioned, the media 
therefore continued to reinforce the party-state’s accusation since 2001 of East Turkistan 
forces as terrorist threat (see also Tredaniel and Lee 2018; Clarke 2018).28 More frequently 
was the media reporting on police investigations that discovered jihad flags or East Turkistan 
flags with the perpetrators in all eight attacks or note witness reports of them shouting the 
word ‘jihad’. While this links the attack back to the religious extremist threat, the media 
never interpreted the discovery any further by linking it to Islam or the Uyghurs explicitly. 
Nonetheless, the media portrayal of such discovery links the Xinjiang conflict with the 
Uyghurs to the global war on terror discourse on Islamic radicalisation. From both 
observations it becomes clear that Islamic radicalisation is a defining trait of the archetypical 
terrorist, yet it remains obscured with the East Turkistan forces and the abstract concept of 
religious extremism. The example below shows that the media blame ETIM for the Beijing 
2013 attack (Case 3), while the second half shows the separation between ‘us’ as the Chinese 
people and ‘them’ as the terrorists as part of the framing on the enemy other.  
 
 
28 For more information on ETIM and other terrorist groups in China, see Clarke 2018. 
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Example 6: ETIM and terrorist motivation 
Xinjiang Daily (14/11/2013) 
Safeguarding the unity of the motherland is the common responsibility of the citizens of all ethnic 
groups  
(Zuliati Simayi, Associate Professor, School of Politics and Public Administration, Xinjiang University) 
 
[…] On October 28 of this year, at Tiananmen, Beijing, a violent terrorist attack took place that injured 
many civilians and tourists and led to significant loss of life and property. This atrocity has made countless 
people angry and shocked the peace-loving people of the world. 
 
Relevant departments have now ascertained that the ‘East Turkistan Islamic Movement’ [ETIM] group was 
the one who planned and carried out the Tiananmen terrorist attack in Beijing. The group is recognized by 
the United Nations Security Council as terrorist organization. Over the years, its personnel, together with 
many international terrorist extremist organizations, have been disseminating violent terrorist ideas in China 
through various means, and inciting, planning and implementing terrorist activities. It constitutes a major 
threat to the security and stability of China and other countries. 
 
The Tiananmen Square in Beijing has always been regarded as the political heart of China. ETIM has chosen 
this special area in order to create fear among the people of China and to bring about more violent political 
reactions and sensationalism both at home and abroad. 
 
Terrorist activities are mainly directed against the lives and property of ordinary civilians, using acts of 
violence or threats of violence. When committing this crime, they usually do not target any specific 
individuals. As in the ‘10.28’ incident in Beijing, the victims were innocent civilians, regardless of ethnic 
group, religion and nationality. The atrocities committed by terrorism against innocent people reflect their 
cruelty and cowardice. 
 
From the "7.5" incident in 2009 to the "10.28" incident this year, we can clearly see that no country, ethnic 
group or individual can remain ‘an outsider’ in the terrorism problem. Terrorism is a violation of the citizens' 
basic human rights and a challenge to the order of human civilization. Its crazy nature opposes society, 
humanity and civilization. […] 
 
The most prevalent face of the terrorists are not East Turkistan forces but that of a ruthless 
and brutal beast (Appendix 2, IC 7). This potent image portrays the enemy not only as 
straightforwardly villainous but goes further to deny their basic humanity. Examples of this 
‘demonization frame’ were found in reports commonly labelling the terrorist act or the 
terrorists as inhuman (৽Ӫ㊫) or more specifically described the brutality involved with the 
attacks. For example, a report in the Beijing Morning Post described police officer Shelin 
(ሴ᷇) as not retreating in the face of the terrorists approaching and how their hit with a 
machete caused a ten-centimetre head wound, leaving him in a pool of blood (Case 4, Beijing 
Morning Post). Another very common statement on the attacks clearly separates the terrorist 
as an evil ‘other’ that stands opposed to the Chinese people: ‘Violent terrorist attacks are 
against humanity, against society, and against a modern economy’ (᳤࣋ ᙆ㻝ࠫᱟ৽Ӫ㊫ǃ
৽⽮Պǃ৽᮷᰾Ⲵ㹼ᖴ) (Case 3, Nanfang Daily). 
 
With the same observation of demonization in the US news coverage, Steuter and Wills 
(2016) argue that the description of the violent nature of terrorism increases drama and 
therefore news value, making terrorist acts to stand out against the routinised news treatment 
of crime and politically motivated violence. Another effect, they argue, is that these 
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metaphors of the terrorist’s ‘bestial nature’ persuades the readers as ‘our’ side as righteous 
and the enemy as demonic. Therefore, stripping them systematically of humanity would 
provide the cultural platform for acts of war against the terrorist threat and a potent cognitive 
framework of the public for interpreting future acts of terrorism. This matters since creating 
sides fosters a sense of unity and conviction in objectives, as the next paragraph on 
adversarial framing demonstrates.  
 
While terrorist acts have become horrifying, Chinese society was simultaneously glorified 
as inherently good. The media frequently reminded the readers that the ‘good’ manifested in 
improved living standard, as well as a harmonious society defined by ethnic solidarity and 
national unity. Reinforcing that ‘we’ stand on the side of stability and economic growth; the 
news promote terrorism as a fight between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (see Adversarial Frame, 
Appendix 2, IC 7). The emotional language, such as ‘violent acts’ (᳤㹼) and the ‘struggle 
against brutal extremism’, help to create and reinforce the separation between ‘us’ as the 
‘good guys’ and ‘them’ as violent terrorists. This ‘adversarial frame’ was in the content 
analysis one of the most prevalent frames (see Appendix 2 for the indicator question results). 
By also assuring the public of the success in this fight depending on ‘us’ standing united, the 
media engage in a form of othering and seek public trust in the party-state’s ability to 
safeguard them. An indicative example is the following: ‘I am fully convinced that the 
masses of all ethnic groups and cadres at the grass-roots level can unite against violence and 
terror. With [national] unity as foundation, we can surely win the struggle against violence 
and terror, and against separatist forces’. (ᡁᆼޘ⴨ؑˈᡁԜⲴ਴᯿㗔Շǃสቲᒢ䜘ˈ㜭ཏഒ㔃䎧
ᶕ৽ሩ᳤࣋ ᙆǄᴹҶഒ㔃Ⲵส⹰ˈᡁԜ㛟ᇊ㜭ਆᗇ䘉൪৽ሩ᳤࣋ ᙆǃ৽ሩ࠶㻲࣯࣋ᯇҹⲴ㜌࡙) 
(Case 4, Southern Metropolis Daily). 
 
By taking the ethnic grievances and political motivation out of terrorism and concentrating 
on the horror inflicted by religious fanatics, the ideograph of terrorists magnifies the 
incomprehensibility of terrorism. Using the ideograph of the Chinese society as the actual 
and symbolic target of terrorism has confined terrorism to a struggle between ‘us’ against 
‘them’ rather than exploring the broader issue of the pre-existing ethnic grievances in 
Xinjiang. By portraying the ideographs as dialectically opposite, the news imparts equal 
levels of abstraction to the terms. In other words, terrorism functions as a term of political 
separation, while the ideograph of Chinese society promotes unification. In addition to 
creating a separation between the two, their ideological opposition further mobilises public 
support in opposing the enemy other. Therefore, presenting terrorism as an ideological 
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opposite to the Chinese society empties terrorism of both political motivation and historic 
context, while mobilising public support for party-state action against the terrorist threat. 
 
Fanning the flames of the terrorist threat: Urgency, gravity and ‘the right side’  
The media portrayal of terrorism as an unprecedented threat to the maintenance of an orderly 
society has elevated it to the status of a national security threat. Stipulating an official truth 
in the media and juxtaposing this to ‘false rumours’ and the ‘double standard’ of ‘the West’ 
also enabled the party-state to maintain opinion leadership in how the terrorist threat is 
perceived. In this sense, the prevalent urgency and gravity frame as well as ‘the right side’ 
frame portray terrorism as a grave threat which requires a united and resolute response by 
the Chinese people.  
 
The urgency and gravity frame manifested in the consistent emphasis on the seriousness (ѕ
䟽) of the terrorist attacks whenever referring to the incident, followed by claims of their pre-
meditation (亴䈻). Other manifestations of the urgency and gravity frame were visible in 
earlier examples, such as when reporters stress the need to fight terrorism resolutely to 
prevent any further harm to China’s stability. The media portrayed the terrorist attacks as 
serious, independent of whether the casualties were high or low (see Figure X in Chapter 4), 
therefore signalling that the number of casualties is not the main reason for the assessment 
on its severity. The data analysis showed that the terrorist threat and its gravity was not 
defined by the number of casualties but rather its destabilising effect on the Chinese society.  
 
As Example 7 shows, the media portrayed stability at the centre of China’s contemporary 
society, yet it is under threat by terrorism and extremism (see also Appendix 2, IC 6). First, 
the media portrayed terrorism as unprecedented threat to the maintenance of the orderly 
society due to its negative effect on economic growth (i.e. property loss, loss in tourism 
income) and quality of life. As discussed in more detail at the end of this Chapter on social 
values, the news reports picture solidarity and commitment to the Chinese economy as 
necessary for the continuous growth in living standard, a factor that is at the very least 
disrupted by acts of terrorism. Second, terrorism reportedly spreads extremist thought that 
weakens the social value ideology that holds the Chinese society together. The severity of 
the terrorist threat stems from the de-stabilising effect on society. The example of such harm 
to Chinese society can be found below in which terrorism was portrayed by the media as 
tumours. 
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Example 7: The harm of terrorism to Chinese society 
Xinjiang Daily (15/11/2013)  
Violent terrorists are tumours that gravely affect the stability of the Chinese society 
Kuran Nihemaiti, Member and Vice-President of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Academy of Social 
Sciences 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Their purpose is to create a sensational effect in the international arena, to create pressure on the party and 
the state, and to create an atmosphere of terror in the whole society, which once again exposes their 
reactionary plots to split the motherland, destroy consensus and national unity. Facts have proven once again 
that violent terrorists are the common enemy of the people of all nationalities worldwide. Our struggle 
against violent terrorists is neither a matter of nationality nor religion, but a political struggle between 
splittism and anti-splittism, defending and destroying the unity of the motherland. There is absolutely no 
room for compromise or leeway. 
 
Terrorist crimes have seriously endangered the lives of people of all ethnic groups. From this year's ‘4.23’, 
‘6.26’ to ‘10.28’ violent terrorist Cases, we can see that the tactics of violent terrorists are extremely cruel, 
with killing as the definite goal, among those killed including Uyghur as well as international tourists. These 
acts of violence and terror are a serious violation of human rights, a serious challenge to the dignity of the 
legal system, a serious damage to the civilized order, and a typical anti-social, anti-human and anti-civilized 
terrorist act, which will surely be strongly condemned and rejected by peace-loving countries and people 
around the world. The reality also warns us once again that violent terrorism has become the most realistic 
and direct threat to the social stability of China and Xinjiang. 
 
Therefore, when an attack occurs, the media’s goal seems to articulate an official account to 
serve as the authoritative version of events and to control the way the public perceives the 
issue (Appendix 2, IC 15). One can also observe the party-state’s practice of articulating an 
official truth in the rapid response to each incident, providing brief event descriptions that 
are displayed in each newspaper within two days. Starting with Case 3, the 2013 car crash 
into Tiananmen, the media also framed the party-state as providing “the only truth” on 
China’s terrorism problem and providing an antithesis to the ‘double standard’ (ৼ䟽ḷ߶) 
of ‘the West’. The ‘double standard’ refers to the media’s claim of any information on 
terrorism other than from the party-state would be ‘lies’ or ‘rumours’ and stands in contrast 
to the party-state’s ‘truth’ (ⵏ⴨ or ⵏۿ) on the situation. 
 
Accordingly, ‘the West’, specifically the US, were criticised by the media for applying what 
they called a ‘double standard’ to China’s terrorism issue. They claim that “the West” applies 
different criteria to what is called terrorism in China as opposed to their own country and 
includes criticisms against ‘Western’ journalists of breaking their professional ethics by 
lying. Such comments, though with nine examples in the sample a relatively low number, 
are without exception sources that reportedly came from the Xinhua. The example below 
demonstrates this criticism towards various named Western outlets for their reporting, three 
days after the Kunming railway station attack in March 2014. 
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Example 8: Western double-standard on China’s terrorist threat 
Economic Daily (4/3/2014)  
A statement by the head of the All-China Journalists’ Association on Western media having ulterior 
motives in reporting the serious violent terrorist incident in Kunming 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Xinhua News Agency, Beijing, March 3. […] On the evening of March 1, a serious violent terrorist incident 
occurred in Kunming Railway Station, Yunnan Province. Terrorists brutally attacked with knives a large 
number of innocent people. At present, 29 people have been killed and 143 injured. The Chinese people 
of all nationalities and the international community immediately strongly condemned this serious violent 
terrorist incident. However, some western media ignore most basic journalistic ethics, and have 
ambiguous, unpredicTable and ulterior motives in their reports. For example, CNN quotes terrorists in its 
reports, the Associated Press prefixes China's ‘officially called terrorists’ in its reports, and the New York 
Times, Washington Post and Reuters call terrorists ‘attackers’ and ‘radicals’. The British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) not only puts the words violent terrorism in quotation marks, but also emphasizes that 
the official reports cited by the BBC are ‘unconfirmed’. What's more, when the Associated Press selectively 
quoted a respondent, it claimed that ‘Uyghurs should be allowed to be independent’. 
 
It must be pointed out that a large number of facts fully prove that the heart-breaking atrocity at Kunming 
Railway Station is a naked violent terrorist crime. The cruel nature of the criminals' anti-humanity, anti-
civilization and anti-society has been exposed, and these thugs are without doubt terrorists. However, 
some of the Western media, which have always been the loudest voices on the issue of counter-terrorism 
and human rights, have been collectively ‘blind’ and have even defended and sought excuses for the 
atrocities committed by terrorists. This practice is obviously a double standard, contrary to the principle 
of objective and impartial news, and lacks the minimum professional ethics of the media. Chinese 
journalists expressed strong indignation on this. […] 
 
 
Other articles additionally remain brief and with emphasis on not to tell lies (Example: Case 
2, Xinjiang Daily, article 2). They demand loyalty to the government, disbelief of rumours 
and continuous adherence to the promoted social values. In this line, later Cases (under the 
Xi administration) reinforce the need to strengthen media control to guide public opinion 
towards this truth (see also Klimes 2018).  
 
Therefore, the main message remains that of a grave terrorist threat that requires a united 
and resolute response by the Chinese people. Considering the national trauma, national unity 
is deemed essential to the collective survival of the state against hostile foreign forces. As 
Tredaniel and Lee (2018, p. 179) point out, this ‘threat inflation’ comes along with a 
securitisation of the issue and can lead to securitisation of Chinese society. 
 
Mobilising and legitimising China’s securitisation 
Regarding the question of how to respond to the threat, the media focused on mobilising 
public support for the party-state’s counter-operations rather than portraying its reality. 
There is first, unsurprisingly, the event description that shaped the threat perception by the 
selection of information and evaluation given. When describing the event, for instance, the 
number of casualties and the police investigations, immediate party-state response strategies 
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are mentioned. Specifically, the increased security presence on the street and the arrest or 
pursuit of the terrorist suspects are mentioned. Such statements remain brief, yet they 
demonstrate that the party-state has the situation under control and demonstrate the 
capability in successfully detaining terrorist threats. 
 
When it came to the reality of the counter-operations, the media focus aligned with policy 
changes on terrorism. The main focus remained on changes to counter-terrorism legislation 
and bureaucracy (Appendix 2, ICs 8 and 9). Regarding the latter, the media mentions the 
establishment, expansion and training of police and military forces, demonstrating that the 
party-state acts to establish task forces that specialise in counter-terrorism operations. In 
2014, media attention shifted to counter-terrorism legislation and surged in the number of 
statements that demand the drafting of counter-terrorism law to fight terrorism. The timing 
is of importance since in the same year the fourth Plenum of the CCP’s 18th Central 
Committee resolved to advance the ‘social rule of law with Chinese characteristics’, 
promulgating to strengthen ethnic unity work and to fight terrorism.29 The quest for legal 
authority over Xinjiang began already in the late Hu Jintao period, yet it was only in 2014 
that the Committee declared to ‘rule Xinjiang by law, stabilize Xinjiang unity, and build 
Xinjiang for permanence’ (Klimes 2018: 425), and the adoption of China’s first national 
counter-terrorism law took place in December 2015. Therefore, the media seem to reinforce 
policy changes on terrorism by adding statements to the news reports that favoured these 
changes in advance. 
 
Indeed, news focus did not rest with the reality of counter-terrorism but in creating public 
consensus that a pro-active stance by the party-state is a necessity against terrorism. In the 
coding category for counter-operations, the demand of the reporters, Xinjiang locals or 
party-state officials to ‘strike hard’ (ඊߣ৽ ᙆ) was with appearance in 36% of the articles 
in the sub-sample the most prevalent frame. A brief, yet typical example is on the Kunming 
railway station knife attack in Case 3: ‘As for the problem of combating terrorists, such as 
Kunming "3.01", which just happened, these terrorists are inhumane, and their crimes are 
heinous. Anti-humanity, anti-society and anti-civilization are our common enemies, 
including the common enemies of the people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang. Such arrogance 
must be brought down by thunder’ (ሩҾ᳤ ࠶ᆀᢃࠫ䰞仈ˈ∄ྲࡊࡊਁ⭏Ⲵᰶ᰾Āgāˈ
 
29 Implementation papers on the regional level have followed since then for Xinjiang, with the most detailed 
piece being the XUAR De-Extremisation regulation from 2017 and the newest version from March this year, 
2019.  See Klimes 2018 for detail. 
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䘉Ӌ᳤ ࠶ᆀ∛ᰐӪᙗˈ㖚㹼ԔӪਁᤷˈ৽Ӫ㊫ǃ৽⽮Պǃ৽᮷᰾ˈᱟᡁԜޡ਼Ⲵ᭼Ӫˈवᤜᯠ⮶
਴᯿Ӫ≁Ⲵޡ਼᭼ӪǄᗵ享ԕ䴧䴶ѻ࣯ᢺ䘉⿽೓ᕐ≄❠ᢃл৫) (Case 4, Guangzhou Daily).  
No ambiguity could be found on the party-state’s ambition to thwart terrorism, therefore the 
news content is in line with the official Beijing rhetoric of ruling with an iron hand in 
Xinjiang (Gunaratna et al. 2010) (Appendix 2, IC 8). Though Beijing claims its terrorist 
problem to come from outside, rarely articles refer to any cooperation with other states in 
fighting terrorism (3% of the sub-sample). Where this was the Case, the commitment was 
stronger in favour of transnational cooperation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 
(SCO) with China’s neighbouring countries, reference to international cooperation to fight 
the ‘global war on terror’ remained absent.  
 
Concluding from the above observations, the media on the securitisation of China and 
specifically Xinjiang weight towards the necessity of counter-terrorism rather than its reality. 
This aligns with the argument of this larger section on the counter-terrorism framing that the 
media portrayal of terrorism as ideograph includes counter-terrorism as an ideograph. 
 
Embracing social values to fight terrorism  
Example 9: The social values of stability, unity and economic growth 
Xinjiang Daily (1/7/2013) 
Unity and stability are the fundamental interests of the people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang 
Turkan Pida, head of the religious affairs bureau of the Autonomous Region People's Committee  
 
[…] Great developments and changes have all proven the greatness of the Communist Party of China, the 
superiority of the socialist system and the concrete body of ethnic and religious policies. Long-term 
historical practice has proven that national unity and social stability are the fundamental interests of all 
ethnic groups. Without the pre-condition of unity and stability, nothing can be done. The achievements of 
development that have been achieved will be lost, not to mention the sustainable and healthy development 
of economy and society, and the gradual improvement of people's living standards of all ethnic groups. 
The long-term policy of the Communist Party of China and the fundamental interests of the people of all 
nationalities are to unite, advance, prosper and develop together, consolidate and develop equally, united, 
with mutually beneficial and harmonious ethnic relations among the people of all ethnic groups. When 
there is harmony and social and political stability, the economy will develop and the living standards of 
the people of all ethnic groups will be guaranteed. When national unity and social stability are destroyed, 
the economy will stagnate and fall back, and the lives of the people will be affected. This is an irrefuTable 
truth proven by long-term historical practice. […] 
 
Chinese terrorism coverage is not just about the terrorist threat, a main component is the 
promotion of social values that constitute the ideological foundation of contemporary China 
under CCP rule (Appendix 2, ICs 10 and 11). Social value frames were consistently and 
highly prevalent in the news reporting and manifested in frames of stability, economic 
growth, national unity (ethnic solidarity), and rule of law. The above news excerpt is 
indicative of their importance to the party-state, while also demonstrating the promotion of 
social values independent from the issue of terrorism. This section explains the third main 
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argument of this Chapter, which is that the terrorism coverage was not just a campaigning 
opportunity against the ‘three evils’ but for the promotion of social values under CCP 
leadership. This analysis-driven position reflects Brady’s argument reviewed in Chapter 2 
that the party-state successfully reinvented its ideological promotion strategy to be 
applicable in terrorism coverage. The frequency and word network analysis presented at the 
beginning of the Chapter further validated their importance, displaying stability, solidarity 
and economic growth as among the most frequently used terms in the data set. In short, they 
dominate the news coverage. 
 
As the quotation below exemplifies, the media remain clear on stability being the foundation 
of a functioning Chinese society (Appendix 2, IC 11). The media equate stability with 
continuing economic growth and improving living standards yet made its existence 
dependent on national unity and loyalty to the CCP. Starting with Cases in 2014, the rule of 
law became more prevalent as additional conditions to stability yet remained the least 
promoted frame of the four. For instance, the importance of social values becomes clear in 
this citation: ‘Stability is the premise of development, stability is the basis of prosperity, and 
stability is the greatest livelihood of the people, which is the irrefutable truth proved by 
historical practice’ (っᇊᱟਁኅⲴࡽᨀˈっᇊᱟ㑱㦓Ⲵส⹰ˈっᇊᱟᴰབྷⲴ≁⭏ˈ䘉ᱟশਢᇎ䐥ᡰ
䇱᰾Ⲵ仐ᢁн⹤Ⲵⵏ⨶) (Case 2, Beijing Daily).  
 
National unity was the most prevalent condition for stability (Appendix 2, IC 11), which 
manifested in emphasis on collectivity as one Chinese society or through inter-ethnic 
solidarity (i.e. ‘harmony and stability are the common aspirations of all ethnic groups, and 
we must better fulfil our mission’ ઼ 䉀っᇊᱟ਴᯿Ӫ≁Ⲵޡ਼ᗳᝯˈаᇊ㾱ᴤྭൠን㹼֯ભ; Case 
4, Xinjiang Daily). The national unity frame promotes a sense of ‘us’ as collective, but, 
different to the adversarial frame (‘us’ versus ‘them’) is not defined by unity in the face of 
the enemy. Nonetheless, together these two frames, and even on their own, make the sense 
of unity among the Chinese people one of the most prevalent frame in the terrorism coverage. 
Similar to the rule of law covered earlier regarding the counter-terrorism law, the prevalence 
of national unity aligns with the promulgation of the 18th Central Committee as well as the 
Central Xinjiang Work Forum to solve Xinjiang’s ethnic unity problem by establishing 
national consciousness as well as strengthening identification with the homeland (Klimes 
2018). Therefore, the data confirms the aim of the Chinese government to maintain an image 
of a harmonious society with unity among its different ethnic groups, using the rhetoric of 
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solidarity between all ethnic groups to raise national consciousness and strengthen 
boundaries to terrorism. 
 
The Chinese and US framing of terrorism in comparison 
Contrary to the scholarly findings on US terrorism framing reviewed in Chapter 2, the 
Chinese media do not employ the ‘war on terror’ frame (Steuter and Wills 2016). The 
framing analysis for China found indeed the portrayal of a fight against terrorism yet does 
not use the terminology of war. Moreover, the US ‘war on terror’ involves the conflict with 
other states due to the perception of terrorists coming from outside the US border. While the 
Chinese media explain the terrorism issue to be the result of religious extremist thought 
being spread from outside China, there is no indication of an inter-state conflict to combat 
terrorism. Contrasting these two portrayals of the terrorism issue demonstrates that the party-
state interprets the issue as a domestic one. This finding challenges the currently existing 
claim of Xinjiang scholars who see the party-state appropriating the ‘war on terror’ lexicon 
for the Xinjiang conflict (Clarke 2008; Roberts 2018; Wayne 2007). While this yet requires 
testing for the policy domain, this finding on the media would suggest that scholars who use 
the ‘war on terror’ label to refer to China’s terrorism issue do so prematurely and require 
conceptualisation before their use. 
 
In contrast with Islamophobia in the US, the Chinese news stories of terrorism exhibit an 
Extremism-phobia. In the US war on terror, scholars confirmed the existence of 
Islamophobia with comments on Islam being a ‘cancer’, regular calls for arrest and 
deportation of non-white immigrants and the extermination of entire countries that may or 
may not harbour suspected terrorists (Steuter and Wills 2016). The Chinese media, however, 
rarely mention Islam and subtle comments defame Islam as prone to extremism. However, 
the central purported threat lies in religious extremist thought more generally. While subtle 
comments defamed Islam, a larger number state that Chinese terrorism is not linked to any 
specific religion or ethnic group. Therefore, ‘extremism-phobia’ is a more precise 
description of the Chinese news reporting. An additional impression from the reading of the 
material, though requiring further testing in future research, is the stronger level of 
abstraction for the terrorist enemy in China in comparison to the US.  
 
Another difference rests with China’s focus on social values. The previous discussion 
showed in the prevalence of the four frames stability, economic growth, national unity and 
rule of law the central role the CCP ideology takes in China’s terrorism coverage. These 
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frames are unique to China. However, one could argue of a similar existence of social values 
in the US coverage, just in different forms. For instance, Dobkin (1992) already described 
the pride Americans take in freedom and their morality in terrorism coverage. Similarly, 
being a nation under god as well as the defence of democracy as were chief rhetorical 
weapons (Moeller 2009). However, the analysis confirmed similarity between both countries 
in the thematic framing, on the incidents remain brief, and even those that seemed pivotal in 
shifting the direction of the conflict were quickly subsumed into the larger story of China’s 
terrorist threat (Moller and Skaaning 2013). In addition, they both reportedly show the 
prevalence of the adversarial framing (‘us’ versus ‘them’). In both Cases, the media seem to 
set boundaries between the nation’s citizens as unified and in opposition to the terrorist. The 
similarity includes the demonization of the terrorist enemy strengthening said boundaries 
(Edney 2014, Roberts 2018; Yang 2012). 
 
Overall, there are certainly similarities in terrorism coverage between the US in framing 
terrorism as an ideograph, focusing with thematic framing more on the larger terrorist threat, 
promoting a sense of unity, and setting with adversarial frames boundaries to the evil other. 
Therefore, both countries share the attempt of legitimising counter-operations against the 
alleged terrorists by defining the news construction. Yet, there are several differences in the 
news construction that provide empirical support to the de-Westernisation of media theory 
debate discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
Conclusion 
The data analysis found ten prevalent frames in the Chinese terrorism coverage, creating a 
news product that not just legitimises any party-state action against the enemy in the name 
of a counter-terrorism, promotes social values in accordance of CCP ideology and constructs 
the archetypical enemy as an ideograph that the party-state can apply to any perceived threat. 
The terrorism label has come to represent a virtual biological threat to the Chinese social 
order, making it a powerful image that stands opposed to China’s ideal of the ‘harmonious 
society’. 
 
Data analysis observations of reinforcing, transcendence, denial, and party-state sourcing 
focus led to the empirically grounded conclusion that the party-state is promoting and 
defining the terrorist threat perception. They constructed the terrorism brand that the media 
applied and promoted to the Xinjiang conflict. The findings on leaked censorship 
instructions discussed in the previous Chapter further support this conclusion. While 
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Barbour and Jones (2013) and Zeng et al.’s (2015) study suggest party-state attempts of 
‘guiding’ terrorism coverage, neither had empirical evidence to support their claims on this 
or drew on a comprehensive framing analysis to reach this conclusion. The previous Chapter 
already demonstrated that the party-state was not silencing news coverage on the terrorist 
attacks but was engaging in ‘media management’. Reasons for this strategy are reflected in 
prevalent frames, such as on ‘the right’ side, social values or the adversarial frame, which 
all promote a definition of who is the enemy and which ideals are to be desired. In this sense, 
the framing observation confirm the media to serve as another resilience tool of the party-
state in addition to those covered in Chapter 2. 
 
The terrorism brand does both, mobilising support for the fight against an abstract other and 
juxtaposing it to the ideal of harmonious and stable society. The previous discussion on 
prevalent frames revealed the reporting of terrorism to be a complex combination of almost 
opposing views, such as the defaming of Islamic beliefs while advocating for ethnic 
solidarity, legitimising a fight against terrorism while embracing the ideal of a ‘harmonious 
society’, mentioning ETIM as terrorist group yet focusing largely on terrorism as an 
ideograph. It becomes clear from the analysis that the framing of the terrorist threat is imbued 
with the fear of an evil other, seeking to legitimise the forceful intrusion of the party-state’s 
security forces. Meanwhile, at the centre of the news coverage is not the terrorism, especially 
not its victims, but the social values that define the CCP ideology. 
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Chapter 6: Prevalent Changes in the  
News Framing of Chinese Terrorism 
 
No research until now has investigated Chinese news frame changes on terrorism since 2009, 
and yet the literature on the securitisation of Xinjiang and the tightening of media control 
during the Xi administration would suggest changes in the news construction of terrorism. 
This dissertation’s exploratory analysis of prevalent frame changes over time did indeed find 
Xinjiang under ‘new circumstances’ during the Xi administration, with cases in 2014 shifting 
in news framing towards Xi Jinping and social values. This chapter demonstrates that the 
terrorist threat portrayal itself, however, only changed to a minor extent. Two exceptions 
were the growing prevalence of the securitisation frame in 2014 with the news demanding 
counter-terrorism law and the increased focus on the larger terrorist threat with its links to 
extremism. The news media attention turned stronger towards Xi Jinping and social values, 
with the rule of law being a new prevalent frame since 2014. Therefore, the findings evidence 
the media’s increased role in promoting ideology while the terrorist threat in terrorism 
coverage became secondary.  
 
This argument has been distilled from the sub-sample of 458 articles by comparing framing 
differences between cases, therefore allowing to identify prevalent changes in framing over 
time. The first part of this chapter involves findings from three quantitative tests on the 
similarity of news content between these cases. The aim was to identify the extent to which 
news coverage varies in terrorism coverage over time; the quantitative text analysis validates 
some of the framing observations presented in the previous chapter, while also 
demonstrating that quantitative text analysis of Chinese content requires much more 
scholarly development.  The indicator question analysis was the main source of findings to 
answer the research question. For each case, I answered the 16 indicator question in 
Appendix 3 and compared differences in the answers across cases to identify frame changes. 
These are the same indicator questions as used for the framing analysis used for Chapter 5, 
only that separates the answers by case.  Together, this chapter empirically confirms 
scholarly claims on Xi Jinping’s tighter grip over the media to hold true for terrorism 
coverage and that it has resulted in press reporting of terrorist incidents that focus heavily 
on Xi’s appeal to fight terrorism and the promotion of the social values stability, economic 
growth, national unity and rule of law. 
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Similarities in news coverage over time 
The exploration of frame changes over time began with quantitative similarity tests in which 
the data population of 2291 articles was separated by case. Based on the frequency of words 
in each of these documents, the Pearson’s correlation test was a first indication of the extent 
to which the news coverage of these cases overlapped in content. It tested the hypothesis that 
news content in terms of words used is consistent across the cases. In order to test the 
hypothesis, the Pearson’s correlation test used the frequencies of all words occurring in each 
article and compared their similarity across cases.  Case 1 served as reference point for 
comparison since it was the only case that is timewise furthest apart from the other cases, 
Case 1 occurred in 2009 whereas the other cases took place between 2013 and 2015. 
Therefore, a similarity test between case 1 and each of the other seven cases indicated the 
extent of news content change within the six years (see Table 6-1).  
 
Table 6-1: Similarity of news coverage across cases 
Cases Extent of similarity 
Case 1 and Case 2 
Case 1 and Case 3  
Case 1 and Case 4 
Case 1 and Case 5 
Case 1 and Case 6 
Case 1 and Case 7 
Case 1 and Case 8 
68% 
55% 
60% 
73% 
73% 
55% 
67% 
Note: See Appendix 3 for the full test details. 
 
The test results suggest that news content of case 1 compared to other cases ranged from 
moderate correlation with case 3 (r=0.55, p≤ 0.05) to high correlation with all other cases (r 
=0.60≤0.73, p ≤ 0.05). All tests showed statistical significance of p≤ 0.05, with most cases 
achieving the high correlation range of 0.60-1.00 in relation to case 1.30 Strong levels of 
similarity exist between case 1 and the other others, starting with 68 per cent of similar words 
between the cases 1 and 2. Over time, this level of similarity fluctuated by around ten per 
cent, yet the values remain consistently over 50%. This shows that the news content for the 
different terrorist attacks remained similar over time. 
 
Figure 6-1 illustrates these high levels of similarity between both cases by clustering words 
close to the dashed line that goes in each box from the bottom left to the top right. The 
 
30 To the best of my knowledge, this similarity test has not previously been conducted on the news coverage 
of any news item in China. While the importance of this test should not be overstated since the similarity of 
words cannot signal frame similarity, I hope that continuation of incorporating this test can allow researchers 
to establish a link between these two based on a larger number of cases. As of now, it shall only serve to 
indicate the extent of content similarity. Only a few studies on Western press have used this test, suggesting 
that any correlation higher than 0.60 signals strong similarity in content. For examples, see Baden and 
Tenenboim-Weinblatt 2017; Schober et al. 2018; Tedesco 2006. 
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deviation of a word from the dashed line signalled that this word occurred more frequently 
in one of the two cases. Words positioned at the bottom left of the box appeared rarely, 
whereas those positioned at the top right appeared frequently in the news coverage. For 
instance, in the comparison of the first and second case, the term Xinjiang (ᯠ⮶) was at the 
top right corner of the box and close to the dashed line. The high x-value signalled highly 
frequent use of the word in case two, the additional high y-value showed the same for case 
1. In another example, the word ‘terrorism’ ( ᙆ) was in the same box below ‘Xinjiang’ 
and deviated from the dashed line. The extremely high x-value signalled frequent appearance 
in the news coverage of case 2, yet the y-value is lower. Therefore, the terrorism appeared 
much more frequently in case 2, therefore signalling a difference in news content regarding 
this word.  
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Figure 6-1: Frequent words in news coverage compared by case  
 
 
The large cluster of words at the bottom left and centre of each box confirmed the high level 
of similarity between case 1 and all other cases. In each box, readable Chinese characters in 
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the top right or at the centre confirm the prevalence of the social value frames and counter-
terrorism frames in Chinese terrorism coverage. For instance, frequent terms across cases 
were ‘terrorism’ ( ᙆ), ‘unity’ (ഒ㔃), ‘the people’ (Ӫ≁ and 㗔Շ), ‘[people of all] ethnic 
groups’ (਴᯿), ‘development/growth’ (ਁኅ), ‘serious’ (ѕ䟽), ‘violence’ (᳤࣋). The words 
align with the previously discussed prevalent frames of national unity, economic growth, 
injustice and gravity frame. Meanwhile, a prevalent difference between the first and the other 
cases is the use of the word ‘terrorism’, at a y-value of around 0.100%. Its position right of 
the dashed line illustrates that, apart from case 4, all other cases used the term much more 
frequently than case 1. Future research could take this observation as a starting point for an 
in-depth analysis of the use of the word ‘terrorism’ in news coverage over time. As of now, 
a possible explanation could be an increasing use of the terrorism label over time for terrorist 
attack, yet more cases during the Hu administration would be necessary to reach this 
conclusion. 
 
Finally, I used structural topic modelling to explore framing patterns in the news, while also 
testing for any framing differences across cases to extend on the above similarity tests. While 
the above tests only considered word frequencies, structural topic modelling identifies 
prevalent ‘topics’ that constitute a main component of the news story based on the 
frequencies of words and their relation to each other. While this should not be confused with 
framing, since the former remains highly generalised based on large amounts of text and the 
latter is a concrete understanding of a word/phrase/sentence(s), it nonetheless indicates 
prevalent parts in a news story. In this sense, it is an unstructured quantitative text analysis 
that analyses news content independent from the qualitative content analysis (for more 
details, see Chapter 3). Diagnostic tests showed that four topics defined the news coverage 
of all eight cases (see Appendix 3 for the diagnostic tests and selection criteria). Figure 6-2 
shows these four topics together with the ten most commonly associated words. 
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Figure 6-2: Structural topic modelling - News topics and associated words 
 
Note: ‘Beta’ on the x-axis refers to the extracted per-topic-per-word probability, while ‘term’ on the y-
axis denotes the words that are most frequently associated with the respective topic.  
 
The output generally suggested a news focus on the terrorist threat, the fight against that 
threat, and the role of legislation in this. It confirms framing observations stated in the 
previous chapter on their prevalence. Taking a closer look at the first topic, the extracted 
words ‘thug’ (᳤ᗂ) as common word for terrorist, ‘crime’ (㖚), ‘the accused’ (㻛੺Ӫ), ‘the 
suspect’ (ჼ⯁), ‘death sentence’ (↫ࡁ) and ‘kill’ (ᵰ) together suggest this topic to be on the 
terrorist suspects and their punishment. Topic three is also recognisable due to several 
extracted terms being location terms related to case 4, these were Kunming (ᰶ᰾), Yunnan 
(Ӂই) and the train station (⚛䖖ㄉ), which reminded of the knife attack at the Kunming 
central railway station in case 4. The words ‘judicial’ (ਨ⌅) and ‘thug’ might relate to content 
analysis observation for case 4 on the prevalence of calls for counter-terrorism legislation. 
 
The topics two and four remain less clear to interpret due to the large number of single 
characters that require further context for interpretation. The two terms that were strongest 
associated with topic two, ‘burn/cook/heat’ (✗) and ‘fight over/ grab/rob’ (ᣒ), together 
with the term ‘thug’, where when reading the reports as part of the open coding commonly 
used in the context of ‘cracking down’ on terrorists. For topic 4, the terms ‘bingtuan’ (ޥ
138 
 
ഒ)31, ‘employment’ (ቡъ) and ‘labour’ (ࣣࣘ) suggested that another news focus was on 
work life. This finding links back well to the open coding observation that shows the media 
to appeal to the people to continue the day-to-day work life without fear of terrorism. In 
previous chapters I explained that the media demand to the public to resolutely fight 
terrorism, yet the news coverage does not contain any suggestion on how to do so but instead 
mobilises the people to maintain stability. One example of this stability was not just the 
political leadership of the Chinese Communist Party but also the economic growth as 
signalled above with the fourth topic on work life.  
 
I cannot interpret the role of the other terms in the news focus of topic 4 due to large number 
of single characters. This issue demonstrates the challenge any utilisation of structural topic 
modelling still poses for the analysis of Chinese text, it is the word segmentation process 
that is necessary for the text analysis as part of pre-processing the data. The process yet 
suffers from the challenge of which characters together form a ‘word’. For instance, the pre-
processing of the data separated Xi Jinping into two so-called tokens, the first name and the 
last name. The result of this challenge can be seen in the various single characters in topic 
two and four. Therefore, it showed that unstructured topic modelling for Chinese text is still 
in its infancy but also demonstrated why the additional use of qualitative methods for this 
project was necessary to explore the news portrayal. 
 
Nonetheless, the main reason for using the structural topic modelling was to test whether 
these topics derive from each of the eight cases to a similar extent. So, Figure 6-3 showed to 
which extent each of the four topics was associated with each case. If one topic uniquely 
derived from one case, this would uniquely signal differences in news content to the other 
cases. 
 
31 A ‘bingtuan’, with the full name ‘Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps’ (ᯠ⮶⭏ӗᔪ䇮ޥഒ), that 
according to Cliff (2009) is a military-agricultural settlement and production institution founded in 1954 to 
open up land for agricultural production and defend the Xinjiang region. See also Zhu and Blachford (2015). 
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Figure 6-3: Strength of association between each topic and case  
 
Note: ‘Gamma’ on the x-axis refers to the ‘per-case-per-topic probability’, indicating the extent 
to which the news coverage on one case identified a topic. ‘Count’ denoted the number of topics 
that hold a certain gamma-value for each case. See Silge and Robinson (2017) for details. 
 
The key finding was that case one uniquely defined topic two, as signalled by the gamma 
value of one for topic two in box 1. All other cases share ties to the other three topics. Topic 
1 derived strongly from the cases 5, 7 and to less extent also from case 3. Topic 3 was 
strongly tied to the cases 4 and 8, while the fourth topic related strongest to case 2, 3 and 6. 
This figure highlighted once again, though through the difference method of unsupervised 
topic modelling, that news coverage on case 1 was different to the following cases. Together 
with the prior similarity analysis, these findings clearly demonstrate strong similarity in news 
content across cases, while case 1, the only one that occurred during the Hu administration 
seems to deviate from the rest. The subsequent analysis of framing patterns across cases shed 
further light onto prevalent framing changes over time. 
 
Main changes in prevalent frames over time 
For a qualitative understanding of changes in the news framing over time, I divided the 
answers to the indicator questions used for the previous chapter by case. This way, strong 
changes in the answers for each case signal prevalent frame changes over time. Table 6-2 
lists the indicator questions that suggest frame changes (see Appendix 3 for the table with 
all indicator questions). 
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Table 6-2: Indicator questions signalling prevalent frame changes 
Question 1: Does the report take a thematic focus in the news story? 
Answer Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6 Case 7 Case 8 
Yes 61% 65% 69% 68% 72% 68% 66% 70% 
 
Question 7: If at all, which counter-terrorism frames exist in the report? 
Extremism-phobia 44% 41% 35% 58% 64% 61% 63% 55% 
Securitisation 16% 10% 15% 26% 29% 28% 18% 13% 
 
Question 8: Does the report contain the description of or call for ‘striking hard’ against terrorism? 
Yes 25% 20% 32% 37% 39% 40% 27% 22% 
 
Question 9: Does the report contain the description of or call for counter-terrorism legislation? 
Yes 0% 0% 0% 12% 15% 13% 8% 0% 
 
Question 10: To which extent does the report focus on social values? 
Note: Scale between 0 and 10, with 10 suggesting total focus on social values. 
Average 4.6 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.8 
 
Question 11: If at all, which social value frames exist in the report? 
Economic growth 57% 54% 42% 41% 43% 40% 36% 40% 
Rule of law 0% 0% 0% 13% 16% 14% 0% 0% 
 
Question 13: Does the report cite individuals who had been directly affected by terrorist attacks? 
Yes 6% 5% 2% 2% 0% 2% 0% 0% 
 
Question 16: Does the report refer to the general secretary (Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao)? 
Yes 7% 8% 10% 48% 53% 57% 56% 52% 
 
Based on the analysis, the media has over time growingly prioritised the thematic focus on 
the general terrorist threat over a single terrorist act. The answer to question 1 demonstrated 
continuity in thematic news focus across the cases as opposed to an episodic focus with the 
single terrorist attack or an individual. However, the proportion of articles that took a 
thematic focus increased over time. From 61 per cent in 2009, the following attacks starting 
from 2013 showed stronger thematic focus in the top 60 per cent of each sub-sample. From 
reading the material, it became clear that the slightly weaker thematic focus in case 1 was 
due to more frequent references to the East Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM), and 
especially Rebiya Kadeer and the World Uyghur Congress as instigator of the attack. The 
latter two actors were not mentioned at all in the following cases and ETIM remained a rarely 
occurring enemy in the news. 
 
Instead, the later cases tended to focus stronger on the larger terrorist threat with growing 
news focus on extremism as a danger to the Chinese people. Question 7 signalled the 
growing extremism-phobia in an increase from 44 per cent in 2009 to 59-62 per cent in the 
2014 cases. Meanwhile, the impression from the open coding was that the increase in focus 
on extremism came at the expense of separatism as a news topic. While it remained rarely 
used across cases, it very rarely finds mentioning in cases starting from 2014 in contrast to 
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case 1. Another observation regarding extremism was the high level of abstraction as it 
lacked any explanation in the meaning of the term. However, the open coding suggests that 
the concept of extremism has grown more abstract over time. In the cases 1 and 2, the media 
commonly linked terrorism to religious extremism, arguing that religious extremist though 
leads to terrorist activities. Starting from case 3 in 2013, the news discussion shifted from 
‘religious extremism’ to ‘extremism’, in addition to discussing extremism as an issue 
separate from terrorism. 
 
Together, the increased thematic framing, the extremism focus and its higher level of 
abstraction, led to the conclusion that over time news coverage shifted further towards 
portraying terrorism as an ideograph. In tandem with this, the abstraction of both terrorism 
and extremism demonstrate the argument of the previous chapter that terrorism coverage 
was a campaigning opportunity against all ‘three evils’ by inter-connecting the three abstract 
concepts of terrorism, extremism and separatism.  
 
Other components of the counter-terrorism frame showed only minor changes over time, 
signalling that the party-state has constructed a relatively stable terrorist threat for a range of 
incidents. The only exception was the securitisation frame that surged up in the year 2014 
(question 7). The answers to the questions 8 and 9 showed that this surge related to the 
increased number of calls in the news for counter-terrorism legislation in 2014 cases, which 
gained prevalence a year before the final issuing of China’s first national counter-terrorism 
law. Meanwhile, calls to resolutely fight terrorism remains consistently a strong component 
of the securitisation frame. Yet, news coverage of cases 3 and following showed increased 
news reporting of how the party-state follows up on this demand. The news reports describe 
recent changes in the personnel for counter-terrorism strategies, thereby providing evidence 
that the party-state more resolutely fights terrorism. In this sense, the media no longer only 
reiterate the case for policy changes but also demonstrate that the party-state is capable of 
fighting the portrayed threat. Beside from these changes, the terrorist threat portrayal 
remained relatively stable, which suggested a solid party-state terrorism construction that 
was re-applied to cases over time  
 
The thematic focus did not just entail a growing abstraction of the terrorist threat but also a 
growing news focus on social values. Question 10 evidenced this observation by presenting 
the average level of news attention which each report devoted to social values. While media 
attention to social values was consistently high across cases, with roughly every second news 
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report focusing on social value framing, news coverage of cases after 2009 remained 
consistently stronger in social value focus in contrast to case 1.32 Questions 9 and 11 on 
changes in social value framing showed a potential explanation in the prevalence of the rule 
of law frame that occurred together with the increased securitisation frame. While the 
securitisation frame measures any description of, or calls for, counter-terrorism legislation 
(among others explained in the previous chapter), the rule of law gained more news attention 
as a frame that promotes political leadership based on law. Only 2014 cases (cases 4—7) 
utilised this frame, in which the media newly emphasise the fight against terrorism by law, 
which occurred simultaneously to policy changes on the same matter and led to the approval 
of China’s first national counter-terrorism law in the following year. With the promotion of 
legislative changes came a promotion of the rule of law under the Xi administration. 
 
Another change in the social value framing came with increasing number of examples for 
national unity over time. Across cases, national unity was a prevalent frame. Yet, in the cases 
1, 2 and 3, the media discussed national unity on an abstract level as either being harmed or 
as socially desirable. In the following cases, news coverage gave examples that demonstrated 
this strong sense of solidarity much more concretely. For instance, in cases 4 and 5, all 
newspapers published several articles that focused on the voluntary blood donations of large 
numbers of citizens and emphasised this commitment to help others as evidence of solidarity. 
While it remained unreported why so many people decided to donate blood after these two 
attacks, articles instead emphasised that the blood banks were full thanks to all these 
volunteers. Another example, with the same cases, was the reporting of petition that 
unnamed individuals started to ask for a minute of silence in CPPCC National Committee 
meetings as reminder of the lives lost in the terrorist attacks. Following up on this, articles 
across newspapers briefly reported that indeed Members of the Second Session of the 
Twelfth CPPCC National Committee in Beijing committed to a period of silence. These are 
examples in which the news reports evidence national unity, which is an addition in later 
cases to the continuously prevalent, abstract use of national unity as something desirable. 
 
Meanwhile, economic growth, confirmed by research on the Hu Jintao administration as 
indicative of Hu’s more technocratic leadership (Brown and Berzina-Cerenkova 2018; Kou 
and Zang 2014; Singh 2016) in comparison to Xi Jinping’s, lost news focus. While it remains 
 
32 The high percentage values for case 8 for this indicator question and any other question needed to be 
considered with caution. The case received only a small number of publications, therefore the percentage values 
fluctuated stronger for this case. 
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a relatively strong frame in the terrorism news construction, news coverage starting from 
2014 turned stronger to the importance of the party-state guiding public opinion with help 
of the media. For instance, Xi Jinping expressed concerns about the double-standard of anti-
Chinese voices at home and abroad (see Chapter 5) and called for stronger tightening of 
media content to serve the party-state in providing ‘truthful’ reports on the terrorist events. 
Overall, the growing abstraction of the terrorist threat and the greater promotion of social 
values indicated the party-state’s shifting strategy for the media to devote more attention on 
promoting social values at the expense of counter-terrorism frames. 
 
Finally, the media have grown much more personalised in cases one year after the succession 
of Xi Jinping, with prioritising Xi Jinping’s comments and activities in the news coverage 
at the expense of party-state officials and terrorism victims. Question 11 showed this to be 
the most prevalent change over time. In 2009 and 2013 cases, the media rarely mentioned 
Hu Jintao, but instead a range of party-state officials from various party-state departments 
locally and nationally who usually condemned the terrorist act, emphasised the gravity of 
the terrorism issue and the need for resolute struggles against terrorism. Starting in 2014, the 
media greatly increased focus on Xi Jinping’s thoughts and activities regarding terrorism 
and the Chinese people. For instance, case 4 showed often how Xi Jinping visited citizens in 
Xinjiang (not in the area of the attacks) to get a sense of their needs and to emphasise the 
great improvement in living standards they experienced over the previous decades. These 
reports include comments from people who received Xi Jinping, stressing the special 
experience of Xi coming in person to learn about their lives and needs. Other activities 
involve additional visits to military camps, confirming the excellent facilities and training 
the soldiers have at their disposal. In this sense, the news coverage pictured Xi as a leader 
who stands close to the people – a portray that is different to the largely absent predecessor 
Hu Jintao.  
 
Yet, this change in leadership focus came with a large decrease in any citations of terrorism 
victims or Xinjiang locals generally (question 13). In 2009, Xinjiang locals described the 
economic losses or the growing as result of terrorism, in addition to calls for fighting 
terrorism. While victims found mentioning in 2009, the news stories have turned in the 2014 
cases and onwards towards almost exclusively Xi Jinping. Together with the consistently 
high reliance on Xinhua or People’s Daily (see question 15 in the appendix), the news data 
clearly evidenced the stronger leadership focus during the Xi administration.  
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Conclusion 
Distilled from the above findings, the over-arching argument of this chapter is that the strong 
similarity in news content across cases confirms the tight grip of the party-state over news 
content, while over time the media have growingly served as promoter of social values for 
the party-state. Meanwhile, the terrorist threat portrayal remains a relatively stable 
construction. In short, the news coverage has shifted under the Xi administration away from 
the specific issue of terrorism towards the larger issue of terrorism, religious extremism and 
separatism for the Chinese society and the importance of social values for stability.  
 
Both the similarity tests and indicator questions showed greater news content differences 
between the 2009 case and the rest, which occurred in the 2013-2015 period, whereas there 
are fewer differences among the latter group. The news portrayal of the terrorist threat has 
grown more abstract with greater focus on extremism, lending itself to the argument from 
the previous chapter of terrorism as an ideograph, creating an abstract enemy other that can 
be applied to any of the ‘three evils’ (terrorism, extremism, separatism). The only more 
concrete change in this terrorist threat construction is the greater prevalence of the 
securitisation frame in 2014, in form of description of and calls for counter-terrorism 
legislation and ‘strike hard’ campaigns, simultaneous to policy changes for securitisation of 
Xinjiang (Leibold 2019). Other indicator questions on the counter-terrorism frames 
remained relatively stable over time, only the extremism and securitisation frames have 
grown more prevalent at the same time as the Xi administration initiated comprehensive 
measures to fight against terrorism and for stability in Xinjiang under the motto of ‘Xinjiang 
under new circumstances’. Based on the data analysis, the ‘new circumstances’ could be 
interpreted as stronger media focus on Xi Jinping with close ties to the people, a stronger 
counter-terrorism apparatus in response to calls for a resolute struggle against terrorism, and 
the expansion of social values with the rule of law and guidance of public opinion. 
 
Greater frame changes were visible in the stronger leadership focus during the Xi 
administration. While news coverage started with strong focus on Xi Jinping in 2014, this 
stood in sharp contrast to sparse mentioning of the former general secretary Hu Jintao while 
he was on power during the first case. Media attention further shifted towards stronger 
promotion of the social value frames, with the strongest changes involving less focus on 
economic growth and increased focus on the rule of law. Together, these findings highlight 
the tighter leadership focus and ideological promotion that other studies pointed out more 
broadly as stronger ideational governance by Xi Jinping (Klimes 2018; Lams 2018).  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Returning to the research questions at the beginning of the dissertation, the first research 
question asked to what extent determinants of US terrorism coverage can explain the amount 
of Chinese news attention for Chinese terrorist attacks. The regression results discussed in 
Chapter 4 showed that US determinants can only moderately explain the extent of Chinese 
terrorism coverage, factors unique to China’s socio-political environment had greater 
predictive power. In both the US and China, the closer the terrorist attacks were to the news 
organisation the more likely the media covered the event (Ruigrok and van Atteveldt 2007; 
Sui et al. 2017). In China, attacks that involved assaults (i.e. use of firearms or knives) was 
the strongest predictor of the extent of news coverage terrorist attacks received, followed by 
attacks where Chinese authorities identified ETIM as responsible for the attack. 
 
In contrast to these similarities in both the US and China, the first difference among the 
determinants was the predictive power of the number of deaths. In China, measures of deaths 
were strong predictors of the scale of news coverage but the analysis showed that an 
additional death leads to minor increase in media attention. However, different to the US, 
attacks with high death tolls tend to receive much less news coverage in comparison to 
attacks with less than 50 deaths. Furthermore, Chinese news coverage decreased when 
terrorists employed explosives. This stands in contrast to the US, where this event 
characteristic would lead to more extensive news coverage. In contrast, variables that reflect 
China’s censored media environment demonstrated additional relevance in explaining the 
extent of terrorism coverage. Leaked censorship instructions confirmed party-state 
interference with the news coverage by issuing directives for most of the eight terrorist 
attacks under study to either promote, change or delete content on the events. Similarly, 
where the party-state officially held the East Turkistan Independence Movement (ETIM) 
responsible for the attack, news coverage increased over twofold. Meanwhile, there was 
minor differences between official and more commercialised newspapers regarding the 
extent of terrorism coverage.  
 
The findings on the determinants of Chinese terrorism coverage confirm empirically the 
importance of the de-Westernisation debate in the terrorism media scholarship. Following 
the debate, the literature review laid out the question of whether media theories based on 
studies of ‘Western’ democracies, specifically the US, hold true for the Chinese censored 
media environment (Curran and Park 2000, Gunaratne 2010/2011, Miike 2006/2007, 
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Thussu 2009). On the subject of terrorism coverage, this project confirmed the value of 
Western media theory for China with several determinants showing similar effects on the 
extent of news coverage in both the US and China. However, various differences signalled 
the importance of additionally accounting for China’s censored environment in the analysis 
as well. For instance, the minor relevance of additional deaths and the strong relevance of 
censorship instructions. Overall, tests on what determines the amount of terrorism coverage 
in China requires a combination of both ‘traditional’ predictors from the existing terrorism-
media literature as well as consideration of additional variables that account for China’s 
censored media environment.  
 
The second research question asked which frames have been prevalent in the Chinese news 
coverage. Based on a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods, Chapter 5 showed 
that the social value and counter-terrorism main-frames largely make up the Chinese news 
construction of terrorism, together comprising of ten prevalent frames (see figure 7-1). The 
six counter-terrorism frames constructed terrorism as an ideograph, as a highly abstract 
concept. The portrayal of the terrorist remained mainly that of an undistinguishable enemy 
other, a religious fanatic who aimed to disrupt China’s stability. Reports of their brutality 
and the prevalent framing of these ‘inhuman other’, juxtaposed to the Chinese people, 
created a powerful image of a just fight of the party-state against terrorists. The media 
portrayed this enemy not just as a terrorist, but also as a religious extremist and separatist. 
One key finding was that the media constructed a terrorist threat that rarely refers to 
particular agents, organisation or religions, but instead remains highly abstract. This abstract 
construction invokes all ‘three evils’ (terrorism, religious extremism, separatism) as threat. 
Therefore, I concluded that the party-state used the escalation of violence in Xinjiang for a 
media campaign against terrorism, extremism and separatism simultaneously by framing 
terrorism as a highly abstract ideograph.   
 
The four social value frames were another highly prevalent component of the news 
construction, promoted by the media both in relation to terrorism and independently of it. 
Maintaining stability was described by the media to be the ultimate desire of the Chinese 
people and equated with economic growth. The reports reiterated that the pre-conditions for 
stability are national unity, rule of law and the extermination of the biological threat of 
terrorism. Example 7 in Chapter 5 exemplified this by portraying terrorism as ‘tumour’ in 
China’s otherwise orderly society, with its destabilising effect on China as its pathogenic 
effect. Common statements described the consequences of terrorism as the end of economic 
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growth and the rise of inter-ethnic conflicts. This stood in contrast to retrospective views in 
the reports on life in pre-terrorism Xinjiang, in which the media presented a picture of 
improving living standards and ethnic solidarity under the leadership of the Communist 
Party. The media portrayed social values as generally desirable but being in threat by 
terrorism. I reached the conclusion that the party-state used media control not just to 
construct a terrorist threat but adds its ‘twist’ to it with the promotion of social values that 
advocated for maintaining the status quo under leadership of the CCP. 
 
Turning to the literature gaps the above findings are filling, studies on Chinese news framing 
of terrorism remain scarce with only Zeng et al. (2013) showing attempts of the party-state 
to ‘manage’ news coverage of terrorist attacks and Barbour and Jones (2013) observing the 
social drift between Uyghur and Han Chinese in the news reporting. To this scholarship, this 
dissertation provides the first systematic framing analysis of Chinese terrorism coverage. It 
fills the analytical gap not just by discussing prevalent frames but also by illustrating 
differences to the US terrorism framing. For instance, in contrast to the ‘war on terror’ frame 
that is prevalent in the US, the Chinese media do not refer to the fight against terrorism as 
‘war’ and do not identify Islamist radicals as terrorist threats. Instead, the Chinese media 
remain highly abstract in what the terrorist threat constitutes which enabled the party-state 
to campaign against all ‘three evils’ and promote social values unique to China. Thus, the 
dissertation demonstrates the need for continuing research into terrorism framing in censored 
media environments and provides with the discussion of prevalent frame the first stepping 
stone on this for the China studies. The findings further add to the Xinjiang conflict literature 
by demonstrating that the party-state uses the news media to reinforce their portrayal of an 
imminent terrorist threat to legitimise both the securitisation of Xinjiang and the importance 
of social values. Where the extant Xinjiang conflict studies are focused on the securitisation 
of the Xinjiang conflict (Clarke 2018; Roberts 2018; Tanner and Bellacqua 2016), the 
framing analysis confirmed the media as another party-state tool used to legitimise party-
state action in Xinjiang. 
 
The third research question asked what prevalent frame changes occurred from 2009 to 2015. 
Quantitative comparison of news content for each case under study showed strong similarity, 
with every second article showing a primary focus on social values. What has changed was 
the growing news focus on social values. While stability, economic growth and national 
unity gained more news attention, the previously less mentioned rule of law gained 
prevalence in 2014 together with a larger number of calls for counter-terrorism legislation 
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reiterate the case for the first national counter-terrorism law (which was promulgated in 
2015). Rule of law frames state the governance of China and Xinjiang in accordance with 
law, without further specification of what the rule of law involves. In this sense, 2014 marked 
a turning point in the media on terrorism towards greater promotion of social values and 
particularly the concept of rule of law. Meanwhile the terrorist threat portrayal remained 
relatively stable over time, only growing more abstract with stronger focus on extremism as 
threat to China and the growing focus on Xinjiang’s securitisation to counter the terrorist 
threat. Meanwhile, any victims of terrorism receive less and less media attention, at the 
expense of the news focusing on Xi Jinping’s visits to Xinjiang locals and security forces or 
calls to strike hard. From these findings, I concluded that the party-state’s grip over the news 
content on terrorism tightened, with stronger news focus on social values while the terrorist 
threat portrayal remains relatively stable over time. 
 
These findings address all three of the literature gaps identified in Chapter two as follows. 
Regarding the analytical gap, it presents the first analysis of terrorism news framing changes 
in China. Also, it is the first framing analysis of terrorist attacks after the 2009 Urumqi attack. 
The exploratory findings demonstrate that the news portrayal of terrorism has changed since 
2009, therefore highlighting that more in-depth analysis of frame changes is a necessary 
study field for the future. Regarding the media gap, the above findings demonstrate the 
strong alignment between news coverage and political changes, as demonstrated in the 
prevalence of securitisation and social value frames simultaneously to Xi Jinping 
strengthening these areas in the policy domain. Therefore, the analysis confirms that the 
media reinforce political changes as necessary (Brady 2017b; Lams 2018). In this sense, the 
media gap in the literature on the Xinjiang conflict, as well as the empirical gap on 
authoritarian resilience, was filled with the empirical finding that the media indeed are used 
by the party-state as resilience tool to legitimise both the securitisation of Xinjiang and the 
stronger ideational governance under Xi. In conclusion, the analysis of Chinese coverage is 
an important tool to further understand the party-state strategies regarding the Xinjiang 
conflict and China’s terrorism problem. 
 
Taking all of the above findings together, my thesis is that the party-state has constructed 
through use of media control a highly abstract terrorist threat which invokes extremism as 
the actual threat but without much referring to particular agents, root causes or religion, 
whereas promoting stability maintenance for regime resilience. This terrorism brand shares 
similarities with the US ‘war on terror’ framing in creating an enemy other that is portrayed 
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as inhuman and juxtaposed to an orderly society, and requires a resolute state response to 
safeguard peace. However, differences lie in the interpretation of the terrorist threat. While 
the US media portray the terrorist as radical Islamist and point to the Middle East for 
preventive counter-terrorist measures (i.e. Powell 2011/2018), the Chinese media turn the 
‘three evil forces’ ideology of the Communist Party. While the US news media mobilise its 
people to a global ‘war on terror’, the Chinese media promote the party-state ideal of stability. 
It becomes clear from the findings discussed in this dissertation that both the censored media 
environment and the CCP’s ideational governance of China led to a different terrorist threat 
portrayal to the US. Therefore, the findings support the de-Westernisation of media theory 
argument that further research into China (and other authoritarian regimes) is necessary due 
to variation in the news outputs.  
 
Ideographs, social values and counter-terrorism frames in the Chinese news coverage 
of terrorism 
Chen (2012) explains based on interviews of party-state officials that the party-state desires 
‘controlled’ opening of news coverage of domestic terrorist attacks. In doing so, she 
confirms for Chinese terrorism coverage what is well acknowledged among China 
researchers: that the party-state uses media control to create and control frames (Brady 2017; 
Creemers 2017; Luqiu 2018; Stockmann 2013). To this field, the dissertation presents the 
argument that the party-state used media control to create a terrorism construction for the 
Xinjiang conflict. The party-state not just uses media control to construct the media’s 
portrayal of terrorism but also promotes this news construction to the public thorough news 
censorship and coordination efforts. The predictive power of traditionally strong 
determinants of terrorism coverage, leaked censorship instructions and the high similarity in 
news content across cases confirm that the party-state constructs the media portrayal of 
China’s terrorism. The high number of news reports on some of the terrorist attacks under 
study (see Figure 4-1), the strong media focus on social values and lengthy articles that 
extensively cover social values, or the terrorist threat, show the party-state is promoting the 
terrorism news construction. Therefore, this dissertation presents the Chinese news coverage 
of terrorism as massive party-state attempt to introduce, define and promote their own 
terrorism construction.  
 
To the analytical gap, only Barbour and Jones (2013) provide thus far insight into the content 
of the terrorism brand in form of the negative media portrayal of the Uyghurs in terrorism 
coverage. This dissertation adds to this gap, as first systematic framing analysis of Chinese 
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terrorism coverage, the understanding of the portrayed terrorism as an ideograph. Each of 
the six prevalent frames that construct the terrorist threat remain highly abstract in the news. 
The media portray the terrorist as an archetypical enemy, a brutal and irrational other, that 
opposes Chinese society and its stability. Said enemy primarily remains an abstract concept 
as religious extremist, only rarely are there information that link this enemy to East Turkistan 
‘terrorist groups’ (i.e. ETIM) or Islam. However, this threat is said by the media to be a grave 
threat, therefore preludes calls to fight terrorists resolutely and celebrate Xinjiang’s 
securitisation as defence of the people and their stability. With these abstract pictures of the 
enemy, the Chinese people, the gravity of the situation and the need for securitisation, the 
portrayed terrorist threat is that of an ideograph.  
 
Moreover, the dissertation presents the argument that the media’s portrayal of terrorism as 
an ideograph facilitated a media campaign against all ‘three evils’ (terrorism, extremism and 
separatism) simultaneously. This argument speaks to a subject that yet lacks any scholarly 
discussion, that is the conflation of the three-above party-state enemy constructions into one 
archetypical enemy. A potential merit of this strategy lies in the capacity of the party-state 
to denote perceived threats as any of the ‘three evils’ to legitimise domestically repressive 
measures, as demonstrated in the Chechen-Russian conflict in the 1990s (Russel 2005) or 
the recent denotation of Hong Kong protesters that demand democratic reforms as terrorists. 
 
Turning to the Xinjiang conflict scholarship, recent publications discuss the securitisation of 
Xinjiang as party-state strategy to maintain stability over the region (Clarke 2008/2018; 
Leibold 2019; Roberts 2018). Yet, there is a media gap in this literature, to which this 
dissertation contributes with the finding of the media frames legitimising both the 
securitisation of Xinjiang and CCP leadership through portrayal of an urgent terrorist threat. 
Based on a framing perspective, the previous sections show the media picturing an image of 
a prosperous and harmonious society under the CCP leadership that requires protection by 
fighting terrorism resolutely and standing united. In this sense, the media promote both the 
terrorism brand and social values. Therefore, I conclude that the party-state took the 
escalation of violence since 2009 as a media campaigning opportunity to promote social 
values in favour of maintaining stability as part of the terrorism brand in the media.  
 
Moving to the empirical gap, decades of research on China’s authoritarian resilience discuss 
the various strategies the party-state employs to maintain authority (Byman 2016; Dukalskis 
and Gerschweski 2017; Levitsky and Way 2010), among which Bondes and Heep (2012) re-
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introduced to the debate the importance of persuasion for regimes to strengthen legitimacy. 
To their analysis of official frames as forms of persuasion in party-state documents, this 
dissertation adds through framing analysis of news content empirical evidence for the use of 
media control to legitimise both the securitisation of Xinjiang and the authority of the CCP.  
The data analysis discusses ten frames that together portray the terrorist to threaten China’s 
stability and in doing so legitimate counter-terrorism measures by the party-state.  
 
The findings on the Chinese news framing of terrorism are illustrated again in the Figure 
below. 
Figure 7-1: China’s domestic terrorism news framing model 
China’s terrorism construction China’s terrorism frames 
 
§ Reinforcing terrorist threat 
interpretation through 
repetitive use of terrorism 
label 
§ Strong media reliance on 
party-state sources 
§ De-contextualising 
terrorism issue by not 
mentioning existing ethnic 
conflicts and grievances in 
Xinjiang 
 
Counter-terrorism framing 
- Injustice & gravity 
- Extremism-phobia 
- Demonization 
- Adversarial 
- Aptness 
- Securitisation  
 
Social value framing 
- Stability 
- Economic growth  
- National unity  
- Rule of law 
 
 
 
Beyond China, the conclusions in this dissertation point towards features of authoritarian 
regimes that make it likelier for similar strategies of promoting and constructing a terrorist 
threat to appear. First, one key feature is the Leninist organisation structure of the media 
industry with its extensive propaganda system. The propaganda department takes a central 
role in the state apparatus. This enables the propaganda department to reinforce, by use of 
state power, the ideologies of the political leadership to the rest of the citizens in the nation. 
Second, the media commercialisation is another potential feature in an authoritarian regime 
for these observations to occur. The profit orientation that comes with the media 
commercialisation means media actors are catering content more towards the readers; the 
high readership in China and the sensational nature of terrorism in the press provide state 
authorities with reasons to use media control as tool for influencing public perception of the 
terrorist events. Third, another factor is the extensive ideological apparatus involving social 
values that can be applied to terrorist event coverage with relative ease. In China, the media 
were able to draw on social values that the party-state authorities promoted already prior to 
the terrorist attacks. The existence of this extensive ideological apparatus allowed the state 
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authorities to quickly produce a narrative that relates back to the social values that were 
already established in society. Beyond authoritarian politics, a fourth feature is the existence 
of a globally acknowledged and abstract threat. The ‘global war on terror’ that followed the 
September 11 2001 attacks on the US enabled China to employ the terrorism lable of the 
Xinjiang conflict without much international condemnation for it the severity of its actions. 
The abstract global definitions of terrorism, as no longer related to only a single group or 
individual, further allowed the authorities to construct a terrorist threat that can be abpplied 
to a range of perceived threats (i.e. in China the ‘three evils’: terrorism, extremism and 
separatism). In sum, various characteristics of the media system, ideological system, political 
system and the existence of global threat constructions possibly make it likelier in other 
authoritarian regimes to find similar trends of promoting and ‘constructing’ terrorist threats. 
New comparative research is needed on this in the fields of both comparative 
authoritarianism and in the context of democracies. 
 
 
Limitations and opportunities for future research 
Starting from the simple observation at the beginning of this project that no researcher has 
engaged with the party-state’s terrorism communication strategies beyond the Urumqi 2009 
case empirically, this thesis introduces the study of authoritarian political communication 
strategies on sensitive issues as an important field of study. The lack of research on this 
matter possibly has to do with, firstly,  data access challenges given its sensitive political 
nature and, secondly, research design challenges given the ambiguity of the term terrorism 
(i.e. scholars might disagree in the case selection due to ambiguity in what classifies as 
terrorist attack). To avoid this issue, I selected for this research project cases that have been 
by party-state officials and media actors alike reported as acts of terrorism and received 9/11-
like labels to highlight their severity in China’s terrorism history. While selecting high 
publicity cases leaves high confidence in conclusions on what the party-state classifies as 
acts of terrorism, these research findings require testing in the future with other cases of 
domestic terrorism for further validation (e.g. Xie and Liu 2019). It is yet to investigate 
consistent the observations form this research apply to all incidents that state authorities label 
as acts of terrorism. 
 
Methodological extensions to the data analysis can provide further insight into China’s 
political communication on terrorism. The open coding, indicator questions, word frequency 
analysis and topic modelling allowed me to inductively uncover prevalent frames while their 
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triangulation further ensures high reliability in the research observations. I considered this 
inductive approach a necessity given that the creation of codebooks based on the US-derived 
terrorism media theory would easily introduce research bias and does not account for the 
different social structures in China. Aiming at presenting a first attempt of a China terrorism 
news framing model for comparison therefore is an attempt engaging in the debate of de-
westernising (terrorism) media theory. Building on the findings from this research, 
possibilities include a more in-depth framing analysis by reducing the number of newspapers 
or the opposite to test my findings across more newspapers. The focus on one country 
generally entails a recommendation for more comparison. This involves a comparison of 
terrorism coverage with other authoritarian regimes and democracies. Comparison can also 
be made between terrorism and non-terrorism issues in China. When further questioning the 
nature of the terrorism label, researchers could also go back to past violent secessionist 
movements in other countries to identify framing similarities and differences, such as with 
Northern Ireland or the Chechen conflict in Russia. As Kleinot (2017) said in his article, a 
freedom fighter to one might be understood as a terrorist to others. In this sense, comparing 
the news coverage of the Xinjiang conflict, not limited to terrorist attacks, with the above-
mentioned examples might further illuminate, empirically driven, China’s news portrayal of 
the Xinjiang conflict and terrorism. In other words, to what extent does Xinjiang terrorism 
coverage show similar framing patterns to coverage of non-terrorist violent conflicts in other 
countries? 
 
Another potential limitation is that the analysis was limited to only newspapers, given a 
worldwide declining number of newspaper readers questions might arise on the relevance of 
the analysis. This was less a concern with this project, as the interest was in ‘what the party-
state wants the Chinese public to know about the terrorism problem’ and not how many 
people read the newspapers. Conclusions are built on the premise of a media-controlled 
environment, as was confirmed through literature and empirically in this project, but is not 
dependent on the number of newspaper readers. Where researchers are interested in the 
media discourse more generally, other media platforms naturally require additional 
investigation and come with additional methodological challenges. For example, an analysis 
of social media content might require not just to scrape posts from websites but also to 
consider how these immediately or over time disappear due to censorship efforts (i.e. King 
et al. 2013). Therefore, the aim with this project remained with a first exploration of news 
coverage before follow-up studies can widen the scope to other media platforms by using 
my observations. In this vein, this research project contributed with a first comprehensive 
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insight into Chinese terrorism news coverage while also introducing content analysis 
methods for future investigations.   
 
Moreover, comparison of framing differences between newspapers was not possible in the 
confines of this PhD project. This research focused on firstly identifying what are prevalent 
frames in the news and this involved both open coding processes and quantitative analysis 
of the most frequently occurring words. To make this better comparable across newspapers, 
each frame requires further conceptualisation and additional methods for analysis. In this 
sense, this project’s aim was to take the first step for future analysis in the news portrayal by 
exploring the news framing. Another implication of this exploratory focus of the project was 
the study focus on the news output at the expense of an analysis of the audience response. 
The question of why an understanding of the news content matters relies on tacit assumptions 
about the effect frames have on the readership (and beyond as part of the public discourse). 
I engaged with this debate in Chapter 2, in which I showed through review of other literature 
that evidence of the party-state using media control would suggest that they consider media 
influence to matter for the political leadership. Moreover, I demonstrated through discussion 
of experimental studies conducted in the United States how receiving terrorism frames can 
affect our perception of terrorism. Therefore, while I focused first on understanding the news 
product that is available on terrorism, new research needs to study how the audience 
perceives the news construction and responds to it.  
 
Insight into the new patterns in news framing remain limited due to the exploratory nature if 
this study. First, questions arise on how different China’s terrorism coverage is to those of 
other countries. The coding observations could be used to develop a dictionary for 
supervised topic modelling, testing these observations for a larger set of terrorist incidents. 
I have taken a first step towards this by identifying common US terrorism news frames and 
setting these in comparison to China, yet a more comprehensive approach requires to 
examine US newspapers based on my findings anew as most past publications entrenched 
on a few frames rather than as wide-ranging as this project. This approach of testing framing 
observations is also an important follow-up step since I relied on an open coding process as 
part of the framing analysis. I have addressed concerns about its inherently subjective nature 
in earlier sections by explaining the use of a second coder and the triangulation of methods 
(open coding and indicator questions, unsupervised quantitative text analysis) as measures 
to increase the validity of the findings. All of these methods pointed at the discussed news 
content observation. To increase the generalisability of the research findings and review their 
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reliability, further testing is necessary by including more cases, extending the time period 
under analysis and using a deductive approach for the framing analysis. In addition, a 
comparison of the framing observations with news coverage on non-terrorism affairs would 
add insights on how strongly news content on terrorism deviates from other news items. For 
example, I confirmed Xi Jinping’s prevalence in the terrorism coverage empirically, yet it is 
still necessary to compare this to every-day life news coverage to conclude on whether there 
is a unique characteristic to the terrorism news coverage. Finally, things have changed 
already since the beginning of this study. In 2015, regional party secretary Chen Quanguo 
has taken over leadership as regional party secretary of Xinjiang. Since then, strike hard 
campaign continued, massive efforts have been put into the creation of a ‘surveillance state’ 
(Leibold 2019), less high casualty incidents seem to have occurred. In the wake of this, Xie 
and Liu (2019) are already speaking of a new turning point in China’s terrorism history that 
might also be reflected in the news coverage. Data from this fourth period, following my 
time line presented in the first Chapter, could be added to continue the empirical comparison 
of frame changes over time. 
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Appendix 1 
 
--- 1. Model building --- 
Summary statistics of the response variable 
   Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.  
  0.000   2.000   4.000   8.347   9.000 147.000  
 
Residual deviance of the response variable 
      mean            var               ratio  
  8.347436    163.847041    19.628428  
 
Likelihood Ratio test for fit-test of Poisson and Negative Binomial regression models 
Model 1: Poisson model 
Model 2: Negative binomial model 
 
Model 1: articles ~ 1 
Model 2: articles ~ 1 
  #Df  LogLik Df  Chisq Pr(>Chisq)     
1   1 -5742.4                          
2   2 -2472.5  1 6539.9  < 2.2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
Likelihood Ratio test of Single-level NB model and Multilevel NB model 
Model 1: Negative binomial model, single-level 
Model 2: Negative binomial model, two-level (levels: newspaper, case) 
 
Model 1: articles ~ 1 
Model 2: articles ~ 1 + (1 | case) 
  #Df  LogLik Df Chisq Pr(>Chisq)     
1   2 -2472.5                         
2   3 -2148.0  1 648.9  < 2.2e-16 *** 
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
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--- 2. Negative binomial regression modelling for all 65 cases in 2009 – 2015 --- 
 
Full summary of regression model 10 in the regression overview table 
Generalized linear mixed model fit by maximum likelihood (Laplace Approximation) ['glmerMod'] 
Family: Negative Binomial(4.2343)  ( log ) 
Formula: articles ~ location + deaths + government + claimed + official_press + (1 | case),  Data: 
china.all.cases 
 
     AIC      BIC       logLik deviance df.resid  
  4231.3   4268.5  -2107.6   4215.3      772  
 
Scaled residuals:  
    Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max  
-1.8206 -0.6546 -0.1410  0.4942  5.2989  
 
Random effects: 
 Groups    Name      Variance  Std.Dev. 
 Case        (Intercept) 0.6059   0.7784   
Number of obs: 780, groups:  case, 65 
 
Fixed effects: 
               Estimate           Std. Error    z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)     1.351612   0.114897   11.764  < 2e-16 *** 
location         0.661290   0.093697   7.058 1.69e-12 *** 
deaths            0.009944   0.003616   2.750  0.00596 **  
government   0.362864   0.340607   1.065  0.28672     
claimed          0.631800   0.441733   1.430  0.15264     
official_press 0.094709   0.049708   1.905  0.05674 .   
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
Figure A1 – 1: Diagnostic plots for Model 10 (“MM10”) 
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--- 3. Negative binomial regression modelling for the selected 8 cases in 2009 – 2015 --- 
 
Full summary of regression model 8 in the regression overview table 
 
The singularity test confirmed a single.level model (glm.nb) as better fit for the dataset 
[1] 1.413521e-06 
 
Full summary of regression model 17 in the regression overview table 
glm.nb(formula = articles ~ deaths + deaths_30up + deaths_50up +  
    assault + claimed + official_press, data = china.corrected,  
    init.theta = 3.862565183, link = log) 
 
Deviance Residuals:  
    Min       1Q   Median       3Q      Max   
-2.5719  -0.8900  -0.1223   0.5605   2.3565   
 
Coefficients: 
                Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)     1.016881   0.311964   3.260  0.00112 **  
deaths          0.026070   0.002007  12.987  < 2e-16 *** 
deaths_30up     0.090862   0.184752   0.492  0.62286     
deaths_50up    -3.406437   0.276664 -12.313  < 2e-16 *** 
assault         1.262041   0.195099   6.469 9.88e-11 *** 
claimed         0.880508   0.197255   4.464 8.05e-06 *** 
official_press  0.154252   0.120193   1.283  0.19936     
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1 – 2: Diagnostic plots for Model 8 in the overview regression table 
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Full summary of regression model with the predictor location 
Generalized linear mixed model fit by maximum likelihood (Laplace   
Approximation) ['glmerMod'] 
Family: Negative Binomial(7.0655)  ( log ) 
Formula: articles ~ location + (1 | case) 
   Data: china.corrected 
 
   AIC      BIC     logLik  deviance   df.resid  
   688.9    699.1   -340.4    680.9       92  
 
Scaled residuals:  
   Min      1Q   Median    3Q     Max  
-1.9181 -0.6035 -0.1277  0.5957  3.2718  
 
Random effects: 
 Groups Name        Variance Std.Dev. 
 case   (Intercept) 1.191    1.091    
 Number of obs: 96, groups:  case, 8 
 
Fixed effects: 
            Estimate   Std. Error  z value Pr(>|z|)     
(Intercept)   2.6741     0.3901   6.855 7.14e-12 *** 
location      0.4175     0.1616   2.583  0.00978 **  
--- 
Signif. codes:  0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1 
 
 
 
 
Figure A1 – 3: Diagnostic plots for Model Location 
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Appendix 2 
 
--- 1. Indicator questions for framing analysis --- 
Explanation: Total number of sample articles: 458. The percentage values behind the possible answers 
denote the number of articles in the sample to which the answer applied. For instance, in question 10, 79% of 
the 458 articles in the sample employed the stability frame. 
1) Does the report mainly classify the incident as an act of terrorism? 
Note: If the answer is unclear due to various classifications, select ‘no’. 
0: No (5%, 23) 
1: Yes (95%, 435) 
 
2) Does the report name a specific terrorist suspect? 
Note: Answer with ‘yes’, if the report refers to any individual or groups by name and identifies them 
as terrorists. I.e. ETIM.  
0: No (82%, 376) 
1: Yes (18%, 82) 
 
3) Does the report mention that ethnic grievances had existed in Xinjiang prior to the terrorist attack or 
identifies these as cause of the attack? 
0: No (100%, 458) 
1: Yes (0%, 0) 
 
4) Does the report take a thematic focus in the news story? 
Note: A thematic focus takes a more distanced perspective in contrast to the episodic focus with the 
single attack. For example, a thematic focus is prevalent where the news story focuses on social 
values or on the larger terrorist threat as opposed to the single attack. Where the question cannot be 
answered clearly, choose ‘can’t say’ (i.e. even episodic and thematic focus). 
0: No (23%, 105) 
1: Yes (66%, 302) 
99: Can’t say (11%, 50) 
 
5) Does the report mention the origin (i.e. motivation) of China’s terrorism issue? 
Note: The question includes both the larger terrorism issue as well as any specific terrorist attack. 
For example, the origin could constitute ethnic grievances in Xinjiang, the goal of harming Chinese 
economic growth, or the killing of people. 
0: No (57%, 261) 
1: Yes (43%, 197) 
 
6) If at all, does the report mention what is in danger due to terrorism? 
Note: The question includes both the larger terrorism issue as well as any specific terrorist attack. 
Choose ‘other’ if other factors are in danger due to terrorism. Value 1,2,3,4 refer to the occurrence 
of exclusively stability, national unity etc. 
0: No, it doesn’t say: (11%, 50) 
1: Stability: (19%, 87) 
2: National unity: (11%, 50) 
3: Economic growth: (6%, 27) 
4: CCP leadership: (0%, 0) 
5: Yes, but it is more than one: (46%, 211) 
99: Other: (7%, 32) 
 
7) If at all, which ‘just’ war frames exist in the report?  
Note: Choose ‘other’ where the question cannot be answered, i.e. no ‘just’ war frames exist. 
1: Injustice & gravity frames (62%, 284) 
2: Extremism-phobia frame (65%, 298) 
3: Demonization frame (28%, 128) 
4: Adversarial frame (57%, 261) 
5: Aptness frame (27%, 124) 
6: Securitisation (27%, 124) 
99: other (8%, 37) 
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8) Does the report contain the description of or call for ‘striking hard’ against terrorism? 
Note: To ‘strike hard’ refers to any expression that states to resolutely fight terrorism, i.e. ‘to bring 
them down with thunder’. 
 0: No (64%, 293) 
 1: Yes (36%, 165) 
 
9) Does the report contain the description of or call for counter-terrorism legislation? 
 0: No (84%, 385) 
 1: Yes (16%, 73) 
 
10) To which extent does the report focus on social values?  
Note: Scale between 0 and 10 using integers, with 10 suggesting total focus on social values. Social 
values are stability, economic growth, national unity, rule of law. 
 Average: 5.2 
 
11) If at all, which social value frames exist in the report? 
Note: Choose ‘other’ where the question cannot be answered, i.e. no social value frames exist. 
1: Stability frame (74%, 339)  
2: National unity frame (51%, 234) 
3: Economic growth frame (39%, 179)   
4: Rule of law frame (12%, 55) 
99: Other (12%, 55) 
 
12) Does the report refer to Islamic believes or Muslim identity? 
Note: This excludes any comments that only refer to religious extremism in general but includes 
indirect references to Islam where the term might not be used. 
0: No (94%, 431) 
1: Yes (6%, 27) 
 
13) Does this news story cite individuals who have been directly affected by terrorist attacks? 
Note: ‘Directly affected’ is defined as experiencing loss that is the direct result of a terrorist attack, 
i.e. emotional harm, loss of closed ones, property loss. 
0: No (98%, 449) 
1: Yes (2%, 9) 
 
14) Where victims are covered, was the primary focus their feelings and emotions?  
Note: Here, ‘victim’ is anybody who directly due to a terrorist attack or indirectly due to terrorism 
in general claimed victimisation. For instance, victim condemns terrorist attack. 
0: No (0%, 0) 
1: Yes (100%, 458) 
 
15) Does the report mention the Xinhua or the People’s Daily as sources? 
0: No (66%, 302) 
1: Yes (34%, 156) 
 
16) Does the report refer to the general secretary (i.e. Xi Jinping, Hu Jintao)?  
Note: For example, this can include citations of the general secretary or description of their 
activities. 
0: No (49%, 224) 
1: Yes (51%, 234) 
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--- 2. Indicative example of terrorism coverage: Full report --- 
Full report on Case 3, Xinjiang Daily (cited in Chapter 5)  
Xinjiang Daily (15/11/2013) 
Violent terrorists are poisonous tumours seriously affecting China's social stability 
Kuran Nihemaiti, Member and Vice-President of the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Academy of Social 
Sciences 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
The recent "10.28" incident at Jinshui Bridge, Tiananmen, Beijing, was closely planned by the "three forces" 
at home and abroad. 
 
Organised and premeditated violent terrorist attacks. In the incident, bereaved terrorists indiscriminately 
killed innocent tourists and civilians, seriously endangering the safety of the people's lives, which can be 
described as inhuman and heinous. Their purpose is to create a sensational effect in the international arena, 
to create pressure on the Party and the government by public opinion, and to create an atmosphere of terror 
in the whole society, which once again exposes their reactionary plots to split the motherland, destroy unity 
and national unity. Facts have proved once again that violent terrorists are the common enemy of the people 
of all nationalities and the people of the whole world. Our struggle against violent terrorists is neither a 
matter of nationality nor religion, but a political struggle between splitting and anti-splitting, defending and 
destroying the reunification of the motherland. There is absolutely no room for compromise or concession. 
 
Terrorist crimes seriously endanger the lives of people of all ethnic groups. From this year's "4.23", "6.26" 
to "10.28" violent terrorist cases, we can see that the means of the violent terrorists are extremely cruel, with 
killing as a clear target, killing innocent people including Uyghurs as well as international tourists. These 
acts of violence and terror are a serious violation of human rights, a serious challenge to the dignity of the 
legal system, a serious damage to the civilized order, a typical anti-social, anti-human and anti-civilized 
terrorist acts, which will surely be strongly condemned and rejected by peace-loving countries and people 
in the world. The reality also warns us once again that violent terrorism has become the most realistic and 
direct threat to the social stability of China and Xinjiang. 
 
Terrorism is a huge obstacle to the peaceful development of the world. It is the international community to 
strengthen cooperation and research in combating terrorism and to combat and prevent terrorism. 
 
It is incumbent upon all countries of the world to share their responsibilities and obligations. However, after 
the "10.28" incident of Jinshui Bridge in Tiananmen, Beijing, some western media have made an ulterior 
attempt to link the terrorist incidents with China's national and religious policies, and even expressed 
sympathy for the terrorists involved. Although some Western countries, led by the United States, are 
threatened by terrorism and have high-profile anti-terrorism verbally, they always wear "coloured glasses" 
to deal with counter-terrorism issues, divide their camps with the so-called "ideology", establish "double 
standards" for China's anti-terrorism cause, and openly and secretly deal with violent terrorism in China. 
Support for or indulge in incitement to terror. Its plot to divide and westernize China has never changed. 
Looking back on history, we can see more clearly that on issues concerning China's core interests and major 
concerns such as Xinjiang and Tibet, some media in the United States have always turned a blind eye to the 
rights of the Chinese government to protect the interests of all nationalities, including freedom of religious 
belief, in accordance with the law; once terrorist and violent crimes occur in China. They confuse and 
mislead public opinion. Finding excuses for terrorist crimes fully exposes the ulterior purposes of the United 
States and other Western countries. 
 
At present, we should deeply realize that behind the escalation of violent terrorist activities, it reflects the 
anti-secession in the ideological field of our region. 
 
The long-term, complex and acute nature of the struggle. Comrade Jiang Zemin once pointed out that 
"opening the gap through ethnic issues is an important means for the peaceful evolution of hostile forces at 
home and abroad." Western hostile forces often use national problems to stir up national emotions and create 
incidents, thus forming internal and external integration of separatist forces at home and abroad; using 
resources development and religious beliefs as excuses to stir up national estrangement; carrying out 
deceptive propaganda under the so-called banner of caring for the interests of ethnic minorities, distorting 
history and facts, and carrying out such propaganda. Stir up alienation, and even carry out violent terrorist 
activities, undermining national unity. Especially in recent years, the infiltration of religious extremism has 
intensified, which has become the ideological basis of the "three forces" separatist and destructive activities. 
Judging from the cases of violence and terror uncovered in the whole region and October 28 this year, the 
scope of violence and terror is expanding, and the number of female members of organizations is increasing. 
By means of suicide bombing, it triggers the resonance of "jihad" and ultimately implements violent terrorist 
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activities. The practice of the anti-secession struggle also fully demonstrates that religious extremism has 
become the theoretical basis and ideological support for the emergence of violent terrorist activities and has 
become a cancer seriously affecting the stability of China's society. 
 
Stability is the overall situation of Xinjiang, the premise and guarantee of leapfrog development and long-
term stability, and the best interests of the people of all ethnic groups in Xinjiang. With the support and 
assistance of the central government and other provinces and cities, Xinjiang is developing at an 
unprecedented speed, and the living standards and living conditions of the people of all ethnic groups are 
constantly improving. We should always be aware that our struggle against the "three forces" is a struggle 
against division and division, a struggle against terror and terrorism, which is long-term, complex and 
arduous. Xinjiang's social sciences have always been at the forefront of separatism and anti-separatism, 
infiltration and anti-osmosis. As a cadre of social sciences, in the current test of anti-terrorism struggle, he 
feels more strongly that he has a great responsibility, just like General Secretary Xi Jinping's recent 
important speech at the national propaganda and ideological work conference. It is emphasized that cadres 
of all nationalities should consolidate the guiding position of Marxism in the ideological field, draw a clear 
line between right and wrong, clarify vague understandings, enhance initiative, grasp initiative, fight a good 
initiative, and be responsible, responsible and conscientious in matters concerning major issues of right and 
wrong and political principles. Faced with the complex and changeable international political pattern and 
the grim situation of Xinjiang's anti-secession, anti-terrorism and anti-osmosis struggle, as well as the 
infiltration and spread of religious extremist ideology in the ideological field, we should conduct theoretical 
guidance from a strategic political and theoretical height, and have a clear attitude and dare to stand firm on 
the issue of major and minor issues. We should dare to shine our sword and make correct voices against 
wrong ideas, noises and murmurs. We should always be ready to step forward at the critical moment with 
practical actions, not disgrace our mission, dare to shoulder our responsibilities, abide by our duties, firmly 
grasp the initiative in the struggle against the enemy, so as to build a harmonious, stable and prosperous 
Xinjiang and achieve leaps and bounds. Typical development and long-term stability are two major 
historical tasks, making unremitting efforts to realize the "Chinese Dream" of the great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation. 
 
ᯠ⮶ᰕᣕᒤᴸᰕ
᳤࣋ ᙆ࠶ᆀᱟѕ䟽ᖡ૽ѝഭ⽮ՊっᇊⲴ∂ⱔ
ᓃޠgቬਸҠᨀᯠ⮶⽮Պ、ᆖ䲒ފငငઈǃ࢟䲒䮯

䘁ᵏ൘ेӜཙᆹ䰘䠁≤ẕਁ⭏ⲴĀgāһԦˈᱟа䎧⭡ຳ޵ཆĀй㛑࣯࣋āѕᇶㆆࡂˈᴹ㓴
㓷ǃᴹ亴䈻Ⲵ᳤࣋ ᙆ㻝ࠫһԦǄһԦѝˈїᗳ⯵⣲Ⲵ᳤ ࠶ᆀ┕ᵰᰐ䗌⑨ᇒ઼ᒣ≁ˈѕ䟽ডᇣ
ҶӪ≁㗔ՇⲴ⭏ભᆹޘˈਟ䉃⚝㔍ӪᙗǃԔӪਁᤷǄԆԜⲴⴞⲴቡᱟ㾱൘ഭ䱵кࡦ䙐䖠ࣘ᭸ᓄˈ
㔉ފ઼᭯ᓌࡦ䙐㠶䇪঻࣋ˈ൘ޘ⽮Պ㩕䙐 ᙆ≋തˈ䘉޽⅑᳤䵢ҶԆԜ࠶㻲⾆ഭǃ⹤ൿ㔏а઼≁
᯿ഒ㔃Ⲵ৽ࣘ䱤䈻Ǆһᇎҏ޽а⅑䇱᰾ˈ᳤࣋ ᙆ࠶ᆀᱟޘഭ਴᯿Ӫ≁઼ޘц⭼Ӫ≁Ⲵޡ਼᭼
ӪǄᡁԜо᳤࣋ ᙆ࠶ᆀⲴᯇҹᰒнᱟ≁᯿䰞仈ˈҏнᱟᇇᮉ䰞仈ˈ㘼ᱟа൪࠶㻲о৽࠶㻲ǃ᥽
ছ⾆ഭ㔏ао⹤ൿ⾆ഭ㔏аⲴ֐↫ᡁ⍫Ⲵ᭯⋫ᯇҹˈ㔍⋑ᴹэ∛࿕ॿǃ䘰䇙Ⲵ։ൠǄ

 ᙆѫѹ⣟㖚ѕ䟽ডᇣҶ਴᯿㗔ՇⲴ⭏ભᆹޘǄӾӺᒤᡰਁ⭏ⲴĀgāĀgāࡠ
Āgā᳤࣋ ᙆṸԦⴻˈ᳤ ࠶ᆀ᡻⇥ᶱަ↻ᗽǃԕᵰӪѪ᰾⺞ᤷੁⴞḷˈ㻛ᵰᇣⲴᰒᴹ㔤
੮ቄ᯿൘޵Ⲵᰐ䗌㗔Շҏᴹഭ䱵⑨ᇒǄ䘉Ӌ᳤࣋ ᙆ㹼ᖴˈᱟሩӪᵳⲴѕ䟽䐥䐿ˈᱟሩ⌅ࡦሺѕ
Ⲵѕ䟽᥁ᡈˈᱟሩ᮷᰾〙ᒿⲴѕ䟽ᦏᇣˈᱟިරⲴ৽⽮Պǃ৽Ӫ㊫ǃ৽᮷᰾Ⲵ ᙆѫѹ㹼ᖴˈᗵ
ᇊՊਇࡠц⭼к⡡ྭ઼ᒣⲴഭᇦ઼Ӫ≁Ⲵᕪ⛸䉤䍓઼୮ᔳǄ⧠ᇎҏ޽а⅑䆖⽪ᡁԜˈ᳤࣋ ᙆ⍫
ࣘᐢ㓿ᡀѪ⹤ൿѝഭ৺ᯠ⮶⽮Պっᇊᴰ⧠ᇎǃᴰⴤ᧕Ⲵᐘབྷေ㛱Ǆ

 ᙆѫѹᱟц⭼઼ᒣਁኅⲴᐘབྷ䳌⺽ˈ࣐ᕪ৽ ਸ֌઼⹄ウˈᢃ઼ࠫ䱢㤳 ᙆѫѹᱟഭ䱵⽮Պ઼
ц⭼਴ഭѹнᇩ䗎Ⲵޡ਼䍓ԫ઼ѹ࣑ǄնᱟˈेӜཙᆹ䰘䠁≤ẕĀgāһԦਁ⭏ਾˈ㾯ᯩњ
࡛Ⴢփত൘ᣕ䚃ѝ࡛ᴹ⭘ᗳൠᢺ ᙆһԦоѝഭ≁᯿ᇇᮉ᭯ㆆᤲ䫙ˈ⭊㠣ሩ⎹Ṹ ᙆ࠶ᆀ㺘⽪਼
ᛵǄԕ㖾ഭѪ俆ⲴаӋ㾯ᯩഭᇦ㲭❦㠚䓛価ਇ ᙆѫѹⲴေ㛱ˈਓཤк儈䈳৽ ˈն൘ሩᖵ৽ 
䰞仈кᙫᡤ⵰Āᴹ㢢⵬䮌āˈԕᡰ䉃ⲴĀ᜿䇶ᖒᘱāࡂ࠶䱥㩕ˈሩѝഭⲴ৽ һъᩎĀৼ䟽ḷ
߶āˈ᰾䟼᳇䟼ൠሩਁ⭏൘ѝഭⲴ᳤࣋ ᙆ⍫ࣘ㔉Ҹ᭟ᤱᡆ㓥ᇩ➭ࣘǄަԱമ࠶ॆǃ㾯ॆѝഭⲴ
䱤䈻Ӿᶕቡ⋑ᴹ᭩ਈ䗷Ǆഎ亮শਢˈᡁԜᴤ␵Რൠⴻࡠˈࠑᱟ൘⎹⮶ǃ⎹㯿ㅹһޣѝഭṨᗳ࡙⳺
઼䟽བྷޣ࠷䰞仈кˈ㖾ഭаӋჂփаੁሩѝഭ᭯ᓌ׍⌅؍ᣔޘഭ਴≁᯿࡙⳺वᤜᇇᮉؑԠ㠚⭡൘
޵Ⲵ਴亩ᵳ࡙㿶㘼н㿱˗аᰖ ᙆ᳤࣋⣟㖚һԦ൘ѝഭਁ⭏ˈԆԜׯ␧⏶㿶ੜǃ䈟ሬ㠶䇪ǄѪ 
ᙆ࠶ᆀⲴ⣟㖚㹼ᖴ᢮ُਓˈݵ࠶᳤䵢Ҷ㖾ഭㅹ㾯ᯩഭᇦнਟ੺ӪⲴⴞⲴǄ

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ᖃࡽˈᡁԜᓄ␡࡫ൠ䇔䇶ࡠˈ᳤࣋ ᙆ⍫ࣘॷ㓗Ⲵ㛼ਾˈ৽᱐Ⲵᱟᡁ४᜿䇶ᖒᘱ亶ฏ৽࠶㻲ᯇҹ
Ⲵ䮯ᵏᙗǃ༽ᵲᙗ઼ቆ䭀ᙗǄ⊏⌭≁਼ᘇᴮᤷࠪ˖Ā࡙⭘≁᯿䰞仈ᢃᔰ㕪ਓˈᱟഭ޵ཆ᭼ሩ࣯࣋
䘋㹼઼ᒣ╄ਈⲴ䟽㾱᡻⇥Ǆā㾯ᯩ᭼ሩ࣯࣋ᖰᖰ࡙⭘≁᯿䰞仈ˈ᥁ࣘ≁᯿ᛵ㔚ˈࡦ䙐һㄟˈӾ㘼
ᖒᡀຳ޵ཆ࠶㻲࣯࣋Ⲵ䟼ᓄཆਸ˗ԕ䍴ⓀᔰਁǃᇇᮉؑԠㅹѪُਓˈ᥁ࣘ≁᯿䳄䰲˗ᢃ⵰ᡰ䉃ޣ
ᗳቁᮠ≁᯿࡙⳺Ⲵᰇਧˈ䘋㹼Ⅺ僇ᇓՐˈ↚ᴢশਢоһᇎˈ䘋㹼᥁ᤘ⿫䰤ˈ⭊㠣䘋㹼᳤࣋ ᙆ⍫
ࣘˈ⹤ൿ≁᯿ഒ㔃Ǆቔަᱟ䘁ᒤᶕˈᇇᮉᶱㄟᙍᜣ⑇䘿⍫࣐ࣘࢗˈᡀѪĀй㛑࣯࣋ā࠶㻲⹤ൿ⍫
ࣘⲴᙍᜣส⹰ǄӾӺᒤޘ४ԕ৺Āgā⹤㧧Ⲵ᳤࣋ ᙆṸԦᶕⴻˈ᳤࣋ ᙆ㤳ത൘ᢙབྷˈྣ
ᙗ㓴㓷ᡀઈ൘໎࣐ˈԕ㠚ᵰᔿ⠶⛨ㅹ᡻⇥ˈᕅਁĀ൓ᡈāޡ呓ˈᴰ㓸ᇎᯭ᳤ ⍫ࣘǄ৽࠶㻲ᯇҹ
Ⲵᇎ䐥ҏݵ࠶䈤᰾ˈᇇᮉᶱㄟᙍᜣᐢᡀѪۜ⭏᳤࣋ ᙆ⍫ࣘⲴ⨶䇪ส⹰઼ᙍᜣ᭟᫁ˈᡀѪѕ䟽ᖡ
૽ѝഭ⽮ՊっᇊⲴањ∂ⱔǄ

っᇊᱟᯠ⮶Ⲵབྷተˈᱟ䐘䎺ᔿਁኅ઼䮯⋫ѵᆹⲴࡽᨀ઼؍䳌ˈᱟᯠ⮶਴᯿Ӫ≁㗔Շᴰབྷ࡙⳺ѻᡰ
൘Ǆ൘ѝཞ઼਴ᨤᔪⴱᐲⲴབྷ࣋᭟ᤱоᑞࣙлˈᯠ⮶↓ԕࡽᡰᵚᴹⲴ䙏ᓖੁࡽਁኅˈ਴᯿Ӫ≁Ⲵ
⭏⍫≤ᒣо⭏⍫ᶑԦ൘нᯝᨀ儈ǄᡁԜ㾱ᰦ࡫␵䟂ൠ䇔䇶ࡠˈᡁԜоĀй㛑࣯࣋āⲴᯇҹᱟ࠶㻲
о৽࠶㻲Ⲵᯇҹˈᱟ ᙆо৽ ᙆⲴᯇҹˈ䘉൪ᯇҹᱟ䮯ᵏⲴǃ༽ᵲⲴǃ㢠ᐘⲴǄᯠ⮶⽮Պ、ᆖ
⭼࿻㓸༴൘࠶㻲о৽࠶㻲ǃ⑇䘿о৽⑇䘿Ⲵࡽ⋯ˈ֌Ѫа਽⽮Պ、ᆖ⭼Ⲵᒢ䜘ˈ൘ᖃࡽ৽ ᯇҹ
Ⲵ㘳傼ᖃѝˈᴤ࣐ᕪ⛸ൠᝏਇࡠ㠚ᐡ㛙䍏Ⲵ䍓ԫ䟽བྷˈቡྲҐ䘁ᒣᙫҖ䇠ᴰ䘁൘ޘഭᇓՐᙍᜣᐕ
֌Պ䇞кⲴ䟽㾱䇢䈍ѝᡰᕪ䈳ⲴˈᡁԜ਴᯿ᒢ䜘㾱ᐙപ傜ݻᙍѫѹ൘᜿䇶ᖒᘱ亶ฏⲴᤷሬൠսˈ
൘һޣབྷᱟབྷ䶎઼᭯⋫৏ࡉ䰞仈кˈࡂ␵ᱟ䶎⭼䲀ˈ▴␵⁑㋺䇔䇶ˈ໎ᕪѫࣘᙗǃᦼᨑѫࣘᵳǃ
ᢃྭѫࣘԇˈڊࡠᆸ൏ᴹ䍓ǃᆸ൏䍏䍓ǃᆸ൏ቭ䍓Ǆ䶒ሩഭ䱵᭯⋫ṬተⲴ༽ᵲਈᒫ઼ᯠ⮶৽࠶
㻲ǃ৽ ᙆǃ৽⑇䘿ᯇҹⲴѕጫᖒ࣯ˈ䶒ሩᇇᮉᶱㄟᙍᜣሩ᜿䇶ᖒᘱ亶ฏⲴ⑇䘿㭃ᔦˈᡁԜ㾱Ӿ
ᡈ⮕Ⲵ᭯⋫儈ᓖ઼⨶䇪儈ᓖ䘋㹼⨶䇪ᕅሬˈ൘བྷᱟབྷ䶎䰞仈к㾱ᘱᓖ勌᰾ˈᮒҾඊᆸ䱥ൠˈᮒҾ
Ӟࢁˈሩ䭉䈟㿲⛩ǃ਴⿽ಚ丣ǃᵲ丣ˈ㾱ᮒҾਁࠪ↓⺞Ⲵ༠丣ˈԕᇎ䱵㹼ࣘˈᰦ࡫߶༷⵰൘ޣ䭞
ᰦ࡫ᥪ䓛㘼ࠪˈн䗡֯ભǃᮒҾᣵᖃˈᚚቭ㙼ᆸˈ⢒⢒ᢺᨑሩ᭼ᯇҹѫࣘᵳˈѪᔪ䇮઼䉀ǃっ
ᇊǃᇼᕪⲴᯠ⮶ˈѪᇎ⧠䐘䎺ᔿਁኅ઼䮯⋫ѵᆹєབྷশਢԫ࣑ˈѪᇎ⧠ѝॾ≁᯿Տབྷ༽ޤⲴĀѝ
ഭỖā֌ࠪн៸Ⲵࣚ࣋ʽ
 
 
--- 3. Original reports cited in chapter 5 --- 
Example 1: Early event description of the terrorist attack (Source: Case 2, Beijing News) 
ᯠӜᣕ
ᯠ⮶ ᙆ㻝ࠫӪ䙷ᇣ᳤ᗂ㻛∉ᰕ߼Იᰦ࠶䇨ˈ᳤ᗂ㻝ࠫ⢩ᐑ䆖ѝ䱏ǃ䭷᭯ᓌ઼≁ᐕᐕ
ൠˈ᭮⚛❊✗䆖䖖

ᦞᯠॾ⽮⭥ᰕ߼Იᰦ࠶䇨ˈᯠ⮶ੀ励⮚ൠ४䝟ழ৯励ݻ⊱䭷ਁ⭏᳤࣋ ᙆ㻝ࠫṸԦˈཊ਽᳤ᗂ
ݸਾ㻝ࠫ励ݻ⊱䭷⍮ࠪᡰǃ⢩ᐑ䆖ѝ䱏ǃ䭷᭯ᓌ઼≁ᐕᐕൠˈ᭮⚛❊✗䆖䖖Ǆ

ⴞࡽˈᐢ䙐ᡀ Ӫ䙷ᇣ˄ަѝ㔤੮ቄ᯿ Ӫ˅ˈवᤜޜᆹ≁䆖 Ӫ˗ਖᴹ ਽≁䆖઼㗔ՇਇՔǄ
ޜᆹ≁䆖ᖃ൪ࠫ∉᳤ᗂ ӪǃࠫՔᒦᣃ㧧 ӪǄޜᆹᵪޣ↓൘ޘ࣋ᔰኅᐕ֌ˈⴞࡽᖃൠ⽮Պབྷተᮤ
փᒣっǄ

澳
Example 2: Detailed event description of the terrorist attack (Source: Case 3, Beijing News) 
ᯠӜᣕ
ेӜޘ࣋ᮁ⋫ĀgāһԦՔ㘵

ᰕаਹᲞ䖖ߢᫎ䠁≤ẕ㠤↫Ք˗Ք㘵ѝӪ᡻ᵟˈӪ൘,&8ˈަ։Ӫ䖜Ѫа㡜տ䲒઼⮉㿲ᯠ
Ӝᣕ䇟Āᴸᰕ䠁≤ẕ⊭䖖ߢᫎһԦāǄ

ᰕᰦ࠶䇨ˈа䖶ਹᲞ䖖⭡ेӜᐲই⊐ᆀইਓ䰟ޕ䮯ᆹ㺇ׯ䚃ˈ⭡ьੁ㾯㹼傦ᫎੁཙᆹ䰘䠁≤ẕ
ᣔḿਾ䎧⚛ˈ㹼傦䗷〻ѝ䙐ᡀཊ਽⑨ᇒ৺ᢗऔ≁䆖ਇՔǄᦞࡍ↕㔏䇑ˈһ᭵㠤Ӫ↫ӑˈӪਇՔˈ
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ަѝ㚷һ䖖޵Ӫ↫ӑˈਖᴹ਽⑨ᇒ↫ӑ˄਽㨢ᖻᇮ㉽ྣ⑨ᇒǃ਽ᒯьⴱ⭧⑨ᇒ˅ˈ਽ਇՔӪ
ઈѝवᤜ਽㨢ᖻᇮ㉽⑨ᇒ˄ྣ⭧˅৺਽ᰕᵜ㉽⭧⑨ᇒǄ

һԦਁ⭏ਾˈेӜᐲ・ণ㓴㓷Քઈᮁ⋫ᐕ֌ˈᐲငǃᐲ᭯ᓌ亶ሬ㾱≲ছ⭏䜘䰘ޘ࣋ԕ䎤ǃнᜌа࠷
ԓԧǃॳᯩⲮ䇑ᣒᮁՔઈǄᐲছ⭏ተ䗵䙏ᡀ・Ҷ५⯇ᮁ⋫亶ሬሿ㓴ˈࡦ䇒Ҷᮁ⋫ᯩṸˈᒦ䳶ѝޘᐲ
Ո䍘५⯇䍴Ⓚᡀ・ᐲ㓗уᇦ㓴ˈሩᡰᴹՔઈ䙀а䘋㹼Պ䇺ᤷሬˈ䲿ᰦᤷሬሩড䟽ՔઈⲴᣒᮁǄ

ⴞࡽˈ਽տ䲒ᮁ⋫ՔઈѝˈӪᇎᯭҶ᡻ᵟ⋫⯇ˈӪ൘ ,&8⋫⯇ˈަ։ Ӫᐢ䖜Ѫа㡜տ䲒⋫
⯇઼㔗㔝⮉㿲Ǆ
澳
澳
Example 3: De-contextualisation by denying ethnic grievances (Case 4, Southern Metropolis Daily) 
ইᯩ䜭ᐲᣕ
ޘഭ᭯ॿ≁ᇇငѫԫᵡ㔤㗔˖࡛ᢺᰶ᰾᳤ һԦ਼⢩ᇊ≁᯿ᤲк䫙

ᵡ㔤㗔䓛ԭ˖ޘഭ᭯ॿᑨငǃ≁᯿઼ᇇᮉငઈՊѫԫ䘉Ӌ ᙆ࠶ᆀᰐ䇪ྲօԓ㺘нҶᡁԜԫօањ
≁᯿ˈਚ㜭ԓ㺘䛓Ӌ㛼਋⾆ഭˈҏ㛼਋ԆԜ㠚䓛ᡰ൘≁᯿ⲴᶱቁᮠӪǄ

Āྲ᷌ᡁԜᢺһԦ䐏⢩ᇊ≁᯿㚄㌫䎧ᶕˈ৫ᤷ䍓Ḁњ≁᯿ˈнӵᆼޘ䘍㛼ᇎ䱵ˈ㘼фሶՔᇣቁᮠ≁
᯿㗔ՇⲴᝏᛵˈ䘉ᚠᚠᱟ᳤࣋ ᙆ࣯࣋ᡰᐼᵋⲴǄāᵡ㔤㗔䈤ˈ৽ሩ᳤࣋ ᙆһԦˈ㾱׍䶐਴≁᯿
ޡ਼Ⲵ࣋䟿ǄĀᡁᆼޘ⴨ؑˈᡁԜⲴ਴᯿㗔Շǃสቲᒢ䜘ˈ㜭ཏഒ㔃䎧ᶕ৽ሩ᳤࣋ ᙆǄᴹҶഒ㔃
Ⲵส⹰ˈᡁԜ㛟ᇊ㜭ਆᗇ䘉൪৽ሩ᳤࣋ ᙆǃ৽ሩ࠶㻲࣯࣋ᯇҹⲴ㜌࡙ǄĀ>Ă@
 
 
Example 4: The portrayed threat from ‘Western hostile forces’ (Case 2, Xinjiang Daily) 
ᯠ⮶ᰕᣕ
ݵ࠶䇔䇶৽࠶㻲ᯇҹⲴ䮯ᵏᙗ㢠ᐘᙗ༽ᵲᙗ
ᵜᣕ䇴䇪ઈ

>Ă@ᰙ൘ц㓚ᒤԓԕᶕˈຳ޵ཆ࠶㻲ѫѹ࣯࣋൘ཆഭ᭼ሩ࣯࣋ㆆࣘлˈࠐ⅑ㆆࡂᯠ⮶Ā⤜
・ā᭯⋫ࣘҡǄц㓚ᒤԓˈ䲿⵰ь⅗ࢗਈ઼㣿㚄䀓փˈᶱབྷൠࡪ◰Ҷഭ޵࠶㻲ѫѹⲴ⾎㓿ˈ
࣐ѻ㾯ᯩ᭼ሩ࣯࣋ᢺĀ઼ᒣ╄ਈāⲴ⸋ཤ䟽⛩ᤷੁᡁഭˈ࣐㍗ሩᡁ᧘㹼Ā㾯ॆāĀ࠶ॆā઼䙿
ࡦᡈ⮕ˈԱമ൘⋯䗩ቁᮠ≁᯿ൠ४ራ᢮઼ᢃᔰケ⹤ਓǄԆԜᢺᯠ⮶֌Ѫѫ᭫ⴞḷˈᶱ࣋᣹ᤒǃษἽ
ຳ޵ཆ≁᯿࠶㻲࣯࣋ˈ᭟ᤱ઼᫽㓥≁᯿࠶㻲㓴㓷ˈ䟷ਆ਴⿽᡻⇥Ӿһ䪸ሩᯠ⮶Ⲵ࠶㻲⹤ൿ⍫ࣘǄӾ
ᒤĀgāᐤӱґ৽䶙ભ↖㻵᳤ҡࡠᒤਁ⭏൘Ѽ励ᵘ喀ⲴĀgāһԦˈ޽ࡠ䘁ᵏਁ
⭏Ⲵࠐ䎧᳤࣋ ᙆṸԦˈᰐанᱟ᭼ሩ࣯࣋࠶㻲⹤ൿⲴ䳶ѝ৽᱐Ǆ䘉Ӌһᇎݵ࠶㺘᰾ˈຳ޵ཆ᭼ሩ
࣯࣋ࡦ䙐᳤࣋ ᙆһԦǃডᇣഭᇦᆹޘǃ⹤ൿ≁᯿ഒ㔃઼⽮ՊっᇊⲴ⣟㖚⍫ࣘ⋑ᴹڌ→ҏнՊڌ→ˈ
ᡁԜሩ↔㾱ᴹݵ࠶Ⲵᙍᜣ䇔䇶઼䮯ᵏᯇҹⲴ߶༷Ǆ>Ă@

≁᯿࠶㻲࣯࣋ǃᇇᮉᶱㄟ࣯࣋ǃ᳤࣋ ᙆ࣯࣋⊶♓а≄ˈ֯ᗇᯠ⮶Ⲵ৽ 㔤っᯇҹнᯝ༽ᵲॆǄ䘁
ᒤᶕˈаӋઘ䗩ഭᇦ઼ൠ४Ⲵᇇᮉᶱㄟ᳤઼࣯࣋࣋ ᙆ࣯࣋ॱ࠶⥆⦇ˈԆԜഋ༴ᔪ・䇝㓳สൠˈ㖁
㖇ǃษ䇝᳤࣋ ᙆ࠶ᆀˈ䘋㹼਴⿽仐㾶⍫ࣘǄ൘䘉⿽㛼Ჟлˈᯠ⮶Ⲵ≁᯿࠶㻲⍫ࣘҏ੸䙀↕ॷ㓗ᘱ
࣯Ǆຳ޵ཆĀй㛑࣯࣋ā࣐㍗म㔃ˈнᯝਈᦒㆆ⮕઼᡻⇥ˈԆԜᣛ⵰ᇇᮉⲴཆ㺓ˈ䟷ਆ䳀㭭ᡆޜᔰ
Ⲵᖒᔿˈ䘋㹼৽ࣘᇓՐˈ᭫ࠫފ઼᭯ᓌⲴ䐟㓯ᯩ䪸ˈ⢩࡛ᱟ≁᯿ᇇᮉ᭯ㆆ˗ԆԜษἽ৽ࣘ僘ᒢˈ➭
ࣘᇇᮉ⣲✝ˈ᥁䎧≁᯿ӷ㿶ˈ⭊㠣ࡦ䙐᳤࣋ ᙆ⍫ࣘˈ≄❠ॱ࠶೓ᕐǄ>Ă@
 
 
Example 5: Defaming Islam (Case 3, Xinjiang Daily, article 2) 
ᯠ⮶ᰕᣕ
ᆖᡀᖂᶕⴻᇦґ
ѝഭ、ᆖ䲒儈㜭⢙⨶⹄ウᡰঊ༛∅ъ⭏׍᰾⊏gҠҠᨀ

ᡁ䇠ᗇሿᰦىˈᡁԜߌᶁᖸቁᴹྷྣ㫉䶒Ǆࡍѝ䛓Պݯˈ䶃ѭⲴ ᶏሿ䗛ᆀᱟሿྣᆙ䶂᱕㖾ѭⲴ䊑
ᖱǄ䛓ᰦىˈྣᆙᆀԜӢ᡻㔓᡻ᑅᡆ㣡ᑭ֌Ѫᒤ䖫Ӫ⡡ᛵⲴؑ⢙Ǆ䛓ᰦىˈ⇿њ㘳кབྷᆖⲴᒤ䖫Ӫ
䜭Պᑖк㢮ᗇ㧡ᯟ㼉ᆀᡆ঑၌⬖׍㺜㺓֌ѪሩᇦґⲴᙍᘥǄ䘉⅑എࡠᇦґˈᡁਁ⧠Ѽ励ᵘ喀Ⲵབྷ㺇
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к䜭㜭䙷ࡠ㫉䶒ྷྣˈᖸཊ䜭ᱟᒤ䖫ӪǄ൘ᡁⲴ⨶䀓ѝˈ⽮Պਁኅᓄ䈕ᱟੁࡽǃੁкⲴˈ⧠ԓ᮷᰾
઼≁᯿Ո⿰Ր㔏Ⲵ㔃ਸᱟц⭼਴≁᯿ਁኅⲴ䎻࣯Ǆഭ޵ഭཆᖸཊশਢ㓿傼㺘᰾ˈ䘉⿽ク⵰ǃᙍᜣк
ᖰᶱㄟᯩੁⲴਁኅᖰᖰՊᑖᶕ㹼ѪкⲴᶱㄟˈ⭊㠣ՊᡀѪᇇᮉᶱㄟ࣯࣋⑇䘿Ⲵ俆䘹ሩ䊑ǄᡁԜ⇿а
ս㔤੮ቄ䶂ᒤᗵ享৽ᙍˈᗵ享ᙍ㘳ᡁԜ⽮Պᓄ䈕ᖰӰѸᯩੁਁኅ䘉њṩᵜ䰞仈Ǆྲ᷌ᡁԜ⧠൘нㄉ
ࠪᶕ䐏䛓Ӌᶱㄟᙍᜣ֌ᯇҹˈ᰾ཙԆԜቡн䇙ᡁԜⲴྷྣࠪ䰘ᐕ֌ˈቡн䇙ᡁԜⲴ㡎䑸ⅼᴢкਠǄ
>Ă@

ਚᴹᡁԜ਴᯿Ӫ≁ᛵ਼僘㚹ˈᩪ᡻ᒦ䘋ˈᡁԜⲴߌ≁᡽Պտᗇ䎧⌻ᡯˈᡁԜⲴྣᙗ᡽Պ൘⽮Պкਁ
ᥕᴤབྷⲴ֌⭘ˈ㘼нᱟク⵰ਹ䟼ᐤ⭛䒢൘ᇦ䟼ˈᡁԜⲴᆙᆀՊᴹᴤޘ䶒Ⲵᮉ㛢઼ᴤཊቡъ䘹ᤙǄ䘉
ቡᱟᡁԜᵚᶕⲴ⭏⍫ˈҏᓄ䈕ᱟᡁԜᵚᶕⲴ⭏⍫Ǆ
 
 
Example 6: ETIM and terrorist motivation (Source: Case 3, Xinjiang Daily) 
ᯠ⮶ᰕᣕ
㔤ᣔ⾆ഭ㔏аᱟ਴᯿ޜ≁Ⲵޡ਼䍓ԫ
ᯠ⮶བྷᆖ᭯⋫оޜޡ㇑⨶ᆖ䲒࢟ᮉᦸ⾆࣋ӊᨀgਨ傜ѹ

>Ă@൘ӺᒤⲴᴸᰕˈ൘ेӜཙᆹ䰘ˈਁ⭏Ҷ᳤࣋ ᙆ㻝ࠫһԦˈཊ਽ᰐ䗌ᒣ≁઼⑨ᇒՔӑˈ
䙐ᡀ䟽བྷ⭏ભ䍒ӗᦏཡǄ䘉а᳤㹼䇙ᰐᮠഭӪѪѻ᝔ᙂˈҏ䇙ц⭼⡡ྭ઼ᒣⲴӪ≁Ѫѻ䴷᛺Ǆ

ᴹޣ䜘䰘⧠ᐢḕ᰾ˈ䘉⅑ㆆࡂǃᇎᯭेӜཙᆹ䰘 ᙆ㻝ࠫⲴᱟĀьケ৕ᯟඖԺᯟޠ䘀ࣘā㓴㓷Ǆ䈕
㓴㓷ˈᱟ㚄ਸഭᆹ⨶Պ䇔ᇊⲴ ᙆ㓴㓷Ǆ䈕㓴㓷Ӫઈоཊњഭ䱵 ᙆᶱㄟ㓴㓷म㚄ˈཊᒤᶕнᯝ䙊
䗷਴⿽ᯩᔿ൘ѝഭຳ޵Ր᫝᳤࣋ ᙆᙍᜣˈ➭ࣘǃㆆࡂ઼ᇎᯭ ᙆ⍫ࣘǄሩѝഭഭ޵઼ަԆаӋഭ
ᇦоൠ४ˈ䜭ᶴᡀҶᆹޘоっᇊⲴ䟽བྷေ㛱оᇎ䱵ডᇣǄ

ेӜཙᆹ䰘ᒯ൪শᶕ㻛㿶ѪᯠѝഭⲴ᭯⋫ᗳ㜿ˈĀьԺ䘀ā㓴㓷ሶ ᙆ㻝ࠫ䘹ᤙ൘䘉а᭿ᝏൠ४ˈ
ⴞⲴቡᱟᜣሩഭ޵≁Շ䙐ᡀᴤབྷⲴ ᜗ᗳ⨶ˈ൘ഭ޵оഭ䱵⽮Պ䙐ᡀᴤ࣐ࢗ⛸Ⲵ᭯⋫৽૽઼䖠ࣘ᭸
ᓄǄ

 ᙆѫѹ⍫ࣘѫ㾱ᱟ䪸ሩᲞ䙊ᒣ≁Ⲵ⭏ભǃ䍒ӗˈ䟷⭘᳤࣋ᡆ㘵᳤࣋ေ㛱Ⲵ㹼ѪǄ ᙆ࠶ᆀ൘ᇎᯭ
⣟㖚ѝ䙊ᑨ⋑ᴹ⢩ᤷⲴњӪਇᇣ㘵ˈ↓ྲᵜ⅑ेӜਁ⭏ⲴĀgāһԦˈਇᇣ㘵䜭ᱟһݸ䶎⢩ᇊ
Ⲵᰐ䗌ᒣ≁ˈн࠶≁᯿ˈн࠶ᇇᮉؑԠˈн࠶ഭ㉽Ǆ ᙆѫѹ䪸ሩᰐ䗌≁ՇⲴ᳤㹼ˈ↓ᱟԆԜ޵ᗳ
↻ᗽ㘼᠖ᕡⲴ৽᱐Ǆ
 
 
Example 7: The harm of terrorism to Chinese society (Case 3, Xinjiang Daily, article 3) 
ᯠ⮶ᰕᣕ
᳤࣋ ᙆ࠶ᆀᱟѕ䟽ᖡ૽ѝഭ⽮ՊっᇊⲴ∂ⱔ
ᯠ⮶⽮Պ、ᆖ䲒ފငငઈǃ࢟䲒䮯ᓃޠgቬਸҠᨀ

>Ă@ ԆԜⲴⴞⲴቡᱟ㾱൘ഭ䱵кࡦ䙐䖠ࣘ᭸ᓄˈ㔉ފ઼᭯ᓌࡦ䙐㠶䇪঻࣋ˈ൘ޘ⽮Պ㩕䙐 ᙆ≋തˈ
䘉޽⅑᳤䵢ҶԆԜ࠶㻲⾆ഭǃ⹤ൿ㔏а઼≁᯿ഒ㔃Ⲵ৽ࣘ䱤䈻Ǆһᇎҏ޽а⅑䇱᰾ˈ᳤࣋ ᙆ࠶ᆀ
ᱟޘഭ਴᯿Ӫ≁઼ޘц⭼Ӫ≁Ⲵޡ਼᭼ӪǄᡁԜо᳤࣋ ᙆ࠶ᆀⲴᯇҹᰒнᱟ≁᯿䰞仈ˈҏнᱟᇇ
ᮉ䰞仈ˈ㘼ᱟа൪࠶㻲о৽࠶㻲ǃ᥽ছ⾆ഭ㔏ао⹤ൿ⾆ഭ㔏аⲴ֐↫ᡁ⍫Ⲵ᭯⋫ᯇҹˈ㔍⋑ᴹэ
∛࿕ॿǃ䘰䇙Ⲵ։ൠǄ

 ᙆѫѹ⣟㖚ѕ䟽ডᇣҶ਴᯿㗔ՇⲴ⭏ભᆹޘǄӾӺᒤᡰਁ⭏ⲴĀgāĀgāࡠĀgā
᳤࣋ ᙆṸԦⴻˈ᳤ ࠶ᆀ᡻⇥ᶱަ↻ᗽǃԕᵰӪѪ᰾⺞ᤷੁⴞḷˈ㻛ᵰᇣⲴᰒᴹ㔤੮ቄ᯿൘޵Ⲵ
ᰐ䗌㗔Շҏᴹഭ䱵⑨ᇒǄ䘉Ӌ᳤࣋ ᙆ㹼ᖴˈᱟሩӪᵳⲴѕ䟽䐥䐿ˈᱟሩ⌅ࡦሺѕⲴѕ䟽᥁ᡈˈᱟ
ሩ᮷᰾〙ᒿⲴѕ䟽ᦏᇣˈᱟިරⲴ৽⽮Պǃ৽Ӫ㊫ǃ৽᮷᰾Ⲵ ᙆѫѹ㹼ᖴˈᗵᇊՊਇࡠц⭼к⡡
ྭ઼ᒣⲴഭᇦ઼Ӫ≁Ⲵᕪ⛸䉤䍓઼୮ᔳǄ⧠ᇎҏ޽а⅑䆖⽪ᡁԜˈ᳤࣋ ᙆ⍫ࣘᐢ㓿ᡀѪ⹤ൿѝഭ
৺ᯠ⮶⽮Պっᇊᴰ⧠ᇎǃᴰⴤ᧕Ⲵᐘབྷေ㛱Ǆ

 
Example 8: Western double-standard on China’s terrorist threat (Case 4, Economics Daily) 
㓿⍾ᰕᣕ
ѝॾޘഭᯠ䰫ᐕ֌㘵ॿՊ䍏䍓Ӫਁ㺘䈸䈍ᤷࠪ䜘࠶㾯ᯩჂփሩᰶ᰾ѕ䟽᳤࣋ ᙆһԦᣕ䚃࡛ᴹ⭘ᗳ
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
ᯠॾ⽮ेӜ ᴸ ᰕ⭥>Ă@ ᴸ ᰕᲊˈӁইᰶ᰾⚛䖖ㄉਁ⭏ѕ䟽᳤࣋ ᙆһԦˈ ᙆ࠶ᆀ↻ᗽൠ
⸽ᵰᰐ䗌㗔Շˈⴞࡽᐢ䙐ᡀ  Ӫ䙷䳮ǃ ӪਇՔǄѝഭ਴᯿Ӫ≁઼ഭ䱵⽮Պ䲿ণሩ↔⅑ѕ䟽᳤࣋
 ᙆһԦҸԕᕪ⛸䉤䍓Ǆ❦㘼ˈᴹӋ㾯ᯩჂփত㖄亮ᴰสᵜⲴᯠ䰫߶ࡉˈ൘ᣕ䚃ѝᘱᓖ᳗᱗ˈትᗳ
ਥ⍻ˈ࡛ᴹ⭘ᗳǄ∄ྲˈ㖾ഭᴹ㓯⭥㿶ᯠ䰫㖁˄&11˅൘ᣕ䚃ѝሶ ᙆ࠶ᆀᢃкᕅਧ˗㖾㚄⽮൘⴨ޣ
ᣕ䚃ѝ࣐кѝഭĀᇈᯩᡰ〠Ⲵ ᙆ࠶ᆀā䘉аࡽ㔰˗ǉ㓭㓖ᰦᣕǊǉॾⴋ亯䛞ᣕǊ৺䐟䘿⽮ㅹჂփ
ሶ ᙆ࠶ᆀ〠ѪĀ᭫ࠫ㘵āĀ◰䘋࠶ᆀāㅹǄ㤡ഭᒯ᫝ޜਨ˄%%&˅нӵሶ᳤࣋ ᙆ㻝ࠫйњ䇽࣐к
ᕅਧˈ㘼ф䘈ᕪ䈳ަᡰᕅ⭘Ⲵѝഭᇈᯩᣕ䚃Āᵚ㓿䇱ᇎāǄᴤᴹ⭊㘵ˈ㖾㚄⽮൘䘹ᤙᙗᕅ⭘Ḁਇ䇯
㘵Ⲵ䈍ᰦˈㄏ༠〠Āᓄ䇙㔤੮ቄӪ⤜・āǄ

䈸䈍䈤ˈᗵ享ᤷࠪⲴᱟˈབྷ䟿һᇎݵ࠶䇱᰾ˈᰶ᰾⚛䖖ㄉਁ⭏Ⲵ䘉䎧їᗳ⯵⣲Ⲵ᳤㹼ˈᱟ䎔㼨㼨Ⲵ
᳤࣋ ᙆ⣟㖚ˈ⣟㖚㘵৽Ӫ㊫ǃ৽᮷᰾ǃ৽⽮ՊⲴ↻᳤ᵜ䍘᳤䵢ᰐ䚇ˈ䘉Չ᳤ᗂᱟнᣈнᢓⲴ ᙆ
࠶ᆀǄնᱟˈаੁ൘৽ ઼Ӫᵳ䰞仈кਛᗇᴰ૽ǃḷῌᇒ㿲ⵏᇎⲴ䜘࠶㾯ᯩჂփত䳶փĀཡ᰾āˈ
⭊㠣Ѫ ᙆ࠶ᆀⲴ↻᳤㹼ᖴ䘋㹼䗙ᣔǃራ᢮ᢈ䗎Ǆ䘉⿽ڊ⌅᰾ᱮᱟৼ䟽ḷ߶ˈ䘍㛼ᯠ䰫ᇒ㿲ޜ↓৏
ࡉˈ㕪ѿ䎧⸱ⲴჂփ㙼ъ䚃ᗧǄѝഭᒯབྷᯠ䰫ᐕ֌㘵ሩ↔㺘⽪ᕪ⛸᝔មǄ>Ă@
 
 
Example 9: The social values of stability, unity and economic growth (Case 2, Xinjiang Daily) 
ᯠ⮶ᰕᣕ
ഒ㔃っᇊᱟᯠ⮶਴᯿Ӫ≁Ⲵṩᵜ࡙⳺ᡰ൘
㠚⋫४≁ငᇇᮉተѫԫተ䮯ੀቄᒢgⳞ䗮

ǏǄǄǄǐᐘབྷⲴਁኅਈॆˈᰐан൘ঠ䇱ѝഭޡӗފⲴՏབྷˈ⽮ՊѫѹࡦᓖⲴՈ䎺ˈᰐанᱟފ
Ⲵ≁᯿ᇇᮉ᭯ㆆⲴާփփ⧠Ǆ䮯ᵏⲴশਢᇎ䐥䇱᰾ˈ≁᯿ഒ㔃ǃ⽮Պっᇊˈᱟ਴᯿Ӫ≁ޡ਼Ⲵṩᵜ
࡙⳺ᡰ൘Ǆ⋑ᴹഒ㔃っᇊ䘉њࡽᨀᶑԦˈӰѸһᛵҏᒢнᡀˈᐢ㓿ਆᗇⲴਁኅᡀ᷌ҏՊཡ৫ˈᴤн
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Appendix 3 
 
--- 1. Indicator questions for framing analysis --- 
Explanation: For the indicator questions, see appendix 2 ’indicator questions for framing analysis’. The 
percentage values in the table denote the quantity of articles for the given answer in relation to the sample 
article number of each case. For instance, the answer to question signals that 87% of the sample articles on 
case 1 answered ‘yes’ to the question on whether the report mainly classifies the reported incident as act of 
terrorism. Prevalent changes in framing are highlighted and discussed further in chapter 6. 
Table A3– 1: Indicator question answers by case 
Question Answer Case 1 Case 
2 
Case 
3 
Case 
4 
Case 
5 
Case 
6 
Case 
7 
Case 
8 
1 Yes 87% 92% 90% 94% 94% 96% 92% 95% 
2 Yes 23% 18% 16% 12% 13% 10% 8% 12% 
3 Yes 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
4 Yes 61% 65% 69% 68% 72% 68% 66% 70% 
5 Yes 51% 30% 48% 41% 44% 39% 36% 26% 
6 Stability 18% 18% 16% 16% 17% 12% 18% 15% 
 National unity 11% 13% 14% 7% 6% 9% 16% 13% 
 Economic 
growth 
12% 11% 10% 8% 9% 6% 13% 8% 
 CCP leadership 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 More than one 37% 41% 47% 50% 46% 58% 33% 47% 
 Other 9% 2% 5% 8% 8% 5% 10% 5% 
7 Injustice & 
gravity 
61% 55% 53% 65% 61% 61% 56% 52% 
 Extremism-
phobia 
44% 41% 35% 58% 64% 61% 63% 55% 
 Demonization 22% 16% 12% 29% 24% 26% 20% 24% 
 Adversarial 43% 30% 48% 52% 54% 51% 48% 48% 
 Aptness 19% 18% 24% 26% 27% 24% 21% 20% 
 Securitisation  16% 10% 15% 26% 29% 28% 18% 13% 
 other 5% 8% 5% 0% 4% 0% 8% 10% 
8 Yes 25% 20% 32% 37% 39% 40% 27% 22% 
9 Yes 0% 0% 0% 12% 15% 13% 8% 0% 
10 Average 4.6 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.2 5.4 5.8 
11 Stability 65% 57% 62% 64% 70% 66% 71% 66% 
 National unity 44% 40% 38% 48% 54% 53% 54% 56% 
 Economic 
growth 
57% 54% 42% 41% 43% 40% 36% 40% 
 Rule of law 0% 0% 0% 13% 16% 14% 0% 0% 
 Other 13% 14% 8% 6% 4% 6% 0% 0% 
12 Yes 3% 0% 5% 7% 8% 8% 6% 0% 
13 Yes 6% 5% 2% 2% 0% 2% 0% 0% 
14 Yes 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
15 Yes 34% 27% 32% 38% 35% 36% 28% 32% 
16 Yes 7% 8% 10% 48% 53% 57% 56% 52% 
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--- 2. Full R output for similarity test – 
Explanation: List of Pearson’s product moment correlation tests between case 1 and cases 
2 to 8. 
Table A3 – 2: Similarity of news content across cases 
Case 1 and case 2: 
t = 56.118, df = 3651, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Alternative hypothesis:  
True correlation is not equal to 0 
95 percent confidence interval: 0.6627159 
0.6975558 
Sample estimates: cor.: 0.6805203  
 
Case 1 and case 6: 
t = 88.001, df = 6859, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Alternative hypothesis: 
True correlation is not equal to 0 
95 percent confidence interval: 0.7169118 
0.7391470 
Sample estimates: cor.: 0.728221  
 
Case 1 and case 3: 
t = 45.063, df = 4665, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Alternative hypothesis:  
True correlation is not equal to 0 
95 percent confidence interval: 0.5303954 
0.5703851 
Sample estimates: cor.: 0.5507062  
 
Case 1 and case 7: 
t = 40.268, df = 3716, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Alternative hypothesis:  
True correlation is not equal to 0 
95 percent confidence interval: 0.5283886 
0.5731626 
Sample estimates: cor.: 0.5511722  
 
Case 1 and case 4: 
t = 66.773, df = 7902, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Alternative hypothesis:  
True correlation is not equal to 0 
95 percent confidence interval: 0.5863107 
0.6145035 
Sample estimates: cor.: 0.6005937  
 
Case 1 and case 8: 
t = 58.529, df = 4139, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Alternative hypothesis:  
True correlation is not equal to 0 
95 percent confidence interval: 0.6559256 
0.6892712 
Sample estimates: cor.: 0.6729402 
 
Case 1 and case 5: 
t = 89.917, df = 7176, p-value < 2.2e-16 
Alternative hypothesis:  
True correlation is not equal to 0 
95 percent confidence interval: 0.7167975 
0.7385601 
Sample estimates: cor.: 0.727862  
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-- 3. Structural topic modelling: Model diagnostics for estimation of number of topics -- 
 
Explanation: As part of pre-processing the data, features were trimmed off that were very rare (less than 
7.5%) to decrease statistical noise. For exploring the best fitted number of topics (called ‘K’), model 
diagnostics were run with various K’s. Below the diagnostic tests are illustrated for K=3,4,6, which shows 
K=4 as balance between quantity of residuals, exclusivity and semantic coherence.  
 
 
Figure A3-1: Model diagnostics for structural topic modelling 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
